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Introduction and Executive Summary 
 
Introduction 
 
i. Azerbaijan is now more than 12 years into a transition process that commenced 
immediately after the country became independent.  As elsewhere in the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) the process in Azerbaijan can be characterized as reflecting three transitions 
rolled into one: 
 
i. A political transition – from a highly controlled centralized political system to a 
more decentralized and democratic form of government; 
ii. An institutional transition – from the institutional framework of central planning 
towards the institutions of a market economy; and 
iii. An economic transition – involving the disintegration of the highly integrated 
economic space of the FSU, with the resultant disruptions in trade, financial and 
labor market connections. 
 
Figure 1 
Changes in Real Output – Azerbaijan 
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ii. For each of these areas there have been broadly two stages of transition in the 
FSU countries: 
 
i. A first stage of economic decline, involving the disintegration and destruction 
of existing political, institutional and economic relations; 
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ii. Followed by a stage of recovery, involving rebuilding, reform and integration 
with the world economy. 
 
iii. As shown in Figure 1 above, Azerbaijan initially experienced five years of 
dramatic economic decline starting in 1990, losing almost 60 % of its measured GDP.  It 
then began to experience a turnaround which accelerated in 2000 as Azerbaijan started to 
benefit from both increases in oil export revenues as a result of (a) the price increases that 
began in 1999 and (b) the vigorous economic recovery that began for the region as a 
whole in 1999 and is set to continue in 2004 and beyond.  However, GDP in 2003 was 
still about 20 % below its 1990 level in real terms. 
 
iv. The energy sector has a critical role to play in the continuing transition process.  
The energy sector plays a significant role in the overall economy of Azerbaijan, as in 
other transition countries, and the World Bank’s experience suggests that without energy 
sector reform and financial viability the transition process is much more difficult and 
delayed.  The objective of this report, therefore, is to outline the issues and options facing 
Azerbaijan as it develops and implements its agenda for reform of the energy sector in 
order to inform the country’s dialogue on this subject and the associated decision making 
process. 
 
v. The report focuses on seven key topics and each section of the report can be read 
as a standalone document, as a result there is some duplication between sections.  Each 
section includes a summary followed by a more detailed discussion of the issues and 
options.  The seven sections are as follows: 
 
• Oil Revenue Management 
• The Petroleum Sector 
• The Gas Sector 
• The Power Sector 
• The Regulatory Environment 
• Energy and the Environment 
• Social Issues in the Energy Sector 
 
vi. In addition three appendices are included.  The first discusses the factors 
influencing oil prices, the second outlines the liberalization process and the regulatory 
models adopted for the gas sector in a number of locations and the third summarizes The 
State Program for the Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector of the Azerbaijan 
Republic (2005 – 2015) which has been endorsed by the government. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Avoiding the “Resource Curse” 
 
1. At the time of independence, Azerbaijan inherited a significant hydrocarbon 
resource base and an extensive domestic network for transmission and distribution of 
electricity and natural gas.  Azerbaijan has been very effective in attracting foreign direct 
investment to develop its hydrocarbon resources and major development programs are 
underway.  This offers the prospect of considerable wealth generation.  Based on the 
World Bank’s 2004 oil price forecast1, fiscal revenues related to oil and gas development 
are projected to total over US$70 billion for the period 2004 through 2024. 
 
2. Oil revenues, however, are finite.  Absent any new discoveries, Azerbaijan’s oil 
production is projected to peak in 2010 at about 71 million tons.  Oil and gas related 
fiscal revenues will also peak at that time and both production and fiscal revenues will 
subsequently begin a steady decline. 
 
Figure 2 
Azerbaijan Revenue Contributions
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 Source: World Bank analysis 
 
3. With these revenues in prospect, a critical challenge will be finding ways to avoid 
the “resource curse” that affects many resource rich countries that have failed to achieve 
the rates of economic growth that their non resource rich neighbors have attained.  
Azerbaijan should seek to deploy these revenues in a fashion that promotes the sustained 
development of the non-oil economy.  At the same time the government needs to be 
                                                 
1 The World Bank’s 2004 forecast for oil prices was $39/barrel in 2004 dropping to $36/barrel in 2005, $32 
in 2006 and then declining to $26/barrel in the 2009-2010 timeframe. 
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cognizant of the fact that the high revenue generating window may be relatively small 
and it, therefore, needs to develop and implement a strategy for oil revenue management. 
 
4. The key to avoiding the “resource curse” is good governance of the oil revenues.  
An initial element of good governance is a high level of transparency with regard to both 
the sources of the oil revenues and their uses.  In establishing the State Oil Fund of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) Azerbaijan has taken an important first step towards 
effective governance of oil revenues.  Of particular note are the transparency 
requirements associated with SOFAZ’ operations.   
 
5. Oil related fiscal revenues, however, currently flow to both SOFAZ and directly 
to the budget (see Figure 3 below) and there is much less transparency associated with 
the funds that flow directly to the budget.  This is particularly the case with regard to tax 
payments by SOCAR, the State owned oil and gas company, which are associated with 
its operating activities2.  SOCAR is moving forward with plans to adopt international 
financial reporting standards, but this will take some time.  In the meantime, it would be 
appropriate for SOCAR and the Ministry of Finance to work out a mechanism for more 
transparent reporting of SOCAR’s financial results. 
 
Figure 3 
Azerbaijan Oil Revenues
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 Source: World Bank analysis 
 
                                                 
2 SOCAR makes fiscal contributions from both the operating activities it manages and from holdings in 
production sharing agreements and joint ventures.  There is considerable transparency around the “holding 
company” interests since these flow either to SOFAZ or into an escrow account required to support 
SOCAR’s borrowing for its share of investment in the Shah Deniz and SCP gas development and gas 
pipeline investments.  There is, however, very little transparency around SOCAR’s other revenue 
generating activities.  
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6. One option available to the government to improve the overall transparency of its 
oil related fiscal revenues is to channel all these revenues through a single agency.  
SOFAZ would be the logical agency to receive the revenues.  Channeling all these 
revenues through SOFAZ would ensure a high level of transparency around both the oil 
revenues and their uses. 
 
7. The second critical element of good governance is to ensure that the revenues are 
appropriately deployed.  The centerpiece of an expenditure program should be a medium 
term expenditure framework (MTEF) designed to accommodate the absorptive capacity 
of Azerbaijan’s economy and focus on the non oil sectors of the economy according to 
the priorities set out in the State Program for Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Development (SPPRED). 
 
8. Azerbaijan’s fiscal outlook suggests that adequate funds will be available to fund 
the MTEF.  Budget allocations should be based on the MTEF and should not be impacted 
in the short term by oil price fluctuations. 
 
SOCAR’s Function 
 
9. SOCAR is a major State owned asset.  As the equity owner of SOCAR, the 
government faces a number of specific challenges: (i) To effect a clear separation of the 
regulatory functions currently performed by SOCAR as the de facto “competent 
authority” dealing with the upstream oil sector and the commercial functions SOCAR 
performs as an operator in the sector; (ii) To ensure the State receives the full benefit 
associated with SOCAR’s equity interest in production sharing agreements (PSAs) and 
joint ventures; (iii) To facilitate the transition of SOCAR from a Soviet style State owned 
enterprise to a commercially focused organization operating in accordance with best 
international practice; (iv) To ensure SOCAR’s ongoing financial viability; and (v) to 
address the legacy of environmental problems that were inherited from the Soviet Union 
along with the hydrocarbon assets. 
 
10. In order to address these challenges a restructuring of SOCAR’s operations will 
be required and the government has made a commitment to restructure the company.  
There are, however, certain decisions that the government should make with regard to the 
restructuring: 
 
i. The “competent authority” role that SOCAR performs should be established as a 
separate agency reporting directly to the top levels of government.  The 
government, however, will need to determine the exact nature of and reporting 
structure for this agency. 
 
ii. In addition to the regulatory role it plays, SOCAR also has a minority ownership 
role in a number of production sharing agreements and joint ventures.  These, in 
effect, represent State ownership in these activities that is effected through 
SOCAR.  The government will need to decide what ownership arrangement will 
ensure that the State receives the full benefit associated with these ownership 
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interests.  Options to be considered include (i) transferring the holdings into a 
separate holding company, which would be the optimum approach; (ii) 
maintaining the status quo; and (iii) allowing SOCAR full control over the 
holding’s revenues. 
 
iii. An important early part of the restructuring process is to develop and implement a 
plan to transition to international financial reporting standards.  The costs of this 
transition will not be insignificant and appropriate provision should be made in 
SOCAR’s own budget and, as appropriate, the State budget to cover these costs. 
 
iv. Sustained viability of SOCAR’s core operations is predicated on eliminating the 
subsidies that SOCAR now provides the Azerbaijan economy.  This can be 
effected by bringing prices for the refined products and the gas supplied by 
SOCAR to the domestic market up to levels that reflect their true economic value.  
The government will need to make a determination as to how that can be best 
effected and this should be an element of the medium term tariff policy the 
government is committed to introduce.  In the meantime, provisions should be 
made in the State budget to compensate SOCAR for shortfalls in recovering the 
full economic value of the products it delivers to the domestic market. 
 
v. There is an urgent need to address the legacy of environmental problems 
associated with over 100 years of oil production in Azerbaijan.  Onshore oil 
contamination affects a region of about 100 square kilometers and is one of the 
most serious examples of environmental degradation in the country.  A 
determination is needed with regard to both liability for past contamination and 
responsibility for effecting the clean up.  Although SOCAR has legal 
responsibility for the land, the land pollution in many of these sites was generated 
as a result of practices that occurred prior to SOCAR assuming this legal 
responsibility.  It would not be reasonable, therefore to assign this liability to 
SOCAR and the net cost of clean up should, therefore, be assumed as a budget 
responsibility.  SOCAR, however, is the logical choice to oversee the clean up.   
 
There is, however, a strong likelihood that such a program could pay for itself 
through (a) the appreciation in the value of the land that is cleaned up and made 
available for other uses and (b) as a result of reclamation of oil and of steel which 
can be resold.  Consideration should be given to involving the private sector in the 
clean-up process.  Insofar as oil reclamation is concerned, the current high oil 
price environment has created a window of opportunity to attract private sector 
participants to assist with remediation measures being compensated, at least in 
part, through the proceeds of reclamation.  Land reclamation and sale, however, 
offers a much larger potential opportunity.  It is important, therefore to establish 
the principle that the benefits resulting from land sales and other reclamation 
proceeds accrue to the entity taking on responsibility to finance the clean up.  
Such a program, which would extend over a ten year timeframe, also has the 
potential to create new job opportunities, some of which could be used to mitigate 
the impact of rationalizing SOCAR’s heavily over-staffed workforce. 
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Delivering Quality Electricity and Gas Utility Services to the Domestic Market 
 
11. Although Azerbaijan inherited extensive power and gas networks capable of 
delivering electricity and gas of acceptable quality to almost the entire population, lack of 
investment and limited maintenance have resulted in significant deterioration in these 
networks such that the country is now unable to meet domestic demand for power and the 
potential demand that exists for gas.  In addition, air quality problems are increasing as a 
result of (a) the use of more polluting fuels since gas is not as widely available as 
previously and (b) the flaring and venting of natural gas. The key challenges facing the 
government in these sectors are (i) to restore and maintain acceptable levels of service 
throughout the country and (ii) to ensure the country secures optimum benefits from its 
assets in these sectors. 
 
12. Both sectors are increasingly at risk of systemic collapse.  This risk could be 
significantly reduced by rehabilitating facilities and investing in modern control systems.  
Total investment requirements for publicly owned assets in these sectors are estimated in 
the range of US$1 billion for gas and between US$ 1.95 billion and US$ 3.6 billion for 
power3, of which over US$1.36 billion are urgently required ($450 million for gas and 
$910 million for power).  These investment requirements cover gas treatment, 
transmission, storage and distribution (including funds to meter all customers) and power 
generation and transmission.  They also include funds for recovery of gas that is currently 
being flared by SOCAR. 
 
13. Transferring gas distribution activities to the private sector would reduce these 
public sector requirements by about $100 to $150 million and would reduce the urgent 
funding requirements by about $30 to $50 million.  Similarly, privatizing power 
generation would reduce the public sector requirements by $1,720 to $3,370 million and 
the urgent requirements by almost $680 million.  There would still remain, however a 
need for public sector funding totaling about  $1.08 billion, with over $630 million being 
deemed urgent.  The government, therefore, needs to establish a program to meet these 
investment needs and ensure funding is available. 
 
14. Ideally, these investment needs should be funded from the proceeds generated by 
the sectors.  However, both sectors fall well short of covering their financial needs.  Both 
sectors experience excess losses and are subject to tariffs that are well below the levels 
necessary to recover the true economic value of the gas and electricity supplied.  Payment 
levels are also an issue.  However, here, there is a distinction between the power sector 
and the gas sector.  The management contract arrangements in the power sector 
incorporate a provision allowing the management contractors to defer amounts payable 
for electricity purchased from Azerenergy.  In 2004, for example, Azerenergy only 
received payment for 40% to 45% of the electricity it supplied to the distribution 
companies.  Hence, collection levels are not directly under Azerenergy’s control.  
However, in the gas sector collection levels are under Azerigaz’ control. 
 
                                                 
3 Power sector investment estimates up to 2015. 
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15. Under the terms of the electricity distribution management contracts, payments to 
Azerenergy for electricity will continue to increase reaching 100% by 2010.  In the gas 
sector the government is considering a similar form of private sector involvement and 
this would be a mechanism to address the collections issue over time as well as a means 
of transferring responsibility for distribution investments to the private sector. 
 
16. The government is also considering private sector involvement in power 
generation.  This, however, should be appropriately sequenced.  Azerenergy should be 
unbundled and the generation assets should be corporatized.  Rehabilitation of the 
transmission network should be initiated and the introduction of a SCADA system should 
be followed by the establishment of a dispatch protocol.  The government should avoid 
the temptation to enter into arrangements with individual generators that could result in 
contingent liabilities and a sub-optimal cost of electricity supply. 
 
17. SOCAR is acting as the “single buyer” of gas for the domestic market.  In the 
future, significant volumes of associated gas from the ACG fields will be supplied to 
SOCAR.  In addition SOCAR will purchase 1.5 BCM of gas from Shah Deniz.  The Shah 
Deniz gas will be subject to a supplier nomination arrangement (i.e. the supplier will have 
considerable control over the timing and volume of gas deliveries).  There is, therefore, 
the potential for considerable fluctuations in gas supply levels and the only way SOCAR 
will be able to manage this will be through the use of  a sizable volume of gas storage.   
The investments required to rehabilitate the two underground gas storage facilities in 
order to be able to handle these gas supplies are significant – on the order of US$272 
million.  The government will have to secure the funds to undertake this rehabilitation 
and will need to assess whether this can be effected more easily by transferring the gas 
storage assets, along with the responsibility for rehabilitation, to SOCAR. 
 
18. In order to ensure additional private sector involvement in these sectors 
appropriate incentives will have to be provided, and should be supported by an 
independent and competitive regulatory regime.  One of the key aspects that is needed is 
an assurance that tariffs will be sufficient to recover the full economic value of the gas 
and electricity delivered to the domestic market. 
 
19. The government is committed to the development and implementation of a 
medium term tariff policy that will ultimately raise prices to levels that allow recovery of 
the full economic value of the gas and electricity supplied to the market.  Ideally, an 
effective social safety net should be in place to ameliorate the impact of tariff increases 
on the poorest segments of the population.  Work needs to continue to put such a safety 
net in place.  However, given the improvements in wages and pensions that have been 
implemented, an initial increase in gas4 and electricity tariffs should be affordable.  For 
example, estimates of the potential impact of higher electricity tariffs suggest that a 50% 
increase in the electricity tariff would result in an average income loss of just under AZM 
10,000/month (approximately $2).  Since the increase in the minimum wage that took 
place in July 2004 and the increase in pensions that occurred in 2003 were both about 
                                                 
4 On November 2nd 2004, gas prices were increased.  Details are given in the section of the report on the 
Gas Sector. 
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four times this amount, a 50% increase in the unit price of electricity should be 
affordable.  Outside Baku, the impact could be mitigated by adjusting downwards the 
norms used for billing un-metered customers.  Such a measure would be appropriate in 
view of the fact that a comparison of these norms with consumption levels in areas which 
are metered (Baku and Sumgayit) suggests these norms may be disproportionately high5. 
 
20. Low tariffs and shortfalls in collections translate into the provision of subsidies to 
consumers of gas and electricity.  At the beginning of the economic transition period that 
followed the break up of the Soviet Union, energy supplies throughout the FSU were 
heavily subsidized.  The various FSU countries have had differing degrees of success in 
reducing these subsidies6.  Moldova, Belarus and Armenia have been the most successful 
in eliminating subsidies.  Azerbaijan has been among the least successful of the countries.  
In 2002, Azerbaijan recovered a lower portion of its gas costs than all FSU countries with 
the exception of Uzbekistan and in the power sector its cost recovery performance only 
exceeded that of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.  Since then, however, Uzbekistan has 
increased tariffs significantly allowing it to increase its percentage of cost recovery. 
 
21. In the Bank’s dialogue with its client countries the importance of identifying and 
monitoring performance indicators relative to the reforms being introduced is strongly 
emphasized.  In looking at a country’s economy as a whole there are a number of well 
established measures to assess performance.  At the sectoral level, however, such 
measures are not always as clearly defined.  In the energy sector, for example, it is 
difficult to measure precisely how well a country is meeting the key challenges of energy 
sector reform: 
 
• Creating an effective legislative and regulatory framework; 
• Attracting investment; 
• Creating a competitive market; 
• Introducing good governance; and 
• Assuring financial viability. 
 
The Bank has concluded that perhaps the most effective measure to consider is the level 
of subsidies (both explicit and implicit) provided by the energy sector to the economy as 
a whole.  This is, in effect, a simple measure of the financial viability of the sector.  But it 
also broadly measures whether the sector will be able to sustain and expand its services 
over time, whether it allocates scarce resources efficiently, and whether it relies on quasi-
fiscal flows that could endanger the macroeconomic stability of the country.  It is, 
therefore, important that the government monitor the level of subsidies in the energy 
sector and continue to adopt measures to reduce these subsidies. 
 
22. The introduction of a medium term tariff policy and a continued focus on 
improving collections will help bring down the level of subsidies in the sector.  However, 
                                                 
5 World Bank (2004) Ex-Ante Evaluation of Residential Electricity Tariff Reform. 
6 Data is available for 2002 on all FSU countries except Turkmenistan.  It is likely that Azerbaijan’s 
performance is better than that of Turkmenistan in terms of cost recovery of both gas and electricity given 
the very low domestic tariffs that have applied in Turkmenistan. 
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there will likely remain a shortfall in generation by the sector of the funds needed for 
investment (as discussed above).  The government does have the financial capacity to 
support these investments and provision should, therefore, be made in future budgets to 
cover the investment requirements that cannot be met from the sectors’ own cash flows 
pending the elimination of sector subsidies. 
 
Introduction of an Independent Regulator 
 
23. The introduction of an independent regulator is an important component of energy 
sector reform.  The government has made a commitment to establish a regulatory agency 
for the energy sector.  It is essential that such an agency be solidly supported by 
legislation and that the structure and functions of the agency conform to good 
international practice, in particular: 
 
• The agency should be and should be seen to be independent; 
• The agency should be mandated to promote improved transparency and 
accountability; 
• A key role for the agency will be establishing and monitoring quality standards; 
• The agency should also have powers to promote competition and prevent anti-
competitive behavior. 
 
24. The government’s plans contemplate the full implementation of the new 
regulatory regime by mid-2006.  In the meantime, a transition plan should be developed 
for the period prior to implementation of the new regime.  A step that is urgently required 
is passage of legislation establishing the regulatory agency.  However, in order to craft 
this legislation a number of government decisions are required.  The specific issues to be 
addressed are as follows: 
 
• In which branch (executive, legislative or judicial) should the agency be located? 
• How should the Commissioners be appointed? 
• How will the agency be funded? 
• Who should be responsible for issuing licenses? 
• What level of tariff setting responsibility will be assigned to the regulatory 
agency? 
• What form of appeal process should be instituted? 
 
These issues are discussed in more detail in the body of the report.  Once the government 
has taken a position on each of these issues, legislation can be drafted to conform to the 
government’s view. 
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I - Oil Revenue Management in Azerbaijan 
 
Summary 
 
I-i. Azerbaijan is endowed with a significant hydrocarbon resource base and the 
potential to generate substantial fiscal revenues from this resource base.  The key 
challenge facing the government is to ensure the optimal utilization of the revenues 
generated by these resources.  This section addresses this challenge and outlines some of 
the issues and options to be considered by the government.  The issues range from 
revenue collection, to investment of assets and utilization of proceeds. 
 
I-ii. The conclusions and recommendations of this section may briefly be summarized 
as follows: 
 
• Oil revenues are finite.  Absent any major new discoveries, Azerbaijan’s oil 
production is projected to peak in 2010 at about 71 million tons.  Oil and gas related 
fiscal revenues will also peak at that time and both production and fiscal revenues 
will subsequently begin a steady decline.  The government needs to develop and 
implement a strategy for oil revenue management.  In doing so, however, it needs to 
be cognizant of the fact that the high revenue generating window may be relatively 
small. 
 
• Judicious use of oil revenues requires a broad institutional support structure on 
the revenue and expenditure sides, brought together by the Budget Systems 
Law.  Equal weight needs to be put into safeguarding revenues, management of 
investments and state assets, and into judiciously drawing down the state assets for 
the purpose of undertaking public expenditures. 
 
• Establishment of an oil fund (SOFAZ) has been a very sensible first step in 
revenue management.  The government made an important step towards effective 
oil revenue management with the establishment of the State Oil Fund of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ).  SOFAZ has key roles to play as a savings fund as well as a 
sterilization mechanism to combat Dutch disease.  It is in the forefront of 
demonstrating Azerbaijan’s commitment to oil revenue transparency.   
 
• Clarification of SOCAR’s internal operations is necessary.  SOCAR makes fiscal 
revenue contributions from both the operating activities it manages and from its 
holdings in production sharing agreements (PSAs) and joint ventures.  There is 
considerable transparency around the “holding company” interests, but this is not the 
case with the financial status of the operating activities.  SOCAR is moving forward 
with plans to adopt international financial reporting standards, but this will take some 
time.  In the meantime it would be appropriate for SOCAR and the Ministry of 
Finance to work out a mechanism for more transparent reporting of SOCAR’s 
financial results. 
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• Essential components of a good expenditure management framework are the 
SPPRED and the MTEF.   The centerpiece of an expenditure program should be a 
medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) designed to accommodate the 
absorptive capacity of Azerbaijan’s economy and focus on growing the non oil 
sectors of the economy according to the priorities set out in the State Program for 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Development (SPPRED). 
 
• Budget allocations should be based on the MTEF and should not be impacted in 
the short term by oil price fluctuations.  Azerbaijan’s fiscal outlook suggests that 
adequate funds will be available to fund the MTEF.  The MTEF should, therefore, 
dictate overall budget allocations and, based on the use of a realistic oil price forecast, 
dictate the level of budget financing allocations from SOFAZ.  Over the longer term, 
significant changes in the oil price outlook may necessitate changes in the MTEF, but 
the MTEF should still dictate budget allocations. 
 
• The government needs to decide whether to continue channeling oil-related fiscal 
revenues both directly to the budget and to SOFAZ, or to channel all oil-related 
fiscal revenues through a single agency.  If a single agency approach were chosen, 
SOFAZ would be the logical choice.  Such an arrangement would simplify oil 
revenue management in certain ways: (i) Revenues flowing directly to the budget 
would come only from the non oil sector and would be less subject to oil price 
volatility; (ii) SOFAZ would maintain its unique savings role and reinforce its role as 
a buffer separating commercial oil extraction decisions from public expenditure 
decisions; (iii) Transfers to the budget from SOFAZ would be dictated by the MTEF 
and would not be directly related to the level of oil-related revenues – indeed the 
budget would not need to make a specific oil revenues forecast; and (iv) such an 
arrangement would ensure a high level of transparency around the oil revenues and 
their uses.  
 
• In the event the government continues the existing two track system for 
channeling revenues, oil revenue related surpluses should only be held by the 
Ministry of Finance until the end of the budget year and should then be 
transferred to SOFAZ.  Azerbaijan has, in the past, used fairly conservative oil price 
assumptions in projecting its budget revenues.  However, a consequence of 
conservative price projections that is now being experienced is the generation of a 
sizable budget surplus.  The Ministry of Finance has retained this surplus in a fund it 
describes as a “stabilization fund”.  Retaining the surplus within a budget year is 
entirely appropriate and a necessary step.  However, any remaining surplus funds 
should be transferred to SOFAZ at the end of each budget year.  In the future, the 
government should use realistic price projections but with a tendency to err on the 
conservative side.  Excessively conservative price projections would lead to higher 
up-front allocations from SOFAZ to the budget than needed and this, in turn, would 
result in excessive funds accruing within the Ministry of Finance’s “stabilization 
fund”. 
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Oil Revenue Management in Azerbaijan 
 
The Structure of Oil Revenues 
 
I-1. At the time of independence, Azerbaijan inherited a significant hydrocarbon 
resource base.  At the end of 2003, proven oil reserves were estimated at 7 billion barrels 
and proven gas reserves were estimated at 1.37 trillion cubic meters7.  The country has 
been extremely effective in attracting foreign direct investment to the sector and major 
development programs are underway.  Even though there has been only one major 
discovery in the last 10 years – the Shah Deniz gas field – a significant increase in oil 
production is anticipated in the next several years (see Figure I-1 below).  However, 
absent a major new discovery, production is projected to peak in 2010 at about 71 million 
tons and then experience a steady decline, dropping back to less than 20 million tons - the 
level projected for 2005 – by 2024.  This means that Azerbaijan may have only a 
relatively limited window during which it will generate very significant oil revenues.  It 
is, therefore, important that Azerbaijan establish and maintain programs that ensure the 
State secures the maximum overall benefit from what may be a relatively short period of 
oil funded prosperity. 
 
Figure I-1 
Azerbaijan Oil Production
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  Source: World Bank analysis 
 
I-2. The projected production increases contemplate a significant capital commitment.  
Table I-1 summarizes the projected capital requirements for the period 2004 through 
2020 for three major projects: (i) the development of Azeri/Chirag/Guneshli (ACG); (ii) 
the development of the Shah Deniz gas field and the SCP gas pipeline; and (iii) the BTC 
oil pipeline.  Capital investments in Azerbaijan for these three projects during this period 
                                                 
7 Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2004 
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are projected to exceed $16 billion, with almost $11 billion of spending projected for the 
five year period 2004 through 2008.   
 
Table I-1 
Projected Capital Requirements 2004 – 2020 ($ Millions) 
Project Total Capital 
Investment 
Capital Investment 
in Azerbaijan 
ACG 
 
Shah Deniz: Upstream 
                     Midstream 
 
 
BTC 
 
Total 
$12,323 
 
$  3,724 
$  1,115 
$  4,839 
 
$  1,401 
 
$18,563 
$12,323 
 
$  3,724 
$     618 
$  3,342 
 
$     336 
 
$16,001 
  Source: ACG, Shah Deniz, BTC 
 
I-3. The significant increase in production will translate into a large increase in fiscal 
revenues.  The Bank’s 2004 oil price forecast projected a price of $39/barrel in 2004, 
dropping to $36/barrel in 2005, $32/barrel in 2006, and declining to a price of $26/barrel 
in the 2009 to 2010 timeframe.  Figure I-2 shows the projected level of fiscal revenues 
from various sources based on this price forecast. 
 
Figure I-2 
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 Source: World Bank analysis 
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I-4. As the chart indicates, fiscal revenues are projected to peak at a level of almost $5 
billion in 2010.  For the period 2004 through 2024, fiscal revenues are projected to total 
over $70 billion.  The main contributor is ACG followed by Shah Deniz. 
 
I-5. Fiscal revenues from the upstream oil and gas sector are channeled to the 
government through the following mechanisms: 
 
i. Proceeds from the sale of profit oil from the production sharing agreements, 
bonus payments, royalties (acreage payments), rental fees for the use of state 
property by foreign companies under oil and gas contracts, revenues generated 
from the sale of assets under contracts signed with foreign companies and other 
revenues from joint activities with foreign companies are all paid to the Oil Fund.  
SOFAZ also retains the revenues generated from the investment of its assets.  It is 
anticipated that dividends payable for the State’s interest (both direct and through 
SOCAR) in the BTC pipeline will be paid to SOFAZ. 
 
ii. Profit tax payments from SOCAR and from the ACG partners, who are required 
to file individual tax returns, are payable directly to the budget. 
 
iii. SOCAR’s earnings from its assigned equity interest in ACG were previously paid 
to the Oil Fund.  At present, however, these are being directed to an escrow 
account to secure the anticipated borrowings to support the State’s investment 
(through SOCAR) in Shah Deniz and the SCP gas pipeline. 
 
I-6. Figure I-3 provides a projection of funds to be paid to SOFAZ and to the budget 
(in this figure, SOCAR’s equity interest in ACG is assumed paid to SOFAZ). 
 
Figure I-3 
Azerbaijan Oil Revenues
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Source: World Bank analysis 
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Revenue Collection and Management  
 
 State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
 
I-7. At the end of 2003, net assets in SOFAZ totaled 3.968 trillion manats, or about 
$815 million.  For the period 2004 through 2024 contributions to SOFAZ (excluding 
investment earnings) are projected to exceed $50 billion.  During the same period, direct 
contributions to the budget are projected to approach $20 billion.  The profile of direct 
contributions to the budget is much flatter than the overall profile, a reflection of the fact 
that, under the tax structure incorporated in the PSA, profit tax payments by the ACG 
partners materialize somewhat later than the large increase in profit oil proceeds that is 
expected to flow to SOFAZ. 
 
I-8. SOFAZ is currently structured as a savings fund8.  Transfers are permitted from 
SOFAZ to the State budget but these are capped in any year at the level of inflows into 
the fund.  The approval of the transfers must also conform to the provisions stipulated in 
the Budget Systems Law.  This has the objective of ensuring that Azerbaijan has a single 
State budget not multiple parallel budgets.  SOFAZ is one of several deficit financing 
sources. Parliament approves the consolidated budget deficit including Oil Fund 
expenditures. 
 
I-9. SOFAZ is required to invest its funds outside Azerbaijan in high quality 
securities.  In addition to protecting the principal in the fund this serves to minimize the 
risk of Dutch disease. 
 
I-10. To date, Azerbaijan has been conservative in the use of the oil revenues 
accumulated in SOFAZ.  The State’s oil revenues, however, do represent an important 
instrument for development of the non oil economy and past analysis undertaken by the 
Bank suggests that Azerbaijan should be prepared to increase the level of outflows from 
SOFAZ in order to help stimulate growth in the non oil economy9.  The government, 
therefore, needs to establish a comprehensive medium term expenditure framework that 
takes account of the absorptive capacity of the economy and is designed to promote non 
oil sector growth.  Should this framework result in an approach that is inconsistent with 
the current SOFAZ rules, appropriate amendments should be made to the rules to 
accommodate the program. 
 
The Use of a Stabilization Fund 
 
I-11. The State budget for 2004 was established using an oil price assumption of 
$20/barrel.  With prices averaging in the high $30s/barrel in 200410, the budget will likely 
generate significant surpluses.  At present, the Ministry of Finance is holding these 
surpluses in a fund it describes as a stabilization fund.  The basic concept of a 
stabilization fund is to allow the budget to accommodate fluctuations in the price of any 
                                                 
8 A summary of the institutional framework for SOFAZ is given in Attachment I-1. 
9 World Bank Public Expenditure Review 2003 
10 The Bank’s November 2004 forecast was for an average price of $39/barrel in 2004. 
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commodity that has a material impact on the budget.  In the case of Azerbaijan, the oil 
price clearly plays a significant role in determining the size of fiscal revenues.  With 2004 
oil prices averaging in the high $30s per barrel, the surplus generated in 2004 versus the 
budget projection would have been on the order of $100 million.   
 
I-12. The Ministry of Finance action raises certain questions including: 
• Should Azerbaijan have a fund that performs a stabilization function? 
• If so, should it be separate from SOFAZ? 
• Should the stabilization function be automatic or should it be subject to specific 
review? 
• Should there be a sunset provision on the time funds remain in a stabilization 
mode and, if so, where should the funds be transferred when the sunset provision 
is invoked? 
 
I-13. The issue of introducing a stabilization function should not be addressed in 
isolation.  Rather it should be considered in conjunction with the need to establish a full-
fledged MTEF that could also set the parameters for any required stabilization 
adjustments.  In the near and medium term the key driver of an MTEF is likely to be the 
absorptive capacity of the economy rather than the availability of funds.  With this in 
mind, the State Oil Fund has the potential to perform such stabilization functions as may 
be necessary. 
 
I-14. Consistent with this approach and within the context of the current method of 
channeling oil revenues, it would be appropriate for the government to continue to use a 
realistic oil pricing assumption in its budget preparation process, but with a tendency to 
err on the conservative side.  This should result in some likelihood that surplus funds 
would be generated by the Ministry of Finance relative to the budget projection, but not 
in excessive amounts.  Surplus funds relative to the budget projection should be 
accounted for and retained by the Ministry of Finance during the budget year.  This 
would enable the Ministry to accommodate a sharp decline in the oil price that might 
occur during a year that could push revenues below the budget projection level for some 
period of time.  At the end of the year, however, any residual surpluses should be 
transferred to the State Oil Fund. Excessively cautious assumptions on the oil price would 
lead to higher up front financing allocations from SOFAZ to the budget than needed and 
this, in turn, would result in excessive funds being accumulated in the Ministry of 
Finance’s stabilization account. 
 
I-15. In the event a stabilization function is retained by the Ministry of Finance, it 
would be preferable to avoid introducing an automatic top up mechanism as and when 
prices drop below the budget forecast level.  Rather, the allocation of make up funds to 
the budget under those circumstances should be subject to specific review and approval. 
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 SOCAR’s Contribution to Fiscal Revenues  
 
I-16. SOCAR’s contributions to fiscal revenues consist of profit taxes related to the 
operations it manages directly and its share of the proceeds associated with equity 
interests in PSAs and joint ventures assigned to it by the State.  The latter is made up of 
both net earnings from the PSAs and joint ventures and profit taxes attributable to 
SOCAR’s share of these ventures.  As has been noted, at present the net earnings 
associated with SOCAR’s interest in ACG are being placed in an escrow account to 
secure the funds that SOCAR will borrow to cover its share of investment in Shah Deniz 
and the SCP gas pipeline.  Figure I-4 below provides a comparison of the projected 
contribution that SOCAR will make to fiscal revenues from both its operating activities 
and its “holding company” activities. 
 
I-17. There is considerable transparency around SOCAR’s holding company activities.  
These ventures are managed by private sector companies, prepare their accounts in 
accordance with international financial reporting standards and submit financial and 
operating information to the various shareholders on a regular basis.  This enables the 
various affected financial agencies in the government to keep close track of the financial 
performance of these enterprises and of SOCAR’s component of that financial 
performance. 
 
Figure I-4 
SOCAR Contributions to Fiscal Revenues
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 Source: World Bank analysis 
 
I-18. The picture is not so clear; however, where SOCAR’s operating activities are 
concerned.  SOCAR is in the very early stages of initiating the process of switching to 
international financial reporting standards.  In the meantime, it is very difficult for the 
government to get a clear picture of SOCAR’s financial performance and of its associated 
tax obligations. 
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I-19. The government has demonstrated its commitment to oil revenue transparency by 
signing on to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).  The State Oil Fund 
and the Ministry of Finance will both have a role to play in complying with EITI.  
SOCAR, however, also needs to take near term action to improve the transparency 
associated with its operating revenues, pending the introduction of international financial 
reporting standards.   
 
 Other Options for Channeling Oil Sector Revenues  
 
I-20. As has been noted, fiscal revenues flow either to the Ministry of Finance or to the 
State Oil Fund.  Figure I-2 shows a sharp increase in oil-related budget revenues starting 
in 2006.  Budget expenditures, however, should be determined by absorptive capacity 
and inter-generational considerations and should increase along a more linear trend.  The 
amount of expenditure financing out of the Oil Fund clearly depends on these oil-related 
budget revenues and, as has been noted above, in the event these oil-related budget 
revenues exceed projections, Ministry of Finance may need to transfer some of the 
budget revenue to SOFAZ at year-end in order not to end up with two parallel funds 
accumulating money. 
 
I-21. As an alternative to having two separate flows of oil-related fiscal revenues, one 
to the budget and one to SOFAZ, an option is to have all the oil sector fiscal revenues 
gathered in one place.  In such event, SOFAZ would be the logical agency.  This would 
simplify oil revenue management in certain ways: 
 
i. Revenues provided directly to the budget would come from the non-oil sector and 
these would be much less subject to the volatility of oil prices.   
ii. SOFAZ would preserve its unique savings role and act a buffer separating 
commercial oil extraction decisions from public expenditure decisions.  It would 
also act as the single location for gathering all the oil-related revenues.   
iii. Transfers to the budget would be dictated by the requirements of the MTEF and 
would not be directly related to the level of oil-related revenues.  Procedures, 
established and followed as they are today, would make the appropriate transfers 
to the budget to finance the objectives of the MTEF.   
iv. In following its own procedures on the publication of data, SOFAZ would be able 
to ensure a high degree of transparency around the entire issue of the source and 
use of all oil-related fiscal revenues. 
 
Utilization of Oil Revenues: the Importance of the SPPRED and the MTEF 
 
I-22. Effective use of Azerbaijan’s oil resources is an integral part of an oil revenue 
management strategy.  Azerbaijan has set out its national development strategy in the 
SPPRED, and is preparing a medium term expenditure framework to prioritize its public 
expenditures.  Maintaining the centrality of the MTEF for the use of oil revenues (as well 
as other revenues) is the principal way to assure prioritization of public expenditures for 
Azerbaijan. 
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I-23.  The government’s decision to budget according to the SPPRED/MTEF priorities, 
under the framework provided by the Budget Systems Law suggests that the government 
correctly wants to maintain a single vehicle for sequencing its reforms and a single listing 
of priority expenditures to implement.  Likewise, with the existence of SOFAZ, the 
maintenance of an oil price stabilization fund beyond a particular budget year is 
unnecessary.   
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Attachment I-1 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Framework for the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOFAZ) 
Supervision and Control 
? The three level management structure consists of the President, SOFAZ’s Executive Director, 
and the Supervisory Board. The President appoints members of the Supervisory Board and the 
Executive Director.   
? The Board consists of key government officials (Prime Minister, ministers), two parliamentary 
members (nominated by the Speaker), and representatives from academia. It is entrusted with 
the functions of internal supervision to oversee the composition of the Oil Fund’s assets and 
compliance with the expenditure rules. 
Investment Strategy and Operational Management of Assets  
? The investment strategy is annually approved by the President based on recommendations of the 
Executive Director, taking into account recommendations of the Supervisory Board.  
? Operational management is delegated to the Executive Director, who chairs the Investment 
Board (internal structure of the Fund).  
? Professional portfolio managers may be contracted for a certain portion of the Fund’s assets. 
? Investment portfolio guidelines determine currency composition, the balance between liquid (up 
to 40 percent of the portfolio) and long-term investments, and fixed and equity income 
instruments. Preference is given to fixed income instruments, while equity income instruments 
(corporate securities and stakes) are banned unless a highly reputable professional investment 
manager is hired to handle them. 
Transparency, Accountability, and External Oversight  
? A highly reputable international auditor is selected to conduct an annual audit of the Oil Fund’s 
accounts. The results from the annual report on the use of the funds and the external audit report 
are published in the mass media. Pursuant to the Azeri laws, the Chamber of Accounts (the 
country’s Supreme Audit Institute) may also audit the Fund.   
? Quarterly reports produced by the Executive Director shall be submitted to the Supervisory 
Board and the President. 
? The annual report is prepared in coordination with the Ministry of Finance (MoF). After 
recommendations of the Supervisory Board are incorporated, it shall be submitted to the 
President. The annual report is posted on the official website of SOFAZ. 
Governance of Revenues/Expenditure Rules 
? While the ultimate decision-making rests with the President, Oil Fund expenditures (other than 
its own operating expenses) are consolidated with the state budget with the monies allocated to 
the budget and used for purposes that are consistent with the public investment program (PIP). 
? According to the 2002 Budget Systems Law, and the 2003 amendments to the Law Parliament 
has the authority to set the expenditure and deficit ceilings for the Oil Fund.  
? All investment expenditures are to be executed through the Treasury. 
? Use of the funds is subject to the State Procurement Law, which governs all budgetary 
expenditures. 
? Investments should be made in projects of national importance; project investments have to be 
part of the governmental PIP and MTEF and consistent with the SPPRED. 
_____________ 
 Annual Report 2001, State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and www.oilfund.az. 
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II - The Petroleum Sector in Azerbaijan 
 
Summary 
 
II-i. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan inherited a significant 
hydrocarbon resource base.  The country has been very effective in ensuring optimum 
exploitation of this resource base.  Azerbaijan was in the forefront of the former Soviet 
Union countries in attracting foreign investment to the upstream oil and gas sector and it 
has succeeded in establishing a production sharing agreement regime that is consistent 
with best industry practice. 
 
II-ii. One of the main challenges now facing Azerbaijan in its petroleum sector relates 
to the State owned oil and gas company – SOCAR.  The government has made a 
commitment to restructure the company and decisions will be required on both the form 
and the scope of the restructuring.  The government also faces the challenge of ensuring 
the sustainable financial viability of SOCAR following its restructuring.  This section 
addresses these challenges and outlines the issues and options to be considers as the 
SOCAR restructuring process proceeds. 
 
II-iii. The conclusions and recommendations of this section may briefly be summarized 
as follows: 
 
• The key objective of the restructuring process is to transform SOCAR from an 
enterprise that mixes public and commercial roles into a commercially focused 
company capable of performing at a level defined by good international oil and gas 
industry practice.  A required precursor to this is to effect a clear separation of the 
regulatory functions performed by SOCAR as the de facto “competent authority” 
dealing with the upstream oil sector and the commercial functions it performs as an 
operator in the sector.  The “competent authority” role should, therefore, be 
established as a separate agency reporting directly to the top levels of government. 
 
• In addition to the regulatory role it plays, SOCAR also has a minority ownership role 
in a number of production sharing agreements and joint ventures.  These, in effect, 
represent State ownership in these activities that is effected through SOCAR.  The 
government will need to decide what ownership arrangement will ensure that the 
State receives the full benefit associated with these ownership interests.  Options to be 
considered include (i) transferring the holdings into a separate holding company, 
which would be the optimum approach; (ii) maintaining the status quo; and (iii) 
allowing SOCAR full control over the holdings’ revenues. 
 
• Full implementation of an effective restructuring process for SOCAR could take a 
number of years to complete.  The process, however, should not take place in 
isolation but should be accompanied by other reforms in the energy sector, for 
example those designed to reduce and ultimately eliminate subsidies. 
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• An important early part of the process is to develop and implement a plan to 
transition to international financial reporting standards.  In order to effect this 
transition SOCAR will require outside assistance.  Specifically, SOCAR would 
benefit significantly from hiring a senior adviser to guide the company through a 
process that could take several years.  The costs of the transition will not be 
insignificant and appropriate provision should be made in SOCAR’s own budget and, 
as appropriate, the State budget to cover these costs. 
 
• A critical element associated with the restructuring process is the introduction of 
greater transparency to SOCAR’s operations.  While a move to international financial 
reporting standards is an important component of this, certain measures to 
demonstrate increased transparency can be introduced at an earlier stage.   
 
• It is also important to develop and monitor benchmarks of performance.  Performance 
should be monitored both internally to track improvements over time and externally 
against best practice performers.  The benchmarks should address key aspects of the 
business and address both revenues and costs. 
 
• Increasing attention is being focused on the legacy of environmental problems that 
SOCAR inherited and a process should be introduced to address these. 
 
• SOCAR’s financial performance will benefit from investment in certain facilities and 
rationalization of the workforce.  Sustained financial viability of the company’s core 
operations, however, is predicated on eliminating the subsidies that SOCAR now 
provides the Azerbaijan economy.  These subsidies are the result of problems with 
payments for fuel and feedstock delivered into the domestic market (particularly to 
State owned enterprises such as Azerenergy, Azerigaz and Azerchemia) and also with 
the fact that price and tariff levels do not reflect the true economic value of the fuel 
and feedstock supplied. 
 
• In the case of refined products, prices are at a level that is sufficient to cover 
SOCAR’s costs, although they fall short of international price parity levels.  In 
November 2004, the government increased petroleum product prices as an initial step 
in moving them towards international parity levels (details are provided in 
Attachment II-2).  The government should also open up the market to allow retailers 
and major consumers to enter into arrangements to import product directly, thereby 
creating competition with SOCAR. 
 
• In the case of gas, the price in 2004 was well below cost recovery levels.  Depending 
on the level of imports it appears that, even after the November 2004 price increase,  
the wholesale price would have to at least be doubled if SOCAR is to cover its costs 
and a three to fourfold increase would be required if the wholesale price is to be 
brought up to the import parity level. 
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The Petroleum Sector in Azerbaijan 
 
II-1. Azerbaijan is endowed with a significant hydrocarbon resource base with proven 
oil reserves totaling 7 billion barrels and proven gas reserves totaling 1.37 trillion cubic 
meters11.  Since independence, Azerbaijan has been in the forefront of the former Soviet 
Union countries in attracting foreign investment to its upstream oil and gas sectors.  It has 
successfully established a production sharing agreement (PSA) regime that is consistent 
with best industry practice and has supplemented this by creating an effective “competent 
authority” approach in the form of the Foreign Investment Relations Department of 
SOCAR.  At this point, Azerbaijan has signed over 20 PSAs (see Attachment II-1).  The 
sector plays host to most of the major players in the international oil industry despite the 
fact that there has been only one major new discovery – the Shah Deniz gas field – since 
foreign investors entered the sector in 1994 when the so-called “Contract of the Century” 
was signed with the AIOC consortium. 
 
II-2. The oil sector plays a critical role in Azerbaijan’s economy representing over 26% 
of GDP in 2002.  This critical role can be expected to continue.  The State’s financial 
interest in the oil sector takes four forms: (i) the receipt of profit oil from the PSAs; (ii) 
the receipt of taxes associated with oil sector operations; (iii) a direct equity interest in 
the PSAs which, up to this point, has been assigned to SOCAR12; and (iv) its ownership 
interest in SOCAR as a State owned oil and gas company. 
 
II-3. As the equity owner of SOCAR, the government faces a number of specific 
challenges: 
 
i. To effect a clear separation of the regulatory functions currently performed by 
SOCAR as the de facto “competent authority” dealing with the upstream oil 
sector and the commercial functions SOCAR performs as an operator in the 
sector; 
 
ii. To ensure the State receives the full benefit associated with SOCAR’s equity 
interest in PSAs and joint ventures; 
 
iii. To facilitate the transition of SOCAR from a Soviet style State owned enterprise 
to a commercially focused organization operating in accordance with best 
international practice; 
 
iv. To ensure SOCAR’s ongoing financial viability; and 
 
v. To address the legacy of environmental problems that were inherited from the 
Soviet Union along with the hydrocarbon assets. 
 
                                                 
11 Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2004 
12 SOCAR has an equity stake in all the PSAs 
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Overview of the Sector 
 
Oil and Gas Production 
 
II-4. SOCAR is the dominant player in the domestic petroleum sector.  The company 
produces approximately 9 million tons of oil per year and 4 billion cubic meters (BCM) 
of natural gas.  It acts as a “single buyer” for the gas sector and is the supplier of all 
refined oil products sold in the domestic market.   
 
Figures II-1 and II-2 
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-
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
00
0s
 T
on
s
SOCAR AIOC Shah Deniz "New Oil"
 
 
Azerbaijan Gas Production
-
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
B
C
M
SOCAR Existing Fields SOCAR Additional Gas ACG Associated Gas
Shah Deniz Phase 1 Shah Deniz Phase 2
 
 
  
26 
 
 
II-5. The major increments of oil and gas production, however, will come from the 
PSAs operated by international oil companies – see Figures II-1 and II-2 above13. 
 
The Refining Sector 
 
II-6. SOCAR owns and operates two refineries, Azerneftyag and Azerneftyanajag with 
a combined design distillation capacity of about 20 million tons per year.  The 
Azerneftyag refinery has a design distillation capacity of 11.7 million tons per year of 
crude charge but includes refining facilities that commenced operations over 100 years 
ago.  The refinery is essentially a lubricating oil/bitumen plant, with incidental production 
of straight run kerosene, diesel and mazut.  The refinery does not even have a reforming 
unit and the naphtha it produces is transferred to Azerneftyanajag for processing into 
gasoline and/or is sold to Azerchemia as petrochemical feedstock.  The technology base 
of all constituent process units and production control systems is obsolete.  The physical 
facilities are very old, poorly maintained and generally run down.  Production and 
offsites facilities have been built over a very large area with poor operational and control 
integration.  
 
II-7. The Azerneftyanajag refinery commenced operations initially in the 1965/66 
timeframe.  It has distillation design capacity of 8 million tons per year of crude charge.  
It does have upgrading capacity with fluid catalytic cracking units, a thermal cracking 
unit, a coker and an alkylation unit.  The facility, however, has also suffered from a lack 
of funding for maintenance and upgrading. 
 
II-8. The refineries both operate at throughput levels substantially below their 
distillation capacity levels.  However, the output from the two refineries does largely 
balance the country’s requirements for gasoline and naphtha, although some gasoline is 
exported to Iran.  The refineries’ production profile results in the country being long (i.e. 
surplus) kerosene and diesel and, seasonally (i.e. in the summer14) mazut.  These products 
are all exported by SOCAR to markets in the South Caucasus, the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean. 
 
II-9. The Mediterranean market effectively sets the international parity price for 
product exports from Azerbaijan.  Products moving into the Black Sea and Mediterranean 
markets have generally been exported via Batumi on the Georgian Black Sea coast.  The 
cost of overland transportation from Baku to Batumi is in the range of $29 to $33 per ton 
for white products (i.e. gasoline, kerosene and diesel) and $25/ton for dirty products (i.e. 
mazut and any crude oil that travels overland)15.  These costs dictate parity price levels 
netted back to Azerbaijan.  SOCAR, however, does tend to secure prices higher than 
these parity levels for product sold into Georgia since Georgia is a net importer of refined 
products. 
                                                 
13 Source: World Bank analysis 
14 As Azerbaijan continues to substitute natural gas for mazut for power production the long position with 
mazut is likely to increase. 
15 Source: BP Oil International Limited. 
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II-10. Notwithstanding the age and inefficiency of the two refineries, their location 
creates a situation in which they can be viewed as potentially financially viable.  As is 
indicated above, Azerbaijan is balanced to long refined products.  However, without 
these two refineries, the country would have to import product to meet all its domestic 
needs.    This permits a comparison to be made of the potential financial performance of 
the two refineries if, hypothetically, Azerbaijan were (i) to export all products and (ii) if it 
had to operate the refineries to avoid imports (in which case, with the exception of 
gasoline and naphtha, about half the primary products would have to be exported).  These 
two cases are summarized in Tables II-1 and II-2. 
 
Table II-1  
Financial Viability of the Azerneftyag Refinery - 200316 
Price US$/ton Values US$/ton Product 
Export 
Parity 
Import 
Parity 
Yield % Tons 
Export 
Parity 
Import 
Parity 
Jet Fuel 
Diesel Fuel 
Kerosene KO-26 
Mazut 
Reforming Gasoline 
Naphtha 
Engine Fuel DT 
Bitumen 
Lubricants 
Other 
231.80 
211.14 
231.80 
112.16 
230.64 
221.12 
  72.62 
135.60 
142.37 
  75.00 
315.80 
295.14 
315.80 
177.16 
314.64 
305.12 
156.62 
219.60 
226.37 
  75.00 
  7.50 % 
26.90 % 
  3.30 % 
47.10 % 
  5.00 % 
  5.80 % 
  0.90 % 
  0.90 % 
  0.90 % 
  0.03 % 
   226.9 
   813.9 
     99.8 
1,425.0 
   151.3 
   175.5 
     27.2 
     27.2 
     27.2 
       0.9 
  17.39 
  56.80 
    7.65 
  52.83 
  11.53 
  12.82 
    0.65 
    1.22 
    1.28 
    0.02 
  20.54 
  68.09 
    9.04 
  68.13 
  13.63 
  17.70 
    1.03 
    1.60 
    1.66 
    0.02 
Total   98.33 % 2,974.9 162.19 201.44 
Crude Oil Input 
Refining Cost 
181.77 
  
181.77 
  
 3,025.5 181.77 
  14.15 
181.77 
  14.15 
Net Refinery Margin       (33.73)     5.52 
 
Table II-2 
Financial Viability of the Azerneftyanajag Refinery - 2003 
Price US$/ton Values US$/ton Product 
Export 
Parity 
Import 
Parity 
Yield % Tons 
Export 
Parity 
Import 
Parity 
Gasoline 
Jet Fuel 
Diesel Fuel 
Household Heating 
Kerosene KO-26 
Mazut 
Coke 
Propane 
Butane 
Other 
250.64 
231.80 
211.14 
211.14 
231.80 
112.16 
  39.62 
122.47 
115.37 
  75.00 
334.64 
315.80 
295.14 
295.14 
315.80 
177.16 
  39.62 
122.47 
115.37 
  75.00 
18.50 % 
  6.80 % 
22.90 % 
  1.70 % 
  2.50 % 
37.80 % 
  0.70 % 
  0.03 % 
  1.20 % 
  0.01 % 
   596.3 
   219.2 
   738.2 
     54.8 
     80.6 
1,218.4 
     22.6 
       1.0 
     38.7 
       0.3 
  46.37 
  15.76 
  48.35 
    3.59 
    5.80 
  42.40 
    0.28 
    0.04 
    1.38 
    0.01 
  61.91 
  18.62 
  57.97 
    4.30 
    6.85 
  54.68 
    0.28 
    0.04 
    1.38 
    0.01 
Total   92.14 % 2,969.8 163.97 206.03 
Crude Oil Input 
Refining Cost 
   3,223.4 181.77 
  17.73 
181.77 
  17.73 
Net Refinery Margin       (35.53)     6.53 
Source: Yield data proved by SOCAR to the IMF.  Price data from the IEA and World Bank analysis. 
                                                 
16 The tables are based on production levels in 2001 using average crude oil and product prices for 2003. 
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II-11. This analysis suggests that, from a financial standpoint, Azerbaijan may well be 
better off operating the two refineries than relying on imports.  However, an assessment 
should be made of options for improving the performance and efficiency of the refining 
network. 
 
Downstream Operations 
 
II-12. SOCAR, at present, is the wholesale supplier of oil products to the domestic 
market.  Certain of the neighboring countries are exporters of refined products.  Both 
Turkmenistan and Russia, for example, consistently export refined products and a portion 
of the Turkmenistan exports transits through Azerbaijan.  These volumes are a potential 
source of competitive supply and it would be to Azerbaijan’s benefit to allow product 
retailers and major consumers to enter into bilateral arrangements to purchase imported 
product rather rely solely on SOCAR.  SOCAR would not be adversely impacted by such 
an arrangement since it already has the capacity to manage the sale of product exports. 
 
II-13. Refined products are subject to both VAT and, with limited exceptions, excise 
taxes.  The excise tax is levied on the wholesale price charged by SOCAR.  Logistical 
costs are then added and VAT, at 18%, is levied on the resultant retail price, including the 
excise taxes.  The excise tax rates that currently apply to the major products are 
summarized in Table II-3. 
 
Table II-3 
Petroleum Product Excise Tax Rates 
Product Excise Tax % 
Gasoline-96 
Gasoline-92 
Gasoline-80 
Diesel 
Household Heating Oil 
Jet Kerosene 
Kerosene 
Naphtha 
Mazut 
Engine Lubricants 
Industrial Lubricants 
Turbine Lubricants 
Transformer Lubricants 
Bitumen 
Coke 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
101.4 
  88.1 
  88.4 
  15.0 
  18.6 
12.6 
22.3 
    8.0 
   - 
   32.0 
   29.1 
   33.4 
   34.2 
   14.0 
   13.9 
   10.7 
 
II-14. When wholesale product prices were increased in early 2003, the government 
adjusted a number of the excise tax rates downwards so as to minimize the impact of the 
higher wholesale prices on the retail consumer.  The November 2004 price increases were 
all effected through an increase in the excise tax levels (see Attachment II-2).  Excise 
taxes on petroleum products are a “discretionary” tax.  Looking to the future, therefore, 
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the government should consider what objectives it wants to realize from a petroleum 
products excise tax policy.  Elsewhere such taxes have been used to encourage particular 
behaviors as well as raise revenue. 
 
II-15. Given the significance of the role SOCAR plays in the domestic petroleum sector, 
as well as its participation in the PSAs, it is clear that the company will have a major role 
to play in any reform program instigated in the sector.  Consequently, SOCAR features 
prominently in the discussion of the issues and options in the balance of this section. 
 
Management of the State’s Interests in PSA and Joint Venture Arrangements 
 
II-16. The government of Azerbaijan has made a commitment to restructure the State oil 
and gas company – SOCAR.  This commitment was embodied in Presidential Decree 
Number 844, dated January 24, 2003, On Structural Improvement of the State Oil 
Company of the Azerbaijan Republic.  SOCAR has since embarked on a restructuring 
program that has the objective of transforming the company into a commercially focused 
enterprise capable of performing at a level defined by good international petroleum 
industry practice.  Following its restructuring, Socar could be an attractive candidate for 
privatization.  This restructuring effort, however, raises the question as to where two of 
SOCAR’s current roles - its “competent authority” role and its ownership role in PSAs 
and joint ventures - fit into the future structure. 
 
II-17. In the case of the “competent authority” role it is clear that this is a government 
policy function that should not be included in a commercially focused enterprise.  Rather, 
given the importance of the role, it should be established as a separate agency reporting 
directly to the top levels of government.  The issue of SOCAR’s ownership role in PSAs 
and joint ventures, however, is not quite so clear cut. 
 
II-18. There are various options as to how the ownership issue can be handled, but, 
before addressing these options, some brief discussion on the role of these holdings is 
warranted.  By taking an equity share in the PSAs, the government has ensured that the 
State will participate in a direct fashion in the same risks and rewards as the other 
investors – participation through profit oil and taxes is indirect rather than direct.  As the 
various projects have developed, the value of these equity holdings has appreciated 
significantly.  The State could elect to capitalize on the value of these holdings by trying 
to sell part or all of the equity and realize a substantial one time payment.  Alternatively, 
the State can maintain an attractive revenue stream for the life of the PSA.  Figure II-3 
provides a projection of the revenues associated with SOCAR’s operations as well as 
with these “holding company” activities. 
 
II-19. One of the objectives of a privatization process is to create incentives that will 
promote efficiency of operations.  These holdings, however, exist in activities that are 
already owned and operated by the private sector.  Consequently, the only reason for 
selling these holdings would be to realize a one time capital payment.  Under current 
State revenue guidelines, such a payment would accrue to the State Oil Fund.  While it is 
certainly the prerogative of the State (as owner of these shares) to make its own 
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determination as to the attractiveness of an outright sale, it should be noted that any 
valuation of these shares will be based on a perception of the net present value of future 
cash flows.  To the extent that any investor seeks a return that is higher than that 
obtainable by the State Oil Fund, it would be better for the State to retain the shares (and 
the associated cash flows) rather than sell them to such an investor. 
 
Figure II-3 
SOCAR Contributions to Fiscal Revenues
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 Source: World Bank analysis 
 
II-20. Following the establishment of the State Oil Fund, cash distributions to SOCAR 
from its PSA holding in Azeri, Chirag, Guneshli (ACG) were directed to the Oil Fund.  
These are now being directed to an escrow account to secure the anticipated borrowings 
to support the State’s investment (through SOCAR) in Shah Deniz and the SCP gas 
pipeline.  Consequently, these funds have been, and will continue to be kept separate 
from the funds (and funding requirements) associated with SOCAR’s operating activities. 
 
II-21. The State has the following options for managing these holdings: 
i. To spin the holdings off from SOCAR and transfer them to a separate holding 
company.  This would be the preferred option.   
ii. To maintain the de facto status quo whereby SOCAR maintains ownership but 
the cash flow is kept independent of SOCAR’s other cash flows. 
iii. To allow SOCAR to retain ownership, but, ultimately, with full control over the 
cash flows. 
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II-22. These options have certain pluses and minuses as follows: 
 
Option 1 – to transfer the holdings into a separate holding company: 
 
Pluses: 
• The revenue streams will clearly be identified as being for the benefit of the State and 
use of the revenues will be under direct government control. 
• Management of these activities can be handled by a small management team. 
• Plans for privatization of SOCAR would have to proceed strictly on the merits of 
SOCAR’s operations ensuring that full value was received for such operations. 
• Full transparency of these cash flows can easily be effected. 
• Revenues generated from the holdings could not be used to subsidize SOCAR’s other 
operations. 
 
Minuses: 
• Changes will be required in agreements such as the Shah Deniz financing to reflect 
the changes in the ownership of these holdings. 
 
Option 2 – to maintain the status quo: 
 
Pluses: 
• No changes are required in current arrangements and agreements. 
• Ownership of these holdings could make SOCAR appear more attractive as a 
privatization candidate. 
• Ownership of these holdings could enhance SOCAR’s ability to secure financing. 
 
Minuses: 
• There will be uncertainty over the accountability for managing these revenue streams. 
• There is no assurance that these cash flows will not at some point in the future be 
consumed by SOCAR rather than be used to the overall benefit of the State. 
 
Option 3 – To allow SOCAR full control over the holdings’ revenues: 
 
Pluses: 
• This would create the most attractive case for privatization of SOCAR (but at the 
potential cost of under-realizing the full value of all SOCAR’s assets). 
• This would allow SOCAR the opportunity to meet its investment needs and to secure 
financial support for its activities. 
• Accountability for these revenue streams would be clearly defined. 
 
Minuses: 
• These cash flows would accrue to the benefit of SOCAR rather than to the overall 
benefit of the State. 
• There is a risk that inadequate transparency will apply to these cash flows. 
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Restructuring SOCAR 
 
II-23. Full implementation of the SOCAR restructuring process could take a number of 
years.  The process should be accompanied by a significant cultural re-orientation 
towards a fully commercial focus.  Experience both within the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) and elsewhere demonstrates that significant cultural changes require a minimum of 
three years and often more than five years.  At this stage, the best examples of FSU 
companies that have effected this transition exist in the oil sector in Russia among some 
of the privately owned companies, but, even in those cases, the transition process has 
taken more than five years. 
 
II-24. SOCAR’s transition to a fully commercially focused operation cannot occur in 
isolation.  Rather, it should be accompanied by other reforms in the energy sector 
designed to ensure, for example, the elimination of subsidies that SOCAR is currently 
forced to provide through either non payments or through the application of tariffs and 
prices that do not reflect the true economic value of the oil and gas being supplied.  That 
having been said, specific reform and restructuring actions applicable to SOCAR’s 
operations can be identified. 
 
II-25. The restructuring of SOCAR’s activities and associated reform efforts can be 
undertaken in a phased manner.  The matrix table below summarizes these phases. 
 
Table II-4 
The Phased Restructuring of SOCAR’s Operations 
 
Phase SOCAR’s Operations Holding Company 
Activities 
The Regulatory Role 
Current 
Situation 
SOCAR manages vertically 
integrated oil operations 
and upstream gas operations 
but also operates a legacy of 
non oil and gas related 
businesses. 
 
Accounts are maintained in 
accordance with Azerbaijan 
accounting standards. 
 
There is no public reporting 
of SOCAR’s financial and 
operating performance. 
 
SOCAR inherited a legacy 
of environmental problems 
but has yet to develop a 
program to address these. 
SOCAR’s interests in 
various joint venture 
activities have been 
incorporated in a series of 
joint stock companies that 
come under the SOCAR 
holding company umbrella. 
 
These companies do not 
have an operating role (that 
role is carried out by private 
sector partners).  Revenues 
from these activities are 
accounted separately from 
SOCAR’s other activities. 
 
These companies maintain 
their books of accounts in 
accordance with 
international financial 
reporting standards. 
The Foreign Investment 
Department of SOCAR 
plays the role of “competent 
authority” in dealing with 
foreign investors in the 
upstream oil and gas sector.  
It issues licenses, negotiates 
PSAs and operates as the de 
facto regulator of upstream 
oil operations in Azerbaijan. 
 
Oil and gas prices in the 
domestic market are 
established by the 
government. 
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Phase 1 Initiate implementation of 
the key recommendations of 
the Ernst & Young study 
including the transition to 
IFRS throughout SOCAR. 
 
Initiate the USTDA funded 
study on restructuring. 
 
Commence public reporting 
of financial and operating 
performance. 
 
Establish a set of 
restructuring monitoring 
benchmarks. 
 
Ensure that all of SOCAR’s 
operations fall within a 
corporatized structure (e.g. 
as part of a joint stock 
company) 
 
Identify all SOCAR’s non 
core business activities. 
 
Initiate work on 
development of a program 
to address the legacy 
environmental problems in 
the sector. 
Transfer the holding 
company activities to a new 
holding company not 
affiliated with SOCAR. 
 
Commence public reporting 
of the financial and 
operating performance of 
these companies. 
Establish the regulatory 
functions now performed 
within SOCAR in an 
independent “competent 
authority”.   
 
In order to preserve the 
independence of this unit it 
should be independently 
financed (e.g. through 
licensing fees) and should 
report directly to a high 
level within the government 
(not to a ministry) such as 
to the Prime Minister or to 
the President. 
 
Transfer price setting 
responsibilities to a new 
regulatory agency 
responsible for regulation of 
the energy sector. 
Phase 2 Commence implementation 
of the key recommendations 
arising from the USTDA 
funded restructuring study. 
 
Initiate the restructuring 
benchmarking monitoring 
process and report on the 
results together with other 
public disclosures of 
financial and operating 
performance. 
 
Commence/continue 
divestment of non core 
business activities. 
 
Commence implementation 
of a program to address 
legacy environmental 
mitigation issues. 
Maintain the holding 
company as a separate state 
owned operation. 
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Phase 3 Complete the restructuring 
process. 
 
Assess the potential for 
privatization of part or all of 
SOCAR. 
Maintain the holding 
company as a separate state 
owned operation. 
 
 
II-26. As has been noted, SOCAR at present combines (i) an operating role covering 
upstream oil and gas, refining, transportation and sales of crude oil and refined products 
with (ii) a holding company role associated with its ownership interest in ACG, BTC, 
Shah Deniz, SCP and other ventures and (iii) certain oil related regulatory functions 
including the role as “competent authority” to deal with international investors in the oil 
and gas sectors.  Two overarching components are, therefore, envisaged in the 
restructuring process.  The first is the separation of these three roles, allowing SOCAR to 
focus exclusively on its role as an operator.  The second addresses the changes needed to 
enable SOCAR to evolve into a commercially focused organization that complies with 
best industry practice as an operator of oil and gas assets.  The more detailed 
restructuring effort will be directed at this second component. 
 
II-27. Within the context of this second component a few key themes are worth 
highlighting.  The first is the need to couple a transition to improved financial 
management practices (including the adoption of international financial reporting 
standards) with the need for greater transparency. It would be highly desirable if SOCAR 
were to adopt the disclosure standards with regard to financial and operating performance 
that represent best practice among State owned oil and gas companies – Statoil of 
Norway and Petrobras of Brazil are examples of best practice among such companies.  
These requirements are summarized in the table above17: 
 
II-28. The second theme relates to the legacy of environmental problems that SOCAR 
inherited.  Increasing attention is being focused on these issues and it would be timely to 
initiate a process to address them.  This process needs to assess the clean-up 
requirements, examine the options for addressing them and then establish an 
implementation plan.  Activities can be broadly grouped into those that will require 
significant technology but are not particularly labor intensive (e.g. land reclamation) and 
those that are relatively labor intensive (e.g. dismantling abandoned rigs).  Such a 
program will create jobs, particularly as regards the more labor intensive components.  
There will also be costs associated with such a program, although these may be partially, 
or even fully mitigated by (i) sales of land that has been cleaned up and (ii) reclamation 
programs (e.g. for the steel in the abandoned rigs and for oil recovered as part of the 
clean up) and initial budget provisions will have to be made to cover these costs18.  This, 
in turn requires agreement on the assignment of responsibility and accountability for the 
clean-up effort. 
                                                 
17 Not all the requirements would apply to SOCAR, but they are indicative of the types of information that 
should be disclosed. 
18 Given the appreciation in land values on the Apsheron Peninsula, a clean up program could well be 
financed through the sale of cleaned up land, thus budget funding may only be required to initiate the 
program. 
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Table II-5 
Transparency Requirements for State Owned 
Oil and Gas Companies 
Disclosure Requirements to the General Public: 
 
Minimum requirements are those that pertain to a publicly quoted major oil and gas company: 
• Annual financial statements (which should be prepared in accordance with international 
financial reporting standards) for the consolidated operation and its major business units. 
• Quarterly interim financial statements. 
• Statistics on operating performance. 
Disclosure to the Government: 
 
The Government has a valid basis for seeking disclosure of any information it requires to ensure 
that these State owned assets are being efficiently managed. 
Disclosure to Lenders: 
 
• Detailed financial information (including, ideally, accounting statements audited in 
accordance with international financial reporting standards). 
• Project specifics (in the case of project financing). 
Disclosure to the Regulatory Authority: 
 
Information required to allow the Regulator to make a determination of the appropriate course of 
action associated with any regulated activity such as transportation tariffs and compliance with 
service standards e.g.: 
 
• Detailed accounts 
• Operating costs 
• Actual and projected capital costs 
• Administrative and general costs 
• Borrowing costs 
• Customer data 
• Physical data 
• Quality of service indicators 
• Any other data deemed pertinent to the decision process* 
 
*Confidential information may be requested by the Regulator, but may not be disclosed by it. 
 
II-29. The third theme is the importance of benchmarking performance and monitoring 
performance during the restructuring process.  Performance should be monitored both 
internally, i.e. to track improvements over time, and externally against best practice 
performers both state owned (e.g. Statoil and Petrobras) and privately owned (e.g. BP, 
Shell, ExxonMobil etc.).  These benchmarks should address key aspects of the business 
and should cover both revenues and costs. 
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The Introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards 
 
II-30. The introduction of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) is an 
essential requirement if SOCAR is to make an effective transition into a commercially 
focused company capable of performing at a level defined by good international oil and 
gas industry practice.  Financial reporting in accordance with IFRS will provide 
SOCAR’s management and the government with critical tools to assess the performance 
of the company.  Financial reporting in accordance with IFRS will also be essential if 
SOCAR is to secure access to commercial sources of financing in the future.   
 
II-31. The process will, however, take some time and it could be as much as three years 
before SOCAR is able to effect the transition with some additional time possibly being 
required before SOCAR is able to secure unqualified audits of its operations.  Key steps 
include developing the capacity to make the transition to IFRS and undertaking the 
analysis of activities and operations that will be required to effect the transition.  In order 
to effect the transition, SOCAR will need access to expert advice and assistance.  One 
measure that should prove particularly helpful would be to hire a senior adviser to guide 
the company through the process.  Such an individual should have significant experience 
in dealing with the financial reporting of a major international integrated oil and gas 
corporation.  Table II-6 below summarizes some of the key actions that will be required 
in making the transition to IFRS and the time frame in which such actions should be 
initiated/ undertaken. 
 
Table II-6 
The Introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards 
 
Time Frame Organizational Activities Accounting Activities 
Months 1 – 6 Hire a senior adviser 
 
Form an IFRS Steering 
Committee 
 
Prepare initial IFRS transition 
plan 
 
Commence IFRS management 
information training for all 
financial staff and for non 
financial managerial staff. 
Prepare list of all business units, subsidiaries, joint 
ventures and other business arrangements and 
interests. 
 
Prepare list of all exploration and production wells 
with their history and details of their current status. 
 
Identify all bank accounts, cash deposits and loans to 
third parties. 
 
Identify all loans and other monetary liabilities and 
cash held for third parties. 
 
Identify current accounting policy for capitalization of 
expenditures and list all new capital expenditures by 
unit. 
 
Identify all material contracts. 
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Time Frame Organizational Activities Accounting Activities 
Months 7 - 12  Prepare consolidated schedule of reserve estimates by 
field.19 
 
Conduct inventory count of all products in inventory 
(oil, gas liquids) by location including in transit 
product.  Count to cover all locations at the same time 
and be completed at a reporting period end.  The 
results should be reconciled to the accounting records. 
 
List fixed assets at a reporting period end with 
sufficient details to enable physical identification of 
assets.  List the book value, the current status and 
condition and logical business unit owner in cases 
where the ownership is undetermined. 
 
Perform count of non product inventories and 
supplies. 
Months 13 - 18  Prepare Current Environment Assessment.  Report 
topics should include, but not be limited to: 
• Identification of primary operational accounting 
input data e.g. well production data, supplies 
usage, refinery outputs by product line. 
• Description and evaluation of major delivery 
processes which accounting relies on to receive 
accounting input data from operations. 
• Actual accounting procedures for primary balance 
sheet and expense items. 
• Accounting policies for Balance sheet items. 
• Accounting policies for Revenue and Expense 
recognition. 
• Identify and detail major related party 
transactions.  Identify and detail inter/intra 
company transactions. 
 
Deliver initial high level internal accounting Policies 
and Procedures manual. 
Months 19 - 30 Decide on future 
organizational structure. 
 
Deliver IFRS migration plan 
including a timetable.   
 
Develop criteria to determine 
which business units be IFRS 
transition pilots in the 
transition for the consolidated 
group. 
For each implementation deliver detailed solutions for 
significant accounting issues. 
     
                                                 
19 This will require the use of outside expertise. 
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II-32. Table II-6 contemplates a two and a half year period leading up to the initial 
switch to international financial reporting standards.  The costs of this transition will not 
be insignificant.  In addition to the requirement for expert assistance, training 
requirements will be extensive and there will be a need to transition to new accounting 
software.  Provision should be made both in SOCAR’s budget and, as needed, in the State 
budget to cover these costs. 
 
Assuring SOCAR’s Future Financial Viability 
 
II-33. SOCAR was established in 1992 through the merger of Azneft and 
Kazpmorneftegas.  The company continues to be responsible for more than half the 
country’s oil production, although that will change as production from ACG increases 
(see Figure II-1 above).  It operates the domestic oil pipeline system and Azerbaijan’s 
two refineries.  It supplies the domestic market with refined products and is responsible 
for oil product imports and exports and for the export of a portion of its own crude oil 
production together with the State’s share of profit oil from ACG.  In addition, it acts as 
the single buyer of gas for the domestic market, purchasing gas imported from or via 
Russia and handling the associated gas that is provided to the State, at no charge, under 
the terms of the ACG production sharing agreement. 
 
II-34. There are clear opportunities to improve the financial performance of SOCAR’s 
operations.  Production costs are high as a result of equipment deterioration and declining 
reservoir pressures.  The two refineries are in need of modernization and the pipeline 
network requires investment for rehabilitation.  However, in theory, SOCAR should be 
able to generate adequate revenues to cover its costs.  Financial performance, however, is 
compromised by the fact that SOCAR is effectively required to subsidize the overall 
energy sector within Azerbaijan. 
 
II-35. SOCAR supplies the fuel required by Azerenergy (gas and mazut) and Azerigas 
(gas) to meet domestic requirements for electricity and gas.  However, a number of 
subsidies are embedded in these transactions as a result of (i) non payment problems in 
the sector which translate into a shortfall in payments by these two State owned 
enterprises to SOCAR, and (ii) domestic prices that do not reflect the true value of these 
fuel supplies.  In 2002, it is estimated that the shortfall in payments alone totaled $150 
million, or about 2.5% of GDP20 while the under recovery of the true economic value of 
the fuel exceeded $200 million21.  
 
II-36. In the last three years, the budget has made explicit transfers to SOCAR to cover 
the shortfall in payments on the part of Azerenergy and Azerigas.  This, however, does 
not address the need for prices for these fuel supplies that reflect their true economic 
value. 
 
II-37. The wholesale price of oil products in the domestic market is, at present, well 
below international price parity – this is largely a reflection of the significant increase in 
                                                 
20 Source: the IMF. 
21 Source: World Bank analysis. 
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oil prices over the last few years.  In November 2004, the government increased the 
prices of refined products as a step towards bringing them in line with international parity 
prices (see Attachment II-2).   
 
II-38. There is also a need to increase the wholesale price for gas.  On November 2nd, 
2004, the wholesale gas price without VAT was increased from 64,000 AZM per 
thousand cubic meters (MCM) or about $13/MCM to 73,000 AZM for untreated gas and 
82,000 AZM for treated gas for an average price of about 79,000 AZM/MCM or about 
$16/MCM.  While this price is sufficient to allow SOCAR to recover the cost of domestic 
supply it is well below the price level necessary to allow SOCAR to cover the combined 
costs of domestic gas supply and imports22 and is also well below the import parity price 
level of $52/MCM that would ultimately be the appropriate price. 
 
II-39. As is indicated in Table II-7, on the basis of production and consumption in 2003, 
an average wholesale price of at least $32/MCM is required if SOCAR is to cover 
production and import costs. 
 
Table II-7 
Gas Supplies and Costs - 2003 
Source of Gas Supply Volume Cost $/MCM 
SOCAR Production 
AIOC Associated Gas 
  Domestic Supply/Average Cost 
Imports 
  Total Volume/Average Cost 
4.0 
1.0 
5.0 
4.0 
9.0 
$20.0/MCM 
$  2.0/MCM 
$16.4/MCM 
$52.0MCM 
$32.2/MCM 
     Source: World Bank estimates. 
 
II-40. SOCAR’s financial performance will also be greatly aided through a 
rationalization of its work force.  With over 60,000 employees, SOCAR is heavily 
overstaffed.  To put this in perspective, ChevronTexaco, the second largest US oil 
company, which operates in more than 180 countries and has assets valued in excess of 
$80 billion employs 51,000 people. 
 
II-41. A focused effort on improving operating performance (including a significant 
rationalization of the staff) coupled with a domestic tariff structure that reflects the true 
economic value of the oil and gas sold by SOCAR in the domestic market and an 
improvement in payments performance will greatly enhance SOCAR’s financial health 
and should allow the company to enter into borrowings strictly on the strength of its 
balance sheet. 
 
 
                                                 
22 SOCAR is compensated for the cost of imports for some of the gas supplied, for example for the gas 
supplied to Azerenergy.  It would be more logical, however, to treat all gas as fungible and have a single 
wholesale price applicable to all wholesale customers. 
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Attachment II-1 
Production Sharing Agreements 
Offshore Production Sharing Agreements 
Name of PSA Dates Project Partners % Status as of 6/02 
Azeri, Chirag and 
Deepwater Guneshli 
(Azerbaijan 
International Operating 
Company AIOC) 
Signed 9/20/94 
Ratified Dec 94 
BP (operator) 
Unocal 
Inpex 
SOCAR 
Statoil 
ExxonMobil 
TPAO 
Devon Energy 
Itochu 
Amerada Hess 
34.1 
10.3 
10.0 
10.0 
  8.6 
  8.0 
  6.8 
  5.6 
  3.9 
  2.7 
Exports began 1997. 
Phase 1 under 
implementation. 
Shah Deniz Signed 6/4/96 
Ratified 
10/17/96 
BP (operator) 
Statoil 
SOCAR 
LukAgip 
TotalFinaElf 
OIEC of Iran 
TPAO 
25.5 
25.5 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
  9.0 
Sanctioned, under 
implementation.  
Initial gas flows 
projected in 2006. 
Lankaran-Talysh Signed 1/13/97 
Effective Jun 97 
TotalFinaElf (operator) 
Wintershall 
SOCAR 
OIEC of Iran 
35.0 
30.0 
25.0 
10.0 
First test well (2001) 
came up dry. 
Yalama/D-222 Signed 7/4/97 
Ratified Nov 97 
LukArco (operator) 
SOCAR 
60.0 
40.0 
Conducted 2-D and  
3-D seismic work 
Apsheron Signed 8/1/97 
Ratified Nov 97 
SOCAR 
ChevronTexaco (operator) 
TotalFinaElf 
50.0 
30.0 
20.0 
First well drilled in 
2001 with poor results. 
Oguz Signed 8/1/97 
Ratified Nov 97 
ExxonMobil (operator) 
SOCAR 
50.0 
50.0 
Dry well April 2001. 
ExxonMobil withdrew 
Nakhchivan Signed 8/1/97 
Ratified Nov 97 
ExxonMobil (operator) 
SOCAR 
50.0 
50.0 
One successful well. A 
second planned. 
Kurdashi-Araz-Kirgan 
Deniz 
Signed 7/7/98 
Ratified Jul 98 
SOCAR 
Agip (operator) 
Mitsui 
TPAO 
Repsol 
50.0 
25.0 
15.0 
  5.0 
  5.0 
First test well drilled 
with poor results 
Inam Signed 7/21/98 
Ratified Dec 98 
SOCAR 
BP (operator) 
Royal Dutch Shell 
50.0 
25.0 
25.0 
BP suspended drilling 
of its first appraisal 
well in Aug 2001 
Araz, Alov, and Sharg Signed 7/21/98 
Ratified Dec 98 
SOCAR 
BP (operator) 
Statoil 
ExxonMobil 
TPAO 
Alberta Energy 
40.0 
15.0 
15.0 
15.0 
10.0 
  5.0 
Exploration suspended 
Jul 2001 following 
confrontation with 
Iranian gunboat. 
Atashgah Signed 12/25/98 
Ratified Jun 99 
SOCAR 
JOAC Consortium: 
Japex (operator) 
Inpex 
Teikoku 
Itochu 
50.0 
50.0 
22.5 
12.5 
  7.5 
  7.5 
Seismic work 
undertaken 
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Name of PSA Dates Project Partners % Status 
Lerik, Jenab, Savalan, 
Dalga 
Signed 4/27/99 SOCAR 
ExxonMobil (operator) 
Unassigned 
50.0 
30.0 
20.0 
 
Zafar-Mashal Signed 4/27/99 
Ratified Apr 99 
SOCAR 
ExxonMobil (operator) 
Conoco 
50.0 
30.0 
20.0 
 
Onshore Production Sharing Agreements 
Name of PSA Dates Project Partners % Status 
Kalamaddin-
Mishovdagh (formerly 
AzPetoil JV) 
JV signed 93 
Converted to 
PSA 00 
Moncrief Oil (operator) 
Pet Oil 
SOCAR 
49.3 
35.7 
15.0 
Produced 2.750 TBD 
oil in 2000 
Anshad Petrol JV signed in 93 
Converted to 
PSA 2000 
SOCAR 
Attila Dogan 
Land and General Berhard 
51.0 
31.5 
17.5 
Drilled 4 wells 98/99. 
Produced 0.9 TBD in 
1999. 
AzGeroil JV signed in 95 
Converted to 
PSA 2000 
SOCAR 
Grunewald 
51.0 
49.0 
Produced 1 TBD in 
1999 
Southwest Gobustan Signed 6/2/98 
Ratified Nov 98 
Commonwealth Oil & Gas 
(operator) 
SOCAR 
Sooner International 
67.25 
 
20.00 
12.75 
Conducting 2-D 
seismic research 
Zykh-Govsany Signed 6/5/00 SOCAR 
Lukoil 
50.0 
50.0 
Rehabilitating fields. 
Produced 1.83 TBD in 
2000 
Kursangi-Garabagli Signed 12/15/98 
Ratified Apr 99 
SOCAR 
CNPC 
Amerada Delta-Hess JV 
50.0 
30.0 
20.0 
Producing 5.5 TBD 
Muradkhanli-Jafarli-
Zardab 
Signed 7/21/98 
Ratified Nov 98 
Ramco 
SOCAR 
50.0 
50.0 
First test well shut 
down in Apr 2001 
Padar-Kharami Signed 4/27/99 Moncrief  (operator) 
SOCAR 
80.0 
20.0 
Seismic work 
Shirvanoil JV signed in 97 
Converted to 
PSA 2000 
SOCAR 
Whitehall 
60.0 
40.0 
Rehabilitating wells. 
Produced 4.35 TBD in 
2001 
West Apsheron 
(Karadag-Kergez-
Umbaki fields) 
Signed 8/10/94 BMB 100.0 SOCAR moved to 
take over in Dec 99, 
following BMB’s 
request to suspend 
operations. 
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Location of the Existing Production Sharing Agreements 
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 III - The Gas Sector in Azerbaijan 
 
Summary 
 
III-i. At the time of independence, Azerbaijan inherited an extensive gas network.  The 
sector’s infrastructure, however, has suffered from lack of investment and limited 
maintenance.  This has resulted in a significant deterioration in both the scope and quality 
of service.  There is, however, evidence of substantial latent demand for gas and, given 
the country’s underlying hydrocarbon resource base there are clear prospects that much 
of this latent demand can be met provided measures are put in place to ensure the 
effective functioning of the domestic gas sector. 
 
III-ii. The government faces the challenges, therefore, of restoring and maintaining 
acceptable levels of service throughout the country that correspond to the latent demand 
and ensuring that the country secures the optimum benefit from its gas sector assets.  
These benefits include environmental gains that can be secured by substituting gas for 
more polluting fuels and by eliminating gas flaring and venting. 
 
III-iii. The conclusions and recommendations of this section may briefly be summarized 
as follows: 
 
• The increasing risk of systemic collapse resulting from the deterioration of the 
sector’s infrastructure could be significantly reduced by rehabilitating key facilities.  
Investment is urgently required to rehabilitate the transmission system.  Investment is 
also urgently required for the rehabilitation of some distribution facilities and for 
meter installation. 
 
• Part of the deterioration in the transmission system results from the fact that over 3 
BCM of domestic gas production – more than a third of supply - is not treated before 
it enters the system.  The result is a gas mix of unacceptable quality with excessive 
liquids and water which causes corrosion and other problems.  SOCAR has evaluated 
options to treat these volumes but has not developed a concrete plan to solve the 
problem.  A failure to treat all the gas will negatively affect all storage and 
transmission operations.  Consequently, priority should be given to developing a plan 
to deal with this issue. 
 
• SOCAR operates as the “single buyer” of natural gas for delivery into the domestic 
market.  In addition to its own production it receives associated gas produced under 
the Azeri, Chirag, Guneshli (ACG) production sharing agreement (PSA) and it 
purchases imported gas supplied by or though Russia.  In the future the volumes of 
associated gas from ACG will increase significantly and SOCAR will begin buying 
gas from the Shah Deniz consortium under a supplier nomination arrangement.  In 
order for SOCAR to be able to handle all these volumes, which could be subject to 
significant fluctuation, Azerbaijan will need to make a significant investment in 
rehabilitating its two underground gas storage facilities.    
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• SOCAR is likely to continue in the role of “single buyer” at least in the medium term.  
In undertaking this role, SOCAR will be faced with the challenge of balancing the 
domestic system with imports and, on occasion, dealing with potential supply 
surpluses.  Consequently, it will be important for SOCAR to work closely with ACG, 
Shah Deniz and the domestic consumers to develop and maintain updated projections 
of the supply demand balance so as to allow maximum time to develop strategies to 
balance the market. 
 
• It would be desirable to transfer the gas distribution activities to the private sector.  
This would leave Azerigaz as the operator of the gas transmission network and of the 
gas storage facilities23.  The government plans to effect such a transfer of the 
distribution facilities.  In preparation for this it would be helpful to consolidate the 
6824 distribution subsidiaries into a much smaller number – at least two (plus 
Nakhichevan) but not more than four or five – and corporatize them.   
 
• In order to secure private sector involvement in storage and/or distribution, 
appropriate incentives will have to be provided, and should be supported by an 
independent and competitive regulatory regime.  In conjunction with the privatization 
process, the government should establish quality standards.  These should be 
monitored by the regulatory agency. 
 
• Investment needs for the domestic gas sector are on the order of $1 billion, $450 
million of which is urgently required.  Transferring distribution activities to the 
private sector would reduce these overall requirements by about $100 to $150 million 
and would reduce the urgent funding requirements by about $30 to $50 million. 
 
• Included in the $1 billion of investment needs is $60 million to eliminate gas flaring 
from shallow water Guneshli.  While this is not classified as an urgent investment 
need it would result in the collection of an additional 0.3 BCM of gas.  At current 
import prices the project would payout in under four years and, in view of the 
associated environmental benefits, the project might be able to access concessional 
financing. 
 
• At present, the sector is not financially viable and is forced to rely on subsidies both 
explicit and implicit.  There is a shortfall in both collections’ levels and in tariff 
levels.  At their present levels, tariffs are not adequate to cover the cash costs of gas 
supply, even with full collections.  The government is committed to introducing a 
medium term tariff policy designed to bring tariffs up to full cost recovery levels.  In 
designing this policy, attention must be paid to the need to rebalance tariffs between 
customer classes to avoid cross subsidies. 
                                                 
23 The option also exists to have SOCAR manage the gas storage facilities. 
24 This includes 7 distribution companies in Nakhichevan. 
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The Gas Sector in Azerbaijan 
 
III-1. At the time of independence, gas that conformed to acceptable quality standards 
was widely available in Azerbaijan and the country’s gas network was integrated on a 
regional basis with connections into Russia, Iran, Georgia and Armenia.  Azerbaijan also 
acted as a key transit route for gas supply to both Georgia and Armenia.  Since then, 
however, lack of investment in the sector and limited maintenance have resulted in a 
significant deterioration in the sector’s assets with the result that the system which is 
shown schematically in Figure III-1 below is no longer fully functional.  Without 
adequate investment, further deterioration will occur increasing the risk of system failure. 
 
Figure III-1 
 
 
III-2. As is shown in Figure III-2 below, a significant decline in domestic production 
during the 1990s was accompanied by a sharp decline in consumption.  This, in turn led 
to a reduced scope of supply with large parts of the country losing access to gas supplies.  
At this time, gas supply is effectively limited to some larger urban and industrial areas 
most of which are located in the Greater Apsheron Peninsula or along the Western 
corridor that had originally played a major role in supplying gas to Georgia and Armenia.   
 
III-3. When gas imports recommenced in 2001 consumption began to increase.  There 
is immediate potential demand for gas to replace the mazut that is still being used for 
power generation and there is also evidence of significant latent demand in areas that 
have lost their access to gas supplies.  This suggests that, with appropriate investment to 
rehabilitate and restore the gas transmission and distribution network, consumption could 
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continue to increase, provided supplies are made available.  The discovery of significant 
non associated gas reserves in Shah Deniz will not only allow Azerbaijan to become a 
gas exporter, but will enable the country to meet a significant portion of future domestic 
demand from its own resources.  This, however, should be accompanied by reform of the 
domestic gas sector.   
 
Figure III-2 
Gas Production and Consumption
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 Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2004 
 
III-4. To obtain a better understanding of the issues the government faces, it is 
instructive to look at an analysis of the sector’s strengths and weaknesses and the 
associated opportunities and threats it faces. 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Significant associated and non associated gas 
reserves 
• Substantial FDI in the upstream gas sector 
• A well established competent authority (within 
SOCAR) to deal with the international oil and 
gas industry 
• Gas storage facilities 
• An established right of way transmission 
network throughout the country 
• Aging and deteriorating physical infrastructure 
• Insufficient gas processing capacity 
• High losses in transmission and distribution 
• Poor payment performance 
• Low tariff levels and tariff imbalances 
• Quality problems 
• A weak legislative and regulatory framework 
with no regulatory agency 
• Inexperienced commercial management 
Opportunities Threats 
• To support economic development through the 
restoration of consistent quality service 
• To secure environmental benefits by 
substituting gas for more polluting fuels and by 
eliminating gas flaring and venting 
• To secure foreign investment in the sector 
• Further deterioration in service quality  
• Deterioration of the physical infrastructure 
• Inability to handle all available gas volumes 
• Increasing unmanaged demands on the fiscal 
revenue streams resulting from both explicit 
and implicit subsidies 
III-5. The government faces two overarching challenges: 
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i. To restore and maintain acceptable levels of service throughout the country that 
correspond to latent demand; and 
ii. To ensure the country secures optimum benefits from its gas sector assets. 
 
III-6. These two challenges encompass a number of subsidiary issues, including: 
 
• Establishing and sustaining financial viability in the sector 
• Securing adequate funding for investment needs 
• Introducing a commercial approach to management of the sector 
• Minimizing the drain on public sector resources to support the sector 
 
III-7. The government has already taken a number of steps to address these challenges 
including a commitment to strengthen financial discipline in the sector, to introduce an 
independent regulator, to establish a medium term tariff policy and to improve and 
strengthen the sector’s infrastructure. However, strong commitment on the part of the 
government will be required together with the provision of sizable investment funds if 
these challenges are to be met.  This section outlines issues and options to be considered 
as the government develops plans to address these challenges. 
 
Overview of the Sector25 
 
Gas Supply and Demand 
 
III-8. SOCAR acts as the “single buyer” of natural gas for delivery into the domestic 
market.  Gas supplies currently come from three sources: (i) SOCAR’s own gas 
production (currently around 4 billion cubic meters (BCM), but declining); (ii) associated 
gas produced under the Azeri, Chirag, Guneshli (ACG) production sharing agreement 
(PSA) that, under the terms of the agreement, accrues to the State at no cost (currently 
around 1 BCM); and (iii) imports that are either sourced from Russia or transit from 
Central Asia through Russia (currently around 4 BCM).  In the future, a fourth source of 
potential supply – gas from the Shah Deniz field, will join the mix.  There is also the 
prospect that SOCAR will be able to increase its own production by gathering the 
associated gas it is currently flaring. 
 
III-9. SOCAR is responsible for processing the gas currently produced in Azerbaijan  
whether from its own production or supplied from ACG.  The gas is processed at the 
Garadag Gas Processing Plant.  However, the gas treatment plant at Garadag is not fully 
operational and, as a result, only about 2 BCM  out of a total domestic supply of 5 BCM 
is treated.  The remainder is put into the domestic system untreated. 
 
III-10. SOCAR sells directly, at a wholesale price, to three primary customers: 
AzerChemia, the country’s petrochemical facility which also obtains naphtha from 
SOCAR, Azerenergy the power generator which also obtains mazut from SOCAR and 
                                                 
25 Information on the domestic network was provided by Dr. Vilayat Valiyev in a study commissioned by 
the World Bank in 2002. 
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Azerigaz.  Azerigaz was established in 1992 and is responsible for domestic storage, 
transportation and distribution of natural gas.   
 
Box III-1 
Azerbaijan’s Natural Gas Supply System 
The gas supply system comprises: 
 
- 4,000 km of main and branch gas pipelines of up to 1000-1200 mm in diameter, with working 
pressure of 55 atmospheres, a daily throughput capacity of 70 mcm and an annual throughput 
of 25 bcm; 
- Over 36,000 km of medium and low pressure gas pipelines; 
- 7 gas compressor stations with a total capacity of 200 mW; 
- 150 gas distribution stations; and 
- 2 underground gas storage facilities with a total active holding capacity of up to 3 bcm. 
 
On average 8 bcm of gas is delivered each year through the gas transportation system, comprising 
equal proportions of domestically produced and imported gas.  The gas distribution system 
supplies gas to all large cities and 32 regional centers in Azerbaijan.  To date, 67,000 meters have 
been installed for residential consumers as part of an ongoing program to install meters for 
residential and other consumers.  
Source: State Program for Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector in Azerbaijan (2005 – 2015) 
 
Figure III-3 
Azerbaijan Domestic Gas Supply and Demand
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 Source: World Bank analysis, NERA estimates and Shah Deniz 
 
III-11. A projection of the outlook for supply and demand is shown in Figure III-3 above.  
This projection excludes those volumes that are produced to meet the export obligations 
of the Shah Deniz consortium, but assumes the purchase by SOCAR from Shah Deniz of 
all volumes available to the domestic market.  The chart provides both a low demand and 
a high demand scenario.  Under the low demand scenario, production targeted to the 
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domestic market could exceed demand for a period of time.  However, under the high 
demand scenario, Azerbaijan will remain a net importer. 
 
III-12. Some comments are warranted on these projections: 
 
• Gas production from SOCAR’s existing facilities is now starting to decline.  SOCAR, 
however, has the potential to recover about 0.3 BCM of associated gas that is 
currently being flared from its shallow water Guneshli field through implementation 
of a gas flaring reduction project.  The investment costs for such a project are 
estimated at US$60 million, but with import gas prices of $60/MCM, such a project 
could show a payout in less than four years and could qualify for some concessional 
financing as a result of the associated environmental benefits. 
 
• Under the terms of the ACG PSA, ACG is required to deliver associated gas 
produced in conjunction with oil operations to SOCAR free of charge26.  At present, 
this gas is delivered to the gas processing plant at Garadag and amounts to about 1 
BCM per year which is the maximum the pipeline to Garadag can handle.  Given the 
transportation constraint, approximately 0.3 BCM of the associated gas produced by 
ACG is being flared. 
 
With the commissioning of ACG Phase 1, some associated gas will be re-injected to 
maintain reservoir pressure, with the balance being transported via a new 700 mm gas 
pipeline to Sangachal27, where it will be treated to a marketable quality for delivery to 
SOCAR.  Deliveries of associated gas from Sangachal are projected to begin the first 
quarter 2005.  The completion of Phases 2 and 3 of ACG will provide further 
increments of associated gas, reaching a peak in total associated gas deliveries of 
about 6 BCM in 2012.  From the first quarter 2006, all associated gas deliveries from 
ACG will be effected at Sangachal, although the line to Garadag will remain as an 
emergency back-up.   
 
• The Shah Deniz field is being developed primarily to service export markets (initially 
Turkey but potentially further west).  The gas delivered to Turkey will transit Georgia 
which will also purchase gas from the Shah Deniz consortium.  In addition, gas will 
be sold to the government for use in the domestic market.  Under the terms of the 
Shah Deniz–Azerbaijan Gas Sale and Purchase Agreement SOCAR, as the designated 
purchaser, will buy 1.5 BCM/year.  This entire volume is subject to a seller 
nomination arrangement whereby Shah Deniz has the option of delivering between 
zero and 400 million standard cubic feet (SCF) on any given day.  SOCAR will pay 
US$58/MCM28 for gas delivered at the battery limit of the Shah Deniz Sangachal 
plant.  
 
                                                 
26 Article 15.1 of the Production Sharing Agreement  
27 Sangachal is also being constructed to process the non associated gas from Shah Deniz. 
28 The $58/MCM price is fixed for the duration of the contract.  The Shah Deniz gas has a higher calorific 
content than the gas delivered from Russia and this price matches the 2004 price of $52/MCM for Russian 
imports in calorific terms.  The import price was increased to $60/MCM at the beginning of 2005. 
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• Pending the receipt of the increments of gas from ACG phases 2 and 3 and from Shah 
Deniz, Azerbaijan will have to continue importing gas.  Under a low demand 
scenario, imports could cease, although it is possible that imports would have to 
recommence as the associated production levels from ACG go into sharp decline.  
Under a high demand scenario, Azerbaijan will have to continue importing gas even 
with the additions from ACG phases 2 and 3 and from Shah Deniz.   SOCAR should 
be able to balance supply and demand through a judicious use of imports, purchases 
from Shah Deniz and the use of the gas storage facilities.  However, it will be 
important for SOCAR to work closely with ACG, Shah Deniz and the domestic 
consumers to develop and maintain updated projections of the supply demand balance 
so as to allow maximum time to develop strategies to balance the market.  Given the 
possibility that supply surpluses could exist from time to time, SOCAR should also 
examine the potential to export surplus gas volumes.  
 
The Domestic Transmission Network 
 
III-13. Transmission within the domestic network was constructed around three corridors 
which meet at a hub location at Gazi-Mammad (see Figure III-1 above): 
 
i. The Northern corridor connects to the Russian border and serves to bring in gas 
imported from or through Russia.  The corridor includes (a) a 100 kilometer high 
pressure line, with a design capacity of 13 BCM/year, that carries the gas imports 
from the border to Siyazan and then continues a further 140 kilometers to Gazi-
Mammad and (b) 60 kilometers of regional high pressure lines that branch off 
from the main line to service domestic customers in the northern part of the 
country.  The corridor is served by a compressor station at Shirvanovka just 
inside the Azerbaijan border and a second compressor station at Siyazan. 
 
ii. The Western corridor was designed both as a route to deliver gas to Georgia and 
Armenia and as a means of supplying domestic customers in the central and 
western parts of the country.  The corridor includes (a) a main pipeline system 
totaling 930 kilometers of high pressure lines between Gazi-Mammad and the 
Georgian border, with a design capacity of 16 BCM/year, and (b) 500 kilometers 
of regional high pressure lines that branch off from the main pipeline system.  
The system is served by a compressor station at Gazi-Mammad.  Compressor 
stations were also constructed at Agdash and Gazakh.  However, the Agdash 
compressor station has not operated since 1993 and the Gazakh station which 
stopped operating in 1991 has been destroyed. 
 
iii. The Southern corridor had been designed to import gas from Iran and service 
customers in the southern part of the country.  The corridor includes (a) a 210 
kilometer main pipeline between Astara and Gazi-Mammad, with a design 
capacity of 10 BCM/year, and (b) 85 kilometers of regional pipelines.  The main 
pipeline has not operated since 1990. 
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Table III-1  
The Status of the Transmission Network 
Pressure (Bar) Function Route Built Km Design 
Capacity Design Avg. 
Operating 
Russia-Gazi-Mammad  1982 240 12.8 BCM 55 25 Yes Import 
Iran-Gazi-Mammad 1971 229 10.0 BCM 55   1 No 
Gazakh-Saguramo  1980 120   7.3 BCM 55   - No Transit 
  To Georgia Gazakh-Rustavi  1968    6.9 BCM 55   - No 
Gazakh- Hiervan 1980   38   6.9 BCM 55   - No Transit 
  To Armenia Gazakh-Injeran 1986    7.3 BCM 55   - No 
Garadag-Gazi-Mammad 1982   68   2.9 BCM  18 Yes 
Gazi-Mammad-Gazakh 1 1971 378   7.3 BCM  17 Yes 
Gazi-Mammad-Gazakh 2 1979 378   8.8 BCM  17 Yes 
Yevlakh-Nakhichevan 1978 350   4.6 BCM    - No 
Altiagaj-Agsu 1986   76   9.9 BCM  20 Yes 
Transmission 
Galmaz UGS-Gazi-Mammad 1982   42   3.1 BCM  18 Yes 
 
The status of the transmission network is summarized in Table III-1 (above) 
 
Distribution 
 
III-14. At the time of independence, almost all urban residents and 80% of residents in 
rural areas had access to the gas grid.  As has been noted, this access has been 
substantially reduced, with access now generally limited to larger urban and industrial 
areas, primarily in the Greater Apsheron Peninsula area and along the Western corridor, 
although access has been expanding.  The geographic distribution of gas consumption is 
summarized in Table III-2. 
 
Table III-2 
Geographic Distribution of Gas Consumption 
Location Consumption Location Consumption 
Baku-Sumgayit-Apsheron 
Ali-Bairamli and South 
North-East Azerbaijan 
37 % 
12 % 
  5 % 
Central Azerbaijan 
Western Azerbaijan 
North-West Azerbaijan 
  7 % 
35 % 
  4 % 
 
III-15. The distribution of consumption by class of consumer supplied by the Azerigaz 
transmission system is summarized in Table III-3. 
 
Table III-3 
Distribution of Gas Consumption by Consumer Category (2001) 
Consumer Category Consumption (BCM) Percentage 
Households 
Budget/Public Services 
Private Commercial 
Power and Heat 
Other 
2.024 
0.527 
0.491 
4.215 
0.027 
  27.8 % 
    7.2 % 
    6.7 % 
  57.9 % 
    0.4 % 
Total 7.284 100.0 % 
  Source: NERA: Azerbaijan Natural Gas Sector Strategy 
 
  
53 
 
 
III-16. As has been noted, significant latent demand for gas exists.  However, major 
rehabilitation investments will be required if supply capacity is to be restored to its 
design levels.  An indication of the challenges facing the sector in this regard is provided 
in the summary of technical problems and concerns given in Box III-2. 
 
Box III-2 
Technical Problems and Concerns in the Domestic Gas Sector 
• Less than 40% of domestic gas production is treated 
• Only 40% of gas entering the network is de-watered 
• Cathodic protection is provided to only about 30% of the pipelines 
• 25% of the pipelines are more than 20 years old; 38% are 10 to 20 years old; 5% have 
exceeded their operational lifespan 
• More than 35% of the large diameter pipelines and 90% of the other high pressure pipelines 
have polymeric coatings that have exceeded their design life 
• 13% of the lines have a wear rate of more than 75%; 26% have a wear rate of between 50% 
and 75% and 38% have a wear rate of between 25% and 50%; 
Source: Dr. Vilayat Valiyev 
 
III-17. In organizational terms, there are 68 distribution subsidiaries (including 7 in 
Nakhichevan).  Looking to the future, distribution activities would benefit from being 
consolidated into a limited number of corporatized distribution companies.  There should 
be at least two distribution companies (plus Nakhichevan), but probably not more than 
four or five.  One option would be to match the consolidation that has taken place in the 
power sector which now has four distribution companies under private management in 
Baku, Sumgayit, Gandja and Ali-Bayramli.  The government has made a commitment to 
transfer management control of distribution to the private sector. 
 
Gas Storage 
 
III-18. Azerbaijan has two underground gas storage facilities located at Galmaz and 
Garadag.  While these facilities had a design capacity of 4.3 BCM, current capacity is 
limited to about 2 BCM and annual turnover is limited to about 0.5 BCM per year 
compared with a design capacity of 2.3 BCM per year.  Azerbaijan is entitled to receive 
associated gas from ACG and has contracted to buy 1.5 BCM per year of gas from Shah 
Deniz under a seller’s nomination arrangement.  There will, therefore, likely be very 
large fluctuations in daily supply levels.    In order to be able to handle these 
fluctuations, SOCAR will need access to significant gas storage capacity.  Investments 
will be required to rehabilitate the gas facilities in order to provide the needed capacity.  
The full cost of rehabilitation is estimated at $272 million and would involve 
rehabilitation of both facilities with the rehabilitation of Garadag being effected in two 
stages.  Table III-4 summarizes existing and projected capacity for the facilities as well 
as the projected capital investment requirements: 
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Table III-4 
Underground Storage (UGS) Facilities 
Galmas UGS Garadag UGS 
Before Rehab Before Rehab After Rehab 
 
Design Current
After 
Rehab Design Current Phase 1 Phase 2 Total 
Initial operation 1976 1986 
Total storage 
capacity (BCM) 
   
  2.6 
 
1.0 
 
  2.5 
 
  1.7 
 
1.0 
 
  3.2 
   
1.8 
 
  5.0 
Annual turnover 
capacity (BCM) 
 
  1.3 
 
0.3 
   
  1.5 
 
  1.0 
 
0.2 
 
  1.3 
   
1.7 
 
  3.0 
Daily injection 
capacity (mmcm) 
 
10.0 
 
2.5 
 
15.0 
 
10.1 
 
1.2 
 
14.0 
 
14.0 
 
28.0 
Daily withdrawal 
capacity (mmcm) 
 
  8.0 
 
2.0  
 
12.0 
 
  8.3 
 
1.0 
 
10.0 
 
11.0 
 
21.0 
Investment needs 
(US$ million) 
 
 
  
$81.0 
   
$80.1 
 
$111.3 
 
$191.4 
Source: Dr. Vilayat Valiyev 
 
III-19. Azerigaz does not have the financial capacity to make these investments.  
However, while gas storage facilities are often associated with transmission activities 
there is no overarching reason for the facilities to be linked.  Consequently, the gas 
storage facilities and the proposed rehabilitation projects could potentially be transferred 
to and funded by SOCAR.  
 
III-20. Regardless of ownership, gas storage will operate as a monopoly activity and, as 
such, the terms and conditions for its use have to be regulated to ensure non-
discriminatory access to all potential users.  Users could include SOCAR, the Shah 
Deniz consortium29 and customers both within Azerbaijan (such as the distribution 
companies) and outside Azerbaijan (for example, GIOC in Georgia30).  The tariff for gas 
storage should be discretely identified and should allow a reasonable return on 
investment. 
 
Investment Requirements 
 
III-21. To ensure optimum exploitation of Azerbaijan’s gas resource base, significant 
investments will be required to rehabilitate the domestic gas sector infrastructure.  
Investment requirements include the following: (i) rehabilitation of gas storage (described 
above); (ii) rehabilitation of transmission pipelines and compressor stations; (iii) 
installation of a SCADA system; (iv) rehabilitation of the distribution network and the 
installation of metering; (v) expansion of gas treatment facilities to ensure that all gas 
produced by SOCAR is treated before entering the domestic gas grid31; and (vi) gathering 
                                                 
29 Shah Deniz is not anticipating a need for gas storage, but as a producer remains a potential future user. 
30 Georgia has no gas storage facilities but it has gas supply contracts involving supplies from and via 
Russia and from Azerbaijan.  The only way it will be able to manage its gas arrangements effectively, 
without depending entirely on the Russians to balance the system, is by having access to some storage 
capacity.  If Azerbaijan were to make some storage capacity available it would greatly enhance the 
probability of the supply arrangements involving gas from Azerbaijan functioning smoothly. 
31 Untreated gas causes serious corrosion problems in the transmission system. 
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of associated gas that is currently being flared.  In all, these investment requirements are 
projected to total $1 billion, of which $450 million can be considered urgent. 
 
Table III-5 
Gas Sector Investment Needs 2004-2010 
 Total Cost 
US$ millions
Urgent Needs 
US$ millions 
Gas Storage 272 161 
Gas Transmission and Distribution: 
 
  New Pipeline from Sangachal  
  Rehabilitation in Nakhichevan  
  Rehabilitation Outside Nakhichevan 
  Compressor Rehabilitation 
  SCADA 
  Metering 
  Retrofitting Apartment Buildings 
 
 Sub-Total 
 
  
  51 
  37 
259 
  60 
  18 
  90 
    4 
 
519 
 
  
  51 
   
  59 
 
  18  
  10 
    4   
 
142 
Gas Treatment 150 150 
Gas Flaring Reduction   60  
Total 1,001 453 
     Source: Azerigaz 
 
III-22. Some observations are warranted on these investment requirements: 
 
• As has already been noted, investment in gas storage is essential if Azerbaijan is to 
be able to handle future increments of associated gas as well as meet its purchase 
obligations related to Shah Deniz.  The rehabilitation of Galmas UGS and the first 
phase of rehabilitation of Garadag are urgently required.   
 
• Azerigaz has been making some investments in pipeline rehabilitation, but further 
investments will be required to ensure the integrity of the system and minimize 
venting and other transmission losses.  Introduction of a SCADA system will 
enhance operational performance and safety. 
 
• Distribution facilities are also in need of rehabilitation.  In addition a comprehensive 
metering program is required.  At present metering of households is limited to some 
customers in Baku and in Gandja.  In order to effect 100% metering of existing 
customers an additional 750,000 meters will have to be installed.  Expansion of the 
customer base, however, is expected to increase this requirement to between 
1,000,000 and 1,100,000. 
 
• Untreated gas is a source of corrosion of the transmission system.  In order to ensure 
adequate quality, all gas input into the system should be treated.  A 1996 study 
funded by the World Bank provided a cost estimate in 1997 dollars of $120 million 
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to replace the Garadag treatment facility, the cost will have increased in the interim.  
Other options do exist but no firm investment program has been developed.   
 
Funding Options for the Sector’s Investment Needs 
 
III-23. While there is considerable donor interest in providing financial support to the 
power sector, there has been only limited interest shown to date in providing financial 
support to the domestic gas sector32.  The bulk of the sector’s investment needs, 
therefore, will likely have to be met from sector cash flows, from the budget and/or from 
private investors.    
 
III-24. The long term viability of the sector is ultimately predicated on its financial 
viability.  Consequently, the sector needs to be capable of generating the funds to meet its 
investment needs along with its operational and maintenance requirements. 
 
The Financial Outlook for the Sector 
 
III-25. At present, the gas sector falls well short of covering its financial needs.  In 
dealing with this problem, three factors will have to be addressed: (i) payment levels; (ii) 
the level of losses from the system33 and (iii) tariffs.  Table III-6 provides a comparison 
of the performance of the gas sectors in the CIS countries in 2002. 
 
III-26. As Table III-6 indicates, only Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic recovered the 
full cost of their gas supply.  However, a number of the countries recovered sufficient 
revenues to cover their cash costs.  The clear exceptions were Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Russia and Uzbekistan. 
 
III-27. The cost of gas supply in Azerbaijan is made up of both an upstream component, 
incurred by SOCAR as the “single buyer” providing gas to the market and a downstream 
component incurred by Azerigaz in managing transmission, storage and distribution.  An 
estimate of SOCAR’s cost of supply is shown in Table III-7. 
 
III-28. With regard to the downstream components: in a study funded by the Public-
Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) that is administered by the World Bank, 
NERA estimated the tariff levels required to assure the financial viability of the various 
components of the gas sector.  For the sector to be viable these tariffs have to be 
recovered from the consumers together with the cost of the gas being provided.  The 
NERA analysis projects tariffs that vary over time and include a component to recover 
capital investment.  The amounts shown in Table III-8, therefore, are intended as an 
indication of the order of magnitude of the unit tariffs required downstream from 
SOCAR. 
Table III-6 
Financial Performance of the Gas Sector – 2002 
                                                 
32 EBRD is prepared to fund SOCAR’s share of the Shah Deniz development but this is primarily an export 
project. 
33 Gas transmission and distribution losses in Azerbaijan average 7%. 
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Country Collections 
% 
Weighted 
Average Tariff 
US$/MCM 
Average 
Receipt 
US$/MCM 
Average Cost 
Recovery Price 
US$/MCM 
% of 
Cost 
Recovery 
Armenia 91 71.3 64.9 58.0 112 
Azerbaijan 47 19.0   8.9 30.034   30 
Belarus 80 30.3 24.2 25.0   97 
Georgia 25 93.2 23.3 65.0   36 
Kazakhstan 95 53.2 50.5 62.0   81 
Kyrgyz Republic 98 64.1 62.8 47.0 134 
Moldova 78 72.0 56.2 65.0   86 
Russia 79 14.0 11.1 35.0   32 
Tajikistan 55 57.9 31.8 47.0   68 
Ukraine 90 61.9 55.7 62.5   89 
Uzbekistan 60 11.1   6.7 25.0   27 
Source: World Bank analysis 
 
Table III-7 
Gas Supplies and Costs – 2003 
Source of Gas Supply Volume (BCM) Cost US$/MCM 
SOCAR Production 
ACG Associated Gas 
  Domestic Supply/Average Cost 
Imports 
  Total Volume/Average Cost 
4.0 
1.0 
5.0 
4.0 
9.0 
$20.0/MCM 
$  2.0/MCM 
$16.4/MCM 
$52.0/MCM 
$32.2/MCM 
      Source: World Bank estimates 
 
Table III-8 
Projected Tariff Margin Requirements 
 AZM/MCM US$/MCM 
Gas Transmission 28,000   5.71 
Gas Storage   7,500   1.53 
Gas Distribution (Average) 19,000   3.88 
Total  54,500 11.12 
   Source: NERA 
 
III-29. Azerigaz has also calculated the tariff amounts required downstream from 
SOCAR.  The Azerigaz assessment is that before the application of VAT it requires a 
margin of AZM 42,000 to cover its costs and generate a small (5%) profit.  In order to 
recover required investment costs this margin requirement would increase to AZM 
88,000.  Table III-9 summarizes the tariff levels that would need to be achieved to be able 
to recover SOCAR’s and Azerigaz’s costs (including the required investment costs).  
SOCAR’s costs are shown both on average and on the basis of 2004 import costs35.  Also 
shown are the tariff levels required to cover the average wholesale cost to Azerigaz. 
 
Table III-9 
                                                 
34 This does not include a component for full cost recovery of downstream investments. 
35 2004 import costs also equate to the price that will be paid for gas purchased from Shah Deniz. 
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Projected Total Tariff Requirements 
AZM/MCM  
Based on 
Wholesale 
Prices36 
Based on 
SOCAR’s 
Average Costs 
Based on 
SOCAR’s 
Import Costs 
Wholesale Price/SOCAR’s Costs 
Azerigaz Operating Costs 
   Tariff Required to Cover Operating Costs 
Tariff to Cover Investment Requirements 
   Total Required Tariff 
VAT (18%) 
   Total Required Tariff with VAT 
  76,600 
  42,000 
118,600 
  46,000 
164,600 
  29,628 
194,228 
156,832 
  42,000 
198,832 
  46,000 
244,832 
  44,070 
288,902 
254,852 
  42,000 
296,852 
  46,000 
342,852 
  61,713 
404,565 
Source:  Azerigaz and World Bank analysis 
 
III-30. What these analyses suggest is that in order to recover the full cost of gas supply, 
including a component to recover downstream investments, and assuming full payment 
compliance, an average tariff level on the order of US$ 50/MCM, or 245,000 
AZM/MCM before the application of VAT would be required.  This would translate into 
a tariff level of 289,000 AZM/MCM with VAT.  Covering only SOCAR’s and Azerigaz’ 
operating costs would require an average tariff of 199,000 AZM/MCM before the 
application of VAT and 235,000 AZM with VAT.  The current tariff level is sufficient to 
cover the wholesale price and Azerigaz’ operating costs (assuming collections in excess 
of 88%), but will not provide the funds to meet Azerigaz’ investment needs. 
 
III-31. Gas tariffs were increased as of November 2, 2004.  However, as Table III-10 
indicates, tariffs to the non residential consumers are sufficient to cover operating costs 
but are not sufficient to generate the funds needed for investment.  It should also be noted 
that while the cost incurred by SOCAR in 2003 was estimated to average US$32/MCM, 
the import price in 2004 for gas, at the border, was US$52/MCM or 254,852 
AZM/MCM.  Tariffs should ultimately be brought up to levels that cover the import costs 
as well as domestic transmission, storage and distribution costs.   
 
III-32. As Table III-10 indicates, only with the increases in November 2004 are all the 
non residential customers paying tariffs that are sufficient to cover operating costs and 
the tariffs are still not sufficient to cover the costs of required investment or the cost of 
gas imports.   The tariffs paid by residential customers fall well short of even covering 
operating costs.  This means that significant subsidies are being provided through the 
tariff structure to the consumers in the sector and this is compounded by the poor 
payments performance.  In 2002, the overall subsidy amounted to about US$ 81 million, 
or about 1.3% of GDP, and was borne by the budget (87%) and by SOCAR (13%)37. 
Table III-10 
Gas Tariffs – 2004 
Prior to November 2nd From November 2nd 
AZM/MCM AZM/MCM 
Customer Category 
w/o VAT with VAT w/o VAT with VAT 
                                                 
36 The wholesale price is based on domestic production only since that is the supply deemed to be provided 
to Azerigaz. 
37 Source: IMF estimates 
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Residential   30,135   35,560   68,644   81,000 
Budget/Utilities/SOEs   89,918 106,103 200,000 236,000 
Commercial 200,000 236,000 200,000 236,000 
SOCAR   70,339   83,000 200,000 236,000 
Azerenergy 165,000 194,700 200,000 236,000 
Weighted Average   91,525 108,000    135,00038 159,300 
Memo: Wholesale Price 
  Untreated 
  Treated 
   
  64,000 
  64,000 
   
  75,520 
  75,520 
 
73,000 
82,000 
 
86,140 
96,760 
 
III-33. Payment performance needs particular attention, but this should be accompanied 
by the introduction of a medium term tariff policy designed to bring tariffs up to full cost 
recovery levels.  The government has made a commitment to introduce a medium term 
tariff policy.  In designing a medium term tariff policy, the government also needs to 
avoid creating cross subsidies whereby certain categories of customers, e.g. the private 
commercial and industrial enterprises, subsidize the residential customers.  As Table III-
10 indicates, the customer that costs the most to supply, the residential customer pays the 
lowest tariff.  There will, therefore, need to be a rebalancing of tariffs within the context 
of the increase in the overall average weighted tariff level required to achieve full cost 
recovery. 
 
The Future Structure of the Sector 
 
III-34. At present, the gas sector is partially unbundled with SOCAR acting as the “single 
buyer” of natural gas for delivery into the market and Azerigaz managing the 
downstream portions of the sector: transmission, storage and distribution.  A further 
unbundling within the sector, however, would be beneficial and would be consistent with 
the government’s stated objective of securing private sector involvement in the domestic 
gas sector. 
 
III-35. In the medium term, there will likely be no realistic alternative to the “single 
buyer” model for supplying the market.  While four separate sources of gas supply are 
projected to be available: (i) SOCAR’s own production; (ii) associated gas from ACG; 
(iii) gas from Shah Deniz; and (iv) imports, SOCAR has a role to play with all four 
sources and in balancing overall supply and demand. 
 
III-36. Under the terms of the ACG PSA, SOCAR is designated to receive the associated 
gas from ACG free of charge.  In receiving this gas, SOCAR is, in effect, acting as the 
beneficiary of a state owned resource.  At a time when the wholesale price of gas is 
insufficient to cover SOCAR’s gas supply costs, the fact that SOCAR receives this gas 
free of charge serves to help reduce the level of subsidy the company bears.  In the future, 
however, as prices increase ultimately to parity with import levels, SOCAR could receive 
significant benefits from the receipt of the associated gas whereas these benefits should 
rightly accrue directly to the State.  Consideration should, therefore, be given to requiring 
                                                 
38 World Bank estimate of Azerigaz’ weighted average tariff after November 2nd , 2004. 
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SOCAR to make a payment that reflects the value of the gas being received.  Such a 
payment could, logically, be channeled through the State Oil Fund. 
 
III-37. SOCAR is perceived by both the Shah Deniz consortium and by Russian suppliers 
as a creditworthy counter-part for gas sales transactions.  SOCAR is, therefore, the 
designated buyer of gas that will be sold by the Shah Deniz consortium for consumption 
within Azerbaijan39.  It will also likely be the preferred buyer of Russian gas, although 
there is no prohibition on suppliers of gas selling directly to consumers within 
Azerbaijan. 
 
III-38. In the longer term, a more competitive gas market could develop with gas to gas 
competition, particularly if other gas discoveries are made.  It may, therefore, be 
appropriate, at some point in the future, for the government to initiate actions to create 
such a market. 
 
III-39. In the downstream portion of the sector it would be appropriate to separate 
transmission, storage and distribution.  The government also plans to secure private 
sector involvement in gas distribution and the power sector provides a possible model for 
effecting this.  The transfer of distribution to the private sector would leave the 
transmission grid, which functions as a natural monopoly, as a State owned and managed 
asset in the downstream portion of the sector, operated by Azerigaz, and would leave the 
gas storage facilities as State owned assets to be managed by either Azerigaz or SOCAR. 
 
III-40. Involvement of the private sector in gas distribution would transfer the funding 
responsibility for needed investments away from the public sector.  However, SOCAR 
and Azerigaz  would remain responsible, as State owned enterprises for securing the 
funding for investment requirements associated with their operations.  It should be noted 
that gas quality will be an issue of particular concern to private sector companies entering 
the distribution businesses.  It is, therefore, important that SOCAR develop plans to 
ensure treatment of all the gas that enters the domestic network. 
 
III-41. Appendix 2 to this report outlines the liberalization process and the regulatory 
models adopted for the gas sector in a number of locations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 The sale and purchase contract is between Shah Deniz and the government. 
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IV - The Power Sector in Azerbaijan 
 
Summary 
 
IV-i. In the years since independence, Azerbaijan’s power sector infrastructure has 
suffered an extended period of under-investment and limited maintenance.  This has 
resulted in a significant deterioration in the infrastructure and the quality of service.  It 
has also resulted in increased costs.  The sector is now unable to meet domestic demand 
fully and faces an increasing risk of systemic collapse.   
 
IV-ii. The government faces the twin challenges of restoring and maintaining acceptable 
levels of service throughout the country and ensuring the country secures optimum 
benefits from its power sector assets.  Addressing these challenges will require efforts to 
establish and sustain financial viability in the sector, securing funding for investment 
needs and finding ways to minimize the drain on public sector resources to support the 
sector.  This section addresses these challenges and outlines the issues and option to be 
considered as the government develops plans to support sector reform. 
 
IV-iii. The conclusions and recommendations of this section may briefly be summarized 
as follows: 
 
• The risk of system failure could be significantly reduced by rehabilitating and 
upgrading generation facilities and investing in a modern transmission management 
control system.  The latter would support efforts to increase regional trade in future, 
thereby increasing the security of supply and reducing the needed domestic power 
reserve margin.  Optimizing the operational and environmental performance of the 
system in tandem with measures to reduce demand would also help to reduce the 
overall vulnerability of the system.  Long term competitive power import contracts 
could be considered, together with new generation proposals (possibly in the form of 
combined cycle gas turbines), to support the sector’s least cost expansion plan. 
 
• Rehabilitating and upgrading generation and transmission facilities would also yield 
environmental benefits through a reduction in emissions.  Azerbaijan could capitalize 
on this through the sale of carbon credits. 
 
• Investment needs in the sector for generation and transmission40 are estimated at 
between $1,950 million and $3,600 million up to 2015, with about $910 million of 
investments needed in the next three to four years.  There is considerable donor 
interest in providing financial support to the sector.  However, donor loans and grants 
will not cover the entire investment requirement.  The budget has the capacity to 
provide the needed funds. It is reasonable to retain the transmission and dispatch 
function under public ownership, but the balance of the sector would benefit from 
                                                 
40 The State at present owns and manages the generation and transmission assets and is therefore 
responsible for these investments.  Distribution investments will also be required but these are the 
responsibility of the private sector companies managing these assets. 
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private sector involvement.  Public sector investment should, therefore, be somewhat 
limited and a focused effort should be directed to creating the climate to attract 
private investors to the sector. 
 
• Appropriate incentives will have to be provided, and should be supported by an 
independent and competitive regulatory regime, to encourage private sector 
investment in generation.  The process, however, should be appropriately sequenced.  
Azerenergy should be unbundled and the generation assets should be corporatized.  
Rehabilitation of the transmission network should be initiated and the introduction of 
a SCADA system should be followed by the establishment of a dispatch protocol.  In 
addition the proposed structure of the future market, taking account of the dispatch 
protocol, should be established with the objective of ensuring energy costs overall are 
minimized.  The government should avoid the temptation to enter into arrangements 
with individual generators that could result in contingent liabilities and a sub-optimal 
cost of electricity supply.  The government also needs to ensure that appropriate 
incentives remain in place to support the distribution sector which is now under 
private sector management and that the contract obligations (on both sides) are 
honored. 
 
• The sector is not currently financially viable and is forced to rely on subsidies both 
explicit and implicit.  There is a shortfall in both collections’ levels and tariff levels.  
Collections’ performance is now in the hands of the distributing companies and 
payments for electricity supplies by these companies will be phased up to 100% by 
2010.  In the meantime, the budget should cover the payment shortfall to Azerenergy 
since the payment schedule was agreed by the government as part of the process of 
attracting the private sector.   
 
• At their present level, tariffs would not cover operating and maintenance costs and 
provide funds for investment, even with full collections.  The government is 
committed to introducing a medium term tariff policy designed to bring tariffs up to 
full cost recovery levels.  In designing this policy, attention must be paid to the need 
to rebalance tariffs between customer classes to avoid cross subsidies.  Correct tariff 
levels will promote appropriate consumption behavior – Azerbaijan’s consumption 
levels relative to GDP are high.  To support the planned transition to cost recovery 
tariffs, Azerenergy’s assets should be re-evaluated to provide a correct basis for tariff 
setting. 
 
• Appropriate social protection measures are needed to support tariff increases in order 
to improve targeting, to streamline and consolidate benefits, to reduce leakage and to 
apply means testing.   
 
• Concurrent with the introduction of a medium term tariff policy, the government 
should establish quality standards.  These should then be monitored by the regulatory 
agency. 
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The Power Sector in Azerbaijan 
 
IV-1. At the time of independence, Azerbaijan inherited a power sector capable of 
providing almost universal service of acceptable quality.  The network was integrated 
with neighboring countries that were part of the Soviet Union as well as with Iran, 
providing the opportunity to take advantage of regional synergies.  However, an extended 
period of under-investment and limited maintenance has resulted in significant 
deterioration in the quality of the sector’s infrastructure resulting in an inability to meet 
domestic demand on a consistent basis and an increasing risk of systemic collapse. 
 
IV-2. Problems with the availability of electricity are consistently cited as the largest 
impediment to economic development in the non-oil sector in Azerbaijan.  The 
government is aware of this concern and the power sector has received particular 
attention in its reform program.  To obtain a better understanding of the issues the 
government faces, it is instructive to look at an analysis of the sector’s strengths and 
weaknesses and the associated opportunities and threats it faces. 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Significant resources of primary energy 
(oil and gas). 
• A mixture of both hydro and thermal 
generation capacity. 
• Extensive network coverage. 
• Private sector participation in distribution. 
• Access to other electricity markets in the 
region. 
• Aging and deteriorating physical 
infrastructure. 
• High generation cost (at the margin). 
• High losses in generation and transmission. 
• Regional disparities in quality of service. 
• Poor payment performance. 
• Low tariff levels and tariff imbalances. 
• Lack of an acceptable social safety net. 
• A weak legislative and regulatory 
framework with no regulatory agency. 
• Inexperienced commercial management. 
Opportunities Threats 
• To support economic development through 
the restoration of consistent quality service. 
• To improve technical and economic 
efficiency of supply and consumption 
(including more economic dispatch). 
• To increase private sector participation. 
• To take advantage of opportunities for 
regional trade in electricity. 
• Continuing deterioration in the quality of 
service. 
• Further deterioration of the physical 
infrastructure with an associated increased 
risk of systemic collapse. 
• A reduction or loss of private sector 
participation in the sector. 
• Increasing unmanaged demands on the 
fiscal revenue streams resulting from both 
explicit and implicit subsidies. 
 
IV-3. The government faces two overarching challenges: 
 
i. To restore and maintain acceptable levels of service throughout the country; and 
ii. To ensure the country secures optimum benefits from its power sector assets. 
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IV-4. These two challenges encompass a number of subsidiary issues, including: 
 
• Establishing and sustaining financial viability in the sector 
• Securing adequate funding for investment needs  
• Minimizing the drain on public sector resources to support the sector. 
 
The government has already taken a number of steps to address these challenges.  
Notably, a fuel and energy development program has been prepared for the period 2005 – 
2015 that addresses developments in the power sector (Appendix 3).  The government’s 
stated goals and objectives in this program are to: 
 
• Identify key development targets; 
• Meet power requirements using domestic resources; 
• Overcome constraints affecting the power system; 
• Provide quality power to established standards; 
• Ensure the efficient use of energy resources;  
• Expand the use of non traditional energy resources; 
• Provide an enabling environment for increased investment and sound 
competition; 
• Increase collection rates; and  
• Ensure environmental safety. 
 
IV-5. Realizing these goals, however, will take both time and a strong commitment on 
the part of the government.  This section outlines issues and options to be considered as 
the government develops implementation plans to achieve these goals. 
 
Overview of the Sector 
 
IV-6. Azerbaijan’s power generation capacity is comprised of a mixture of thermal and 
hydro generation facilities.  The transmission and distribution networks were designed to 
provide almost universal access.  Azerbaijan has transmission inter-connections and is 
able to trade power with Russia, Georgia, Iran, Turkey and Armenia.  Table VI-1, below, 
summarizes the capacity in the sector 
 
IV-7. Generation and transmission are both managed by Azerenergy, a state owned 
enterprise. Distribution activities are grouped in four regional distribution companies and 
the government has transferred management of these activities to two private companies 
under what is, in effect, a concession arrangement.  The Baku and Sumgayit power 
distribution networks are managed by Barmek Holding AS and the Ali-Bayramli and 
Gandja networks are managed by the Baku High Voltage Electrical Equipment Company.   
 
IV-8. The sector, however, has suffered from inadequate funding to perform essential 
maintenance functions and to introduce new technology.  The result has been a distinct 
deterioration in the quality of the infrastructure and an associated deterioration in the 
quality of service.  Rolling blackouts are now commonplace and the sector is becoming 
increasingly exposed to the risk of systemic collapse.  The risk of system failure could be 
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significantly reduced by rehabilitating and upgrading generation facilities and investing 
in a modern transmission management system. 
 
IV-9. With the deterioration in the sector’s infrastructure, the country is now no longer 
self sufficient in terms of electricity supplies.  While it has the capability of providing the 
primary fuels for power generation from its natural resource base – in particular, its 
hydrocarbon resource base, significant investment in generation facilities will be required 
if self sufficiency in terms of electricity supply is to be re-established. 
 
Table IV-1 
Summary Description of Azerbaijan’s Power Sector 
Nameplate Capacity Usable Capacity Generation 
  Hydro Power 
  Thermal Power 
     Total 
1,040 MW 
4,695 MW 
5,735 MW 
   791.0 MW 
3498.0 MW 
4289.0 MW 
500 kV 330 kV 220 kV 110 kV Total Transmission 
   Line length – km. 
   Number of substations 
450.8 
1 
1270.0 
5 
1,261.7 
9 
2,647.5 
33 
5,567.0 
48 
110 kV 35 kV 20 kV 6-10 kV 0.4 kV Distribution Network 
    
   Line length km. 
    Baku 
    Gandja 
    Ali-Bayramli 
    Sumgayit 
      Total 
 
   Cable line length km. 
    Baku 
    Gandja 
    Ali-Bayramli 
    Sumgayit 
      Total 
 
   Substations 
    Baku 
    Gandja 
    Ali-Bayramli 
    Sumgayit 
      Total 
 
 
    0 
    0 
934 
    0 
934 
 
 
    0 
    0 
    0  
    0 
    0 
 
   
  11 
  87 
  66 
  29 
193 
 
 
   727 
1,925 
1,951 
   527 
5,130 
 
 
   111 
   171 
      0 
      6 
   288 
 
 
   217 
   192 
   272 
     60 
   741 
 
 
72 
  0 
  0 
  0 
72 
 
 
  9 
  0 
  0 
  0 
  9 
 
 
57 
  0 
  0 
  0 
57 
 
 
  1,271 
12,519 
11,534 
  3,672 
28,996 
 
 
  1,653 
         0 
       15 
     297 
  1,965 
 
 
  3,674 
  6,129 
  6,290 
  2,087 
18,180 
 
 
  6,490 
20,659 
20,529 
  6,807 
54,485 
 
 
  1,330 
     280 
     132 
     535 
    2,277  
 
 
 
 Source: Report prepared for the World Bank by Dr. Vilayat Valiyev; and, State Program om 
Development of Azerbaijan Republic Fuel Energy Complex within 2004 – 2015 (Draft), Baku 
2004. 
 
Investment Requirements 
 
IV-10. As Table IV-1 indicates, available generation capacity is substantially less than 
installed capacity, representing a little less than 75% of installed capacity.  Available 
capacity is not sufficient to meet peak winter domestic demand when there is extensive 
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use of electricity for heating and, at current consumption rates41, the reserve margin 
which would be expected to be around 20% to 25% is non existent. 
 
IV-11. Options to meet peak demand include (i) expanding and upgrading existing 
generation facilities; (ii) increasing regional trade; (iii) improving the performance of 
existing facilities; and (iv) demand side management. 
 
IV-12. State forecasts for the period 2004 – 2015 predict a 4.7 % growth in electricity 
demand per annum, based on the projected trend of GDP in the non oil sector.  To meet 
projected demand, new generation capacity would be needed from 2005, with required 
additions exceeding 2750 MW by 2015. 
 
Table IV-2 
Installed Capacity Forecast  
Years 
New capacity to be launched in  the 
power system 
Installed 
capacity 
(MW)  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total on capacities to be launched 
with State Guarantee, including: 
1920 - 
2020  60 120 
480 - 
580 460 400  400     
Sumgayit SGF 400÷500    400÷ 500         
Shimal SRPP-2 400     400        
AzDRES 300  60 120 60 60        
Mingechavir Water Reservoir 20    20         
Ali-Bayramli SRPP 800      400  400     
Independent power plants - no state 
guarantee 500   60 70 70 100 100 100     
Wind power plants (private) 260  5 10 10 25 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Small HPPs (private) 30   3 5 10 12       
Total capacity of power system  4100 4165 4378 4923 5428 5970 6100 6630 6660 6690 6720 6750
Source: State Program on Development of Azerbaijan Republic Fuel Energy Complex within 2004 – 2015 
(draft) 
 
IV-13. Significant investments would be required in the power sector to address 
generation and transmission needs up to 2015.  Investment estimates range from $1,950 
million to $3,600 million, depending upon the development profile chosen for the sector. 
$680 million would be required to meet new generation needs (state-owned) up to 2008.  
The investment requirements are briefly summarized in Table IV-3.  With these 
investments Azerbaijan would be on track to meet the generation profile required to 
cover its projected demand through 2015.   
 
IV-14. Priority investments are required to upgrade and rehabilitate existing generation 
facilities to meet the near term demand and to allow time for the financing and 
construction of new capacity.  At a minimum, emergency facilities should be enhanced to 
                                                 
41 In 2002, billed consumption was 18,031 MWh. 
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reduce the risk of large-scale failure.  EBRD is preparing a loan42 to support emergency 
and capacity enhancing investments in generation. 
 
Table IV-3 
Power Sector Investment Needs (2004 – 2015) 
 Total Cost 
US$ millions 
2005 – 2008 Needs 
US$ millions 
Construction and refurbishment of power 
plants, including: 
 
Shimal SRPP Phase 2 
Sumgayit SGF 
AzDRES units 1 – 9 
Mingechavir water reservoir 
Ordubad HPP 
Ali Bayramli SRPP 
Tovuz HPP 
Sangachal TPP 
Shamkir HPP 
Navahi NPP 
 
1,720 – 3,370 
 
270 
300 
70 - 270 
  40 
  90 
650 
0 – 450 
300 
0 – 1,000 
0 – 1,200 
 
680 
 
270 
300 
  70 
  40 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Construction of key transmission lines and 
substations 
 
230 
 
230 
Total 1,950 – 3,600 910 
Source: State Program on Development of Azerbaijan Republic Fuel Energy Complex within 2004 – 2015 
(draft); World Bank 
 
IV-15. The transmission grid represents the largest risk of systemic, catastrophic failure. 
Overloading and protective relay operations have been major contributors to winter 
blackouts43.  There is a high risk that availability could be further reduced due to the sub-
optimal location of generation compared to demand and the consequent reliance on long 
transmission lines.  Investment in a modern transmission control system, such as 
SCADA44, could reduce the risk of failure and improve economic dispatch.  The World 
Bank, in cooperation with Azerenergy, is preparing a power transmission project45 to 
improve system control and complete some upgrades.  KfW is also supporting the 
upgrade of substations46.   
 
IV-16. With the transfer of the distribution facilities to the private sector, responsibility 
for investment in distribution has also been transferred.  These arrangements have been 
established on a contract basis essentially equivalent to a concession arrangement 
(although described as a “management contract”).  While the terms of the contractual 
arrangements need to be respected, careful monitoring will be required to ensure that 
                                                 
42 The loan is expected to amount to at least 70 million Euros. 
43 This was clearly demonstrated in July 2002, when a combination of fire on the ground and poor 
transmission line maintenance caused short-circuits of both the 500 kV and the parallel 330 kV power lines. 
between the Azgres thermal power station at Mingechevir and Baku, ultimately causing the whole power 
system to trip and blackout the entire country. 
44 Including an Energy Management System, metering and telecommunication upgrades. 
45 Up to $50 million is contemplated as an IBRD loan. 
46 KfW has provided a 15 million Euros credit. 
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appropriate investments are made in the distribution companies.  The contracts do include 
an obligation on the part of the private sector enterprises to generate and submit an 
investment plan (see the box below).  Since availability of funding to meet future 
investment requirements will be very much dependent on the margins available to the 
distribution companies, the government will need to work closely with these companies 
to ensure that appropriate incentives exist to allow adequate investment in distribution.  
Within this context, investment plans should be reviewed to ensure that there are 
sufficient funds to support working capital and investment needs. 
 
Box IV - 1 
Management Contract Terms 
The management contracts for the four regional distribution and retail companies 
include the following requirements: 
 
• To make at least certain annual minimum levels of investment in specified areas 
• To install metering for defined customer groups 
• To meet the technical and operational standards proposed by the operator and 
agreed with the MED 
• To meet or exceed specified performance targets for technical losses (or suffer 
reduced profit levels) 
• To propose within one year a new detailed investment program and feasibility study 
which will set out a forward looking business plan for the company 
• Restrict operations to “constant margin” for the first three years of the contract 
 
Regional Trade 
 
IV-17. Supply demand projections assume some continuing level of imports.  This 
reflects the fact that power exchange takes place regularly among some of the countries 
of the region, although on a rather limited scale.  Increased regional trade could improve 
the security of supply and, at the same time, reduce the required domestic capacity 
reserve.  Diversifying sources of supply increases competition and has the potential to 
reduce the cost of power. 
 
IV-18. The government is considering increased private sector involvement in 
generation, predicting private ownership of generation of about 12 % by 2015.  It is 
important, however, that any such arrangements not preclude the opportunity to take 
advantage of attractively priced imports (the issue of privatization of generation is 
discussed further below). 
 
IV-19. In order to take full advantage of potential import opportunities, the transmission 
system will first need to be rehabilitated.  The degree of reliance that can be placed on 
imports as a long term source of supply will have to be based on an assessment of the 
security and reliability of such imports.  However, long term competitively priced power 
import contracts could increase system availability and form part of a least cost supply 
plan in the longer term. 
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Energy Efficiency 
 
IV-20. The fuel input to electrical output is high and has risen over 12% in the past 
decade from 364 grams per kWh in 1991 to 407 grams per kWh in 2002.  As Table IV-4 
below indicates, this level of fuel input compares relatively unfavorably to a number of 
other FSU countries.  Gas-fueled combined-cycle thermal power plants can reach thermal 
efficiencies of 55% to 60% and, thus, produce considerably more electricity per unit of 
natural gas fuel input than Azerbaijan’s aging stock of power plants.  Given Azerbaijan’s 
substantial gas resource base, it would be logical to consider gas fired combined-cycle 
plants as an option for new increments of capacity.   
 
Table IV-4 
Fuel Input to Electrical Output 
Country grams/kWh
Azerbaijan 
Armenia 
Kazakhstan 
Latvia 
Tajikistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
40747 
375 
466 
233 
365 
373 
383 
Source: World Bank analysis 
 
IV-21. The State’s program for development of the sector predicts that with the 
modernization of thermal generation facilities and the increased use of natural gas as a 
fuel source there will be a corresponding decline in conventional fuel use to a level of 
250 grams per kWh by 2015.   
 
Demand Side Management 
 
IV-22. As in all the FSU countries, electricity consumption in Azerbaijan is high relative 
to GDP.  Azerbaijan, however, is one of the higher consumers of electricity suggesting 
there are opportunities for consumption savings.  Table IV-5 provides details of total 
electricity consumption relative to GDP for all of the FSU countries in 2001.  The 
demand profile for the period 2004 – 2015 (Table IV-6) shows an increasing trend in per 
capita consumption, although there is a decline in the overall ratio of consumption 
relative to GDP. 
 
                                                 
47 State Program on Development of Azerbaijan Fuel Energy Complex within 2004 – 2015, Baku 2004 
(draft) 
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Table IV-5 
Annual Electricity Consumption Per Capita Relative to GDP Per Capita - 2002 
Country kWh US $ Ratio Country kWh US $ Ratio 
Middle Income   1,422   1,770 0.80 Kyrgyz Republic 1,269    290   4.38 
USA 12,183 35,430 0.34 Latvia 2,088 3,780   0.55 
Total World   2,225   5,130 0.43 Lithuania 1,938 3,730   0.52 
Armenia    1,113      800 1.39 Moldova    909    400   2.27 
Azerbaijan   1,878      720 2.61 Russia 4,291 2,120   2.02 
Belarus   2,657   1,380 1.93 Tajikistan 2,236   180 12.42 
Estonia   3,882   4,540 0.86 Turkmenistán 1,371    860   1.59 
Georgia   1,033      650 1.59 Ukraine 2,229    780   2.86 
Kazakhstan   2,911   1,520 1.92 Uzbekistan 1,670    460   3.63 
  Source: World Bank Group Data and Statistics 
 
Table IV-6 
Demand Profile 2004 - 2015 
Years Indicators Unit 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Electricity 
Demand Billion kWh 22.9 23.6 24.4 25.3 26.1 27.9 29.2 30.7 32.2 33.9 36.1 37.9 
Electricity 
Generation  kWh per capita 2735 2784 2851 2928 2993 3142 3281 3404 3531 3677 3882 4032 
Demand 
per Unit of 
GDP 
kwh  per AZM  0.81 0.75 0.68 0.63 0.55 0.52 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.37 0.36 
Source: State Program on Development of Azerbaijan Republic Fuel Energy Complex Within 2004 – 2015 (draft), 
Baku 2004. 
 
IV-23. The key factors influencing electricity consumption levels are (i) the incentives to 
conserve and (ii) the availability of alternative more attractive energy sources.  As is 
discussed further below, Azerbaijan’s current tariff structure does not cover the cost of 
electricity supply.  Consequently, appropriate incentives are not in place to ensure that 
electricity is consumed with full regard to the economic consequences.  In addition, 
Azerbaijan uses a substantial amount of electricity for heating in the winter.  This is, in 
part, a result of the deterioration in the domestic gas transmission and distribution 
network.  Azerbaijan is endowed with significant gas resources and should, therefore, 
establish a longer term objective of transitioning from electricity to gas for heating 
purposes where this makes economic sense. 
 
Funding Options for the Sector’s Investment Needs 
 
IV-24. As has been noted above, there is considerable donor interest in providing 
financial support to the power sector.  Donor loans and grants, however, will not be 
sufficient to meet all the investment requirements of the sector.  The balance of the 
funding will have to come from sector cash flows, from the budget or from private 
investors. 
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IV-25. The long term viability of the sector is ultimately predicated on its financial 
viability.  Consequently the sector needs to be capable of generating the funds to meet its 
investment needs along with its operational and maintenance requirements.   
 
The Financial Outlook for the Sector 
 
IV-26. At present, the power sector falls well short of covering its financial needs.  In 
dealing with this problem, three factors will have to be addressed: (i) payment levels; (ii) 
the level of losses from the system; and (iii) tariffs.  Table IV-7 provides a comparison of 
the financial performance of the power sectors in the CIS countries in 2002. 
 
Table IV-7 
Financial Performance of the Power Sector - 2002 
Country Excess 
Losses  
%48 
Collections 
% 
Weighted 
Average Tariff 
USc/kWh 
Average 
Receipt 
USc/kWh 
Average Cost 
Recovery Price 
USc/kWh 
% of Cost 
Recovery 
Armenia  11.95   90.0 3.08 2.77 3.70   74.9 
Azerbaijan   2.03   34.0 1.90 0.65 3.80   17.1 
Belarus -   97.8 3.31 3.24 3.57   90.8 
Georgia   1.23   47.0 4.30 2.02 4.07   49.6 
Kazakhstan   8.07   62.0 2.60 1.61 3.00   53.7 
Kyrgyz Republic 28.72   84.0 1.13 0.94 2.30   40.9 
Moldova 11.70 107.9 5.00 5.40 5.00 108.0 
Russia   2.05   92.1 1.50 1.38 3.00   46.0 
Tajikistan   3.73   70.0 0.50 0.35 2.10   16.7 
Turkmenistan   4.49 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Ukraine   8.04   89.8 2.62 2.35 4.00   58.8 
Uzbekistan -   50.0 0.85 0.43 3.50   12.3 
Source:  World Bank analysis 
 
IV-27. As Table IV-7 indicates, among the CIS countries, only Moldova recovered the 
full cost of its electricity supply in 2002.  However, most of the countries collected 
sufficient revenues to cover cash costs.  The clear exceptions were Azerbaijan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan.  Since 2002, however, Uzbekistan has increased its tariffs substantially, 
thereby reducing the shortfall in cost recovery. 
 
IV-28. The situation on collections in Azerbaijan is somewhat distorted by the 
contractual arrangements that were agreed for the management contracts for the 
distribution companies.  These arrangements allow the management contractors to defer 
amounts payable for electricity purchased from Azerenergy.  The projected payments’ 
percentages are summarized in Table IV-8. 
 
                                                 
48 Excess losses are technical and commercial losses in the system that are in excess of expected system 
norms. 
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Table IV-8 
Projected Payment Levels of the Distributing Companies (Percentage) 
Distributor Purchases in 
2002 -  GWh 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Baku 6,487 50 55 60 75 100 100 100 100 100 
Sumgayit 2,096 30 30 35 40   45   50   65   80 100 
Ganja 4,708 30 30 35 40   45   50   65   80 100 
Ali-Bayramli 3,083 30 30 35 40   45   50   65   80 100 
Source Azerenergy Financial Model (April 2004) 
 
IV-29. In 2002, the overall collection rate from the distribution networks was 34%, but 
the amount paid to Azerenegy was only 27.6%49.  The holders of the four distribution 
contracts are committed to increasing collections from their customers to 100% by 2006 
although they are not obliged to exceed the percentage payment levels to Azerenergy that 
are shown in Table IV-8. 
 
IV-30. The phasing up of payment levels to Azerenergy provides an improving outlook 
for the sector.  However, since the agreement to defer payment obligations was a 
government decision, the government should ensure that Azerenergy is compensated for 
the shortfall in payments via the State Budget50.  The budget did provide explicit 
subsidies of $307 million in 2002 and $388 million in 2003 to Azerenergy to cover the 
majority of fuel costs for thermal power generation.  A decision was taken in 2003, to 
formalize these payments within the State budget and offset SOCAR’s debts to the 
budget with receivables from Azerenergy.  Such support needs to be continued with 
provision being made to include funds to support investment. 
 
IV-31. Even with 100% collections, however, Azerbaijan will fall short of covering the 
full cost of its electricity.  Tariff increases will be required and the government has 
committed to the establishment of a medium term tariff policy designed to bring tariffs up 
to full cost recovery levels.  In order to minimize the impact of higher tariff levels on the 
poor, a targeted and effective social safety net must be developed and introduced and the 
government is working on the implementation of an appropriate social safety net.  Tariff 
increases need to take into account the ability of the population to pay for the electricity. 
However, the increases in income levels, pensions and the minimum wage over the past 
one to two years have been sufficient to make a higher tariff level more affordable.  Thus, 
even absent the implementation of an effective social safety net, phased increases in 
electricity prices can be implemented. 
 
IV-32. In designing a medium tariff policy the government also needs to avoid creating 
cross subsidies whereby certain customer classes, e.g. the commercial and industrial 
customers, subsidize the residential customers. In the first quarter of 2004, the tariffs to 
residential, industrial and commercial customers equated to 2.0 US cents/kWh, 2.7 US 
                                                 
49 The shortfall is attributed to non payment, corruption by low level employees and selective under 
reporting by the companies themselves.  Theft is also high due in part to a lack of metering and under 
reporting as well as to widespread meter tampering. 
50 The government should also ensure that Azerenergy is compensated for the shortfall in tariff levels that 
reflects a government decision to phase in tariff increases to full cost recovery levels. 
  
73 
 
 
cents/kWh and 5.1 cents/kWh respectively.  Consequently, the class of customer that cost 
most to supply – the residential customer – paid the lowest tariff.  There will, therefore, 
need to be a rebalancing of tariffs within the context of the increase in the overall average 
weighted tariff  level required to achieve full cost recovery.  
 
Public Sector Funding 
 
IV-33. Azerbaijan is blessed with significant hydrocarbon resources and enjoys the 
prospect of significant fiscal revenues over the upcoming two plus decades.  Figure IV-1 
below summarizes a projection of fiscal revenues flowing both to the State Oil Fund and 
to the State Budget.  This projection is based on the World Bank’s 2004 price forecast 
which projected oil prices of $39/barrel in 2004, $36/barrel in 2005, $32/barrel in 2006, 
declining to a floor price of $26/barrel in the 2009 to 2010 timeframe. 
 
Figure IV-1 
Azerbaijan Oil Revenues
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 Source: World Bank analysis 
 
IV-34. This projection suggests that Azerbaijan should have the financial capacity to 
meet the critical investment requirements of the power sector from the budget.  This, 
however, represents a potential drain on public sector resources which should be avoided 
if possible. 
 
Private Sector Participation 
 
IV-35. While overall tariff levels remain below cost recovery levels, the margins 
provided to the distribution companies coupled with the deferred payment mechanism for 
the purchase of electricity resulted in attracting private sector participation in electricity 
distribution.  The government has stated an interest in securing further private sector 
involvement in the sector and has specifically identified generation as an area for 
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increased private sector involvement (predicting around a 12% private share in the 
ownership of generation facilities by 2015, Table IV-9).  Such involvement could take a 
number of forms; for example: (i) outright sale of Azerenergy’s generating assets; (ii) a 
concession arrangement similar to that put in place for the distribution companies; (iii) a 
standard management contract whereby management responsibility is transferred to a 
private sector contractor on a fee basis; and (iv) the creation of incentives to encourage 
the development of new capacity by independent power producers (IPPs).  Care must be 
taken, however, with the timing and the sequencing of such additional private sector 
involvement. 
 
Table IV-9 
Projected Ownership of Generation 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total 
capacity 4100 4165 4378 4923 5428 5970 6100 6630 6660 6690 6720 6750 
State 
owned  
(%) 100 99.9 98.2 96.7 95 93.3 91.2 90 89.5 89.1 88.7 88.3 
Privately 
owned 
(%) 0 0.1 1.8 3.3 5 6.7 8.8 10 10.5 10.9 11.3 11.7 
Source: State Program on Development of Azerbaijan Republic Fuel Energy Complex Within 2004 – 2015 
(draft), Baku 2004. 
 
IV-36. Absent appropriate incentives, private sector interest will be very muted.  
Incentives, however, need to be introduced on a basis that is consistent with the overall 
reform objectives of the sector.  Other countries have experienced significant problems 
by introducing specific incentives for individual private sector generators that create long 
term market distortions.  Such incentives often take the form of attractive power purchase 
arrangement terms that have the effect of transferring all commercial risk from the 
private sector generator to a state owned purchaser of power51.  As a precursor to 
involving the private sector in power generation several actions are required: 
 
i. The sector will need to be restructured and a first step is to unbundle Azerenergy, 
separating the transmission and dispatch roles from the generation role.   
ii. Generation activities should then be corporatized in several companies, possibly 
with each generation facility being a company. 
iii. Rehabilitation of the transmission system is also required and the introduction of a 
SCADA system will permit the development of a dispatch protocol which should 
govern future dispatch arrangements. 
                                                 
51 The case of Turkey provides a number of examples of problems associated with specific power purchase 
arrangements (PPAs).  To cite one example, the PPA negotiated by Enron assured the company of a rate of 
11 cents/kWh for electricity supplied to the transmission company which, in turn was only able to resell it 
to the distribution companies at a price of less than 5 cents/kWh.  Turkey’s subsequent decision not to 
provide a state guarantee on such arrangements slowed down the pace of private sector involvement but 
substantially reduced the State’s contingent liabilities and ensured that over the longer term a more 
competitive power market will emerge. 
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iv. A market structure will have to be developed which, coupled with the dispatch 
protocol, should optimize the overall cost of power supply within Azerbaijan.  
The government has already established the principle of bi-lateral contracting 
between Azerenergy and the distribution companies.  It should be possible to 
build on this principle and avoid the introduction of a single buyer model to the 
sector.  In particular, Azerbaijan should avoid a situation whereby the 
transmission company takes on a single buyer role. 
v. A clearly articulated medium term tariff policy and the establishment of an 
independent regulator will also be important in promoting private sector 
investment interest. 
vi. An important adjunct to the development of a medium term tariff policy is the 
development of monitorable quality standards.  Tariff increases will be much 
more palatable if accompanied by a demonstrated commitment to improve the 
quality of service.  Quality standards should be developed and monitored at the 
distribution level and should be incorporated into any agreement for private sector 
involvement in generation.  Establishing and monitoring quality standards will be 
an important role for the regulator 
 
IV-37. The government has outlined a program52 for developing a new regulatory regime 
by mid 2006 that will include a Utility Regulatory Agency with responsibility for the 
regulation of prices and tariffs, technical performance and customer service.  The 
government has also issued a decree emphasizing its commitment to enhance the 
financial discipline in the sector. 
 
IV-38. The measures outlined above can be implemented within the next two to three 
years.  There is then the potential for the sector to continue to evolve towards becoming a 
fully competitive market; in particular it will be possible to establish competition in 
generation.  One barrier at this time is the size of the market in Azerbaijan which is 
probably too small to support the creation of a fully competitive wholesale market.  As 
the market grows such an option will become more feasible and will need to be 
evaluated.  In the meantime efforts should be made to develop an understanding of the 
market structure options in order to ensure that the ultimate market design for the power 
sector in Azerbaijan is optimal for the specific circumstances of the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 In April 2003, the government provided a letter of intent to the World Bank on the “Development of the 
Regulatory Framework for the Utility Sector and Creation of New Institutional Arrangements for 
Regulation”.  This letter of intent covers the electricity; natural gas transmission, storage and distribution; 
heating; water supply; and sewerage sub-sectors. 
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V - The Regulatory Environment in Azerbaijan 
 
Summary 
 
V-i. There is, at present, no independent regulator for the energy industry in 
Azerbaijan.  Responsibilities for regulation of the utility service sectors are fragmented 
and laws overlap in a number of areas, for example licensing and tariffs.  The Ministry of 
Economic Development (MED), the Ministry of Industry and Energy (MoIE)53 and the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) share responsibilities for policy development and regulatory 
oversight and both the President’s office and the state owned enterprises in each sub-
sector also play a role in policy making.  This introduces potential conflicts between 
political and economic decision making.   
 
V-ii. There is a well established “competent authority” within SOCAR that deals with 
the international oil and gas industry on a day to day basis.  However, SOCAR’s role as 
government representative represents a potential conflict of interest with its other 
commercial and investor roles.   
 
V-iii. A solid legislative framework and an effective regulatory function are essential to 
the long term viability of the utility service sectors.  Absent a good legislative and 
regulatory framework it will be difficult to attract adequate private investment to the 
sectors and to promote the needed improvements in efficiency.  This section addresses 
the actions needed to introduce an acceptable regulatory environment to Azerbaijan and 
highlights the respective roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders in this regard54.   
 
V-iv. The conclusions and recommendations of this section may briefly be summarized 
as follows: 
 
• There is a need to establish greater clarity with regard to responsibilities for policy 
making for the energy sector.  In particular, there is overlap and the potential for 
confusion regarding the respective roles of MED and MoIE.  In order to address this, 
the respective roles and responsibilities could be redefined and incorporated in a new 
decree.  Alternatively, the policy making functions of MED and MoIE could be 
consolidated in a single ministry. 
 
• SOCAR is very effective in performing the role of “competent authority” in dealing 
with the international oil and gas industry.  However, this represents a potential 
conflict of interest given SOCAR’s other commercial and investor roles.  To remove 
this potential conflict of interest, this role should be transferred to an independent 
agency with financing and reporting structures that are separate from SOCAR.  Given 
                                                 
53 The responsibilities of the Ministry of Industry and Energy were previously assigned to the Ministry of 
Fuel and Energy.  The charter for the Ministry of Industry and Energy has not yet been finalized but it is 
anticipated that it would include the roles and responsibilities of the former Ministry of Fuel and Energy. 
54 While tariff setting is identified as one of the roles of the regulator, this section does not address the 
methodology of establishing tariffs.  This is addressed in other work that has been undertaken with the 
government. 
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the importance of the role the agency should report directly to top levels of 
government. 
 
• The government has made a commitment to establish a regulatory agency for the 
energy sector.  It is essential that the regulatory agency be solidly supported by 
legislation and that the structure and functions of the agency conform to good 
international practice.  Within this context several factors require particular attention: 
 
◊ The agency should be and should be seen to be independent.  This will require an 
assured source of funding that should, ideally, not come from budget sources.  
The agency should be empowered to establish its own hiring and human resource 
policies.  The agency should operate without direct orders, advice or interference 
from the government and the Commissioners should have tenure and should only 
be removable as the result of egregious acts or gross incompetence.  
 
◊ The agency should be mandated to promote improved transparency and 
accountability.  This will necessitate a transparent approach towards decision 
making and information disclosure. 
 
◊ A key role for the agency will be the establishment and monitoring of service 
quality standards.  The agency will be responsible for tariff setting.  Service 
quality is as important for consumers as prices; yet this fact is frequently ignored 
by newly established regulatory agencies.   
 
◊ The agency should also have powers to promote competition and prevent anti-
competitive behavior. 
 
• The government’s plans contemplate full implementation of the new regulatory 
regime by mid-2006.  In the meantime, however, a transition plan should be 
developed for the period prior to full implementation of the new regulatory regime 
proposed in the government’s Letter of Intent to the Bank.  The transition plan should 
conform to the good international practices that should ultimately be incorporated in 
the new regime.  Key issues to be addressed are the need to:  (i) concentrate 
regulatory functions in a single location; (ii)  change Decrees and Regulations 
pertaining to the MED, MoF, MoIE and the Tariff Council; (iii) rapidly build capacity 
to regulate the sector; (iv) establish clear coordination across institutions with 
overlapping regulatory roles and responsibilities; (v) document regulatory roles, 
responsibilities and procedures; and (vi) promote increased transparency around the 
regulatory processes.  
 
• At present, there are a number of perceived risks embodied within the current 
regulatory framework that act as disincentives for external investors in the energy 
sector.  These need to be reviewed and clarified as part of the transition to an 
independent regulatory regime.  A more liberal policy regime that addresses market 
rules and the opening of the domestic market would also support external 
involvement in the sector.   
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V-v. A step that is urgently required is passage of legislation establishing the 
regulatory agency.  However, in order to craft this legislation a number of government 
decisions are required.  The key decisions relate primarily to the autonomy and the 
authority of the agency.  However, the issue of accountability of the agency is also 
important.  The specific issues to be addressed are as follows: 
 
• In which branch (executive, legislative or judicial) should the agency be located? 
 
Regulatory agencies are generally placed in either the legislative or executive 
branch.  If placed in the legislative branch, the agency would report to the Milli 
Majlis.  Such an approach, in theory, provides the greatest degree of 
independence to the agency by placing some distance between the regulator and 
the government, the utility companies and the public.  However, a considerable 
degree of autonomy can still be retained with an executive-branch agency.  Many 
of the regulatory authorities established in southeastern Europe and in other 
former Soviet Union countries have been structured as executive-branch agencies. 
 
In the event the agency is located in the executive branch the question arises as to 
where, specifically, it should report.  The preferred option would be to have it 
report at the highest levels of government to the President, the Prime Minister or 
to the Cabinet of Ministers.  This would minimize the risk of interference with the 
agency’s role.  There are examples, however, where a regulatory agency reports 
through a ministry.  In such event, however, it remains important that the 
agency’s autonomy be preserved to the extent possible.  In the case of Azerbaijan, 
were the decision made to have the agency report through a ministry it is likely 
that only assignment to the Ministry of Economic Development would be seen as 
preserving sufficient autonomy to the agency to allow such an arrangement to 
function. 
 
• How should the Commissioners be appointed? 
 
If the agency were to be established in the legislative branch, the normal practice 
would be to have the Milli Majlis appoint the Commissioners, although the 
appointment could be based on nominations submitted by the President and 
approved by the Milli Majlis.  If the agency were to be established in the 
executive branch the appointments could be made by the President.  It would still 
be desirable, however, to have the appointments ratified by the Milli Majlis. 
 
Regardless of the specifics of the method of appointment, the autonomy of the 
agency will be predicated on assurances that the Commissioners will be allowed 
to exercise their role without undue interference.  This means that the 
Commissioners should be assured that they can only be removed for clearly 
defined reasons such as being convicted of a criminal offense or becoming 
permanently incapacitated.  It is also important that the institutional memory of 
the agency be preserved and this can be effected by appointing Commissioners to 
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staggered terms.  The total number of Commissioners will be dictated in part by 
the available capacity to perform the function.  It would be desirable, however, to 
have a minimum of three Commissioners appointed to the agency.  The 
Chairmanship could either rotate among the Commissioners or be subject to the 
same rules of appointment as apply for the appointment of the Commissioners. 
 
• How will the agency be funded? 
 
In order to preserve its autonomy, it is important that the agency be independently 
funded to the maximum extent possible.  In the event a regulatory agency is 
entirely dependent on the government for its funding it becomes more susceptible 
to government interference.  The normal forms of independent funding are license 
fees and/or tariff surcharges levied on consumption.  Dedicated taxes are also 
sometimes used as a source of independent funding.  The government will need to 
decide on the preferred sources of independent funding for the agency.  To the 
extent tariff surcharges are used this will impact the form of the tariff policy the 
government will need to adopt (see the discussion below).  It may also be 
necessary, at least for an interim period, to fund a part of the agency’s costs from 
the State budget – this is particularly likely during the start up phase.  Ideally, 
however, the period for such budget funding should have a sunset provision.  
 
The regulatory agency should prepare its own budget, although the government 
should have the opportunity to review and approve the budget.  The government 
will need to decide who should have the authority to approve the budget; options 
include the Milli Majlis or an appropriate authority in the executive branch, for 
example the President. 
 
The regulatory agency should also be authorized to establish its own hiring and 
human resources policies and practices.  This should include the authority to 
establish compensation packages for its employees that will enable it to compete 
with private sector and regulated companies in securing high quality professionals 
for the agency.  This would mean, in effect, that the agency would have a separate 
salary scale from the civil service. 
 
• Who should be responsible for issuing licenses? 
 
It is fairly common for the responsibility for issuing licenses to regulated 
enterprises to be assigned to the regulatory agency along with full responsibility 
to monitor and enforce the provisions of the license.  In certain circumstances 
these responsibilities may be shared with a government agency that would be 
charged with issuing the license while the regulatory agency would be responsible 
for monitoring and enforcing the implementation of the provisions of the license.  
In the case of Azerbaijan such a split responsibility could apply in the case of 
licenses issued by the Ministry of Economic Development.  However, all 
licensing responsibility currently assigned to the Ministry of Industry and Energy 
should be transferred to the regulatory agency.  
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• What level of tariff setting responsibility will be assigned to the regulatory agency? 
 
A principal function of the independent regulator is to regulate tariffs, taking into 
consideration the interests of sector participants, consumers and other interested 
parties.  Ultimately, therefore, the regulator should have comprehensive authority 
to establish a tariff methodology and to calculate tariffs on the basis of that 
methodology.  This authority must be administered in an open and transparent 
manner through such processes as the use of public hearings and publication of 
records of decisions with all supporting documentation. 
 
Tariffs at present, however, are well below full cost recovery levels and a medium 
term tariff policy is required to establish a road map to move tariffs to the 
appropriate levels.  Development and implementation of this medium term tariff 
policy is a government responsibility and actions of the regulator with regard to 
tariff setting will have to be undertaken within the constraints imposed by this 
policy.  The government should, therefore, establish and make public its medium 
term tariff policy and this should, ideally, be done before the regulatory agency is 
established. 
 
• What form of appeal process should be instituted? 
 
It is important that a process be in place to allow an appeal against tariff and 
license decisions.  Ideally, an appeal of tariff and license decisions should only be 
to the courts and should be limited to cases based on errors of fact or procedure.  
The courts should not take on, or be assigned, the role of providing de facto 
approval of regulatory decisions.  For international investors it may be appropriate 
to incorporate provisions allowing some issues to be made subject to international 
arbitration. 
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The Regulatory Environment in Azerbaijan 
 
Background 
 
Current Policy Making and Regulatory Responsibilities 
 
V-1. The Ministry of Economic Development (MED) and the Ministry of Industry and 
Energy (MoIE) 55 were established in 2001 and 2005 respectively and are the primary 
agencies responsible for energy sector policy making.  The MED has broad functions and 
responsibilities including policy making, regulation, pricing and tariffs, licensing, and 
management of fixed assets.  The MoIE is responsible for formulating and implementing 
State policy for oil and natural gas production, transport and processing, electricity 
generation and transmission, district heating, and gas transmission and distribution.  
However, many functions of the MoIE overlap with those of the MED.  The respective 
functions are summarized in Boxes V-1 and V-2 below. 
 
Box V-1 
Key Functions of the MED 
Regulation56  
Article No. 
 
Key Provisions 
3 Formulate and implement State Policy to prevent monopolies and promote 
competition. 
5 Work with other central and local Executive Authorities, local government 
bodies and public organizations. 
5 Regulate socio-economic activities. 
9.10 Prevent monopoly activities and protect consumer interests. 
10.1 Work out the general principles of price and tariff policy (with other bodies). 
10.18 Develop mechanisms to efficiently use natural resources including energy 
(with other bodies). 
10.27 Draft international treaties regarding legal, tariff and other actions in transport, 
transit of goods and foreign trade shipments.  Participate in the negotiation and 
implementation of these treaties. 
10.83 Provide consent to transfer State owned facilities from one balance sheet to 
another and provide opinions to justify writing off fixed assets. 
10.109 Determine the regulatory instruments to be applied to each natural monopoly.  
Issue binding instructions regarding payment of profits to the State budget as a 
result of legal violations in signing contracts with consumers, the provision of 
compulsory services and making changes to contracts. 
11.5 Issue and revoke licenses.  
Source: Nexant (2003) 
                                                 
55 The responsibilities of the Ministry of Industry and Energy were previously assigned to the Ministry of 
Fuel and Energy.  The charter for the Ministry of Industry and Energy has not yet been finalized but it is 
anticipated that it would include the roles and responsibilities of the former Ministry of Fuel and Energy. 
56 Approval of MED Regulations was through Presidential Decree No. 495 (June 11, 2001). 
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Box V-2 
Key Functions of the MoIE 
Regulation57  
Article No. 
 
Key Provisions 
7.5 Participate in the preparation of capital investment programs for the 
development of various parts of the fuel and energy complex. 
7.6 Represent State interests regarding the change of ownership and 
management of State property. 
7.7 Submit proposals to improve the economic regulation of the fuel and energy 
sectors. 
7.8 Regulate State enterprises in the fuel and energy sectors. 
7.12 Participate in the regulation of natural monopolies. 
7.13 Draft normative legal acts to regulate economic relations in the fuel and 
energy sectors and participate in the approval process. 
7.22 Issue licenses for fuel and energy, oversee compliance, and decide on 
revocation / termination. 
7.40 Participate in the regulation of transportation systems of energy carriers. 
7.27 Set guidelines for labor protection and improve working conditions in the 
fuel/ energy field and ensure licenses comply with regulations. 
Source: Nexant (2003) 
 
V-2. The President’s Office and the state owned enterprises operating in each sub-
sector also play a role in policy making. 
 
V-3. The Tariff Council addresses monopoly services for the electricity, natural gas 
and water sectors and its Secretariat has authority58 to restructure tariffs, define customer 
categories and adopt cost reflective tariff designs.  The MED has a pricing and tariff 
policy function59 that provides technical and administrative support to the Council.  The 
Council is also supported by Working Groups that include industry representation60.  
Rules and procedures61 have been adopted by the Council that outline the principles and 
process for tariff determination.  However, they do not address sector specific issues.  
Tariffs for the utility sectors include heavy subsidies to residential consumers and public 
authorities62.  The tariff review procedure lacks clarity and public disclosure of decision 
processes is limited.  There is no appeal process for tariff decisions and for penalties for 
violations and there is no mechanism to challenge details of investigations.   
 
                                                 
57 Regulations for the former Ministry of Fuel and Energy (since replaced by the MoIE) were established 
through Presidential Decree No. 602 (September 6, 2001).  These are the regulations referred to in this 
table and it is anticipated that they will also form part of the charter for the MoIE.  This charter has yet to 
be finalized. 
58 Cabinet of Ministers Decision No. 17 
59 The Economic and Forecasting Department (EPFD) 
60 Azerenergy, Azerigaz, SOCAR, Azerbaijan Airlines, the four distribution companies, Industrial Unit 
Bakukanalizasiya. 
61 Rules for Formation and State Regulation of Prices (Tariffs) of the Products (Works, Services) of Natural 
Monopoly Subjects, MED Order No. 67, September 20, 2002. These rules are registered with the Ministry 
of Justice. 
62 the latter for the gas sector only 
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V-4. There is a well established “competent authority” within SOCAR that deals with 
the international oil and gas industry on a day to day basis.  SOCAR’s Foreign 
Investment Department issues licenses, negotiates PSAs and operates as the de facto 
regulator of upstream oil operations.  This, however, represents a potential conflict of 
interest with SOCAR’s other commercial and investor roles. 
 
V-5. There is, at present, no independent regulator for the energy industry.  
Responsibilities for regulation of the utility sector are fragmented, introducing potential 
conflicts between political and economic decision making63.  There are no provisions that 
allow regulatory review of investment plans to screen for economic efficiency, tariff 
impacts and system prioritization.   
 
The Legislative Framework 
 
V-6. The key legal provisions affecting the energy sector are embodied in the 
following laws and in the Production Sharing Agreements signed with major 
international companies. 
   
Box V-3 
The Legislative Framework 
Law on the Protection of Foreign Investments (1992) – This includes a number of 
safeguards for foreign investors and allows the acquisition of exploration and development 
rights.   Revisions to this Law are planned.   
 
Law on Use of Energy Resources (1996) – This provides the legal, economic and social 
policy basis for the efficient use of energy resources.  The State has the power to control the 
use of energy resources by State enterprises and organizations, to set policy for efficient 
energy resource use, and to use a range of mechanisms to promote energy saving technology 
and equipment.  Registration of plans for energy resource use is also addressed.  
 
Law on Gas Supply (1998) – This regulates the exploration, production, refining, 
transportation, storage, marketing and use of gas including gas liquids. It includes 
requirements for gas facilities, gas connections, licensing, energy agreements, land use, health, 
safety and environment provisions, and enforcement.  Under this law, only approved 
contractors can use the transportation and distribution system or the underground gas storage 
facilities.  In addition, consumers can only connect to gas systems following testing and 
certification by a ‘gas expert’.  
 
Law on Power Engineering (1998) – This provides the legal basis for electrical and thermal 
power generation, transmission, distribution, purchase, sales and consumption.  It governs the 
activities of State power engineering companies, power supply companies, independent power 
producers and consumers. The relevant State authorities are responsible for licensing, 
transmission and distribution contracts, pricing, de-monopolization, performance criteria, rules 
and standards. 
 
                                                 
63 Concession agreements for electricity distribution granted by the MED (also the asset owner) combine 
both regulatory and commercial terms but do not adequately address economic regulation or consumer 
protection 
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Law on Energy (1999) – This covers energy policy objectives; ownership of resources; 
control of exploration, development of fields and the construction and maintenance of 
transport systems. The law includes a strong commitment to energy efficiency and contains 
significant licensing provisions.  
 
Oil Law – This has been under preparation and is currently with the Parliamentary 
Commission.  A date has not yet been confirmed for the first reading of this law.  
 
Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) - At this point, Azerbaijan has signed over 20 major 
international field agreements.  Most PSAs have been developed on an individual basis and 
have the status of law. While various ministries handle the exploration and production 
agreements with foreign companies, SOCAR is a party to all international consortia 
developing new oil and gas projects.   
 
V-7. A critically required addition to this legislative framework is a law establishing 
the regulatory agency, outlining its roles and responsibilities and assuring its 
independence. 
 
Establishing an Effective Regulatory Function 
 
V-8. Regulation normally has two important purposes, namely: 
 
i. Protecting consumers from monopoly practices in those parts of the sector that are 
not subject to competition.  The regulator establishes prices and quality of service 
standards and tries to stimulate a competitive market.  To the extent that the 
regulator succeeds, new investments will be undertaken by the utilities and 
consumers will be satisfied with the quality of service.  If the regulator fails to set 
prices at a level that provides a fair, reasonable and acceptable rate of return to 
investors, new investments will not be forthcoming and the quality of service will 
deteriorate. 
 
ii. Monitoring proper competitive behavior.  Whenever the regulator determines that 
there is not enough competition, or that there are anti-competitive practices, it 
should take action to prevent these practices from adversely affecting consumer 
prices or the quality of service. 
 
V-9. The range of specific functions assigned to the regulator may vary, but in general, 
the following key functions are assigned throughout the world: 
 
• Approve and set tariffs; 
• Issue licenses; 
• Review/approve system expansion, upgrade and rehabilitation plans by all 
regulated licensees; 
• Require implementation of a system of accounts consistent with international 
accounting standards (e.g. international financial reporting standards); 
• Require the filing of annual and other periodic reports containing all information 
necessary to the discharge of regulatory responsibilities; 
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• Specify quality of service and reliability standards as well as customer service 
standards; 
• Carry out inspections and enforcement of license conditions and other regulatory 
requirements; 
• Oversee creation of programs and incentives for maximum efficiency in the use of 
utility services; 
• Cooperate with other government agencies in a transparent manner in 
implementing national priorities in such areas as national security, regional 
development, environmental protection and social welfare; 
• Adjudicate disputes involving licensees and the government, between and among 
licensees, and between licensees and consumers; 
• Carry out a continuous and thorough program of public interaction and 
information on matters relating to the regulator’s mandate. 
 
V-10. The government has made a commitment to introduce an effective regulatory 
function for the utility sectors.  In April 2003, the government provided a Letter of Intent 
(LoI) to the World Bank on the “Development of the Regulatory Framework for the 
Utility Sector and the Creation of New Institutional Arrangements for Regulation”.  The 
LoI covers utility services including electricity, natural gas, water, wastewater and 
heating.  It outlines a program for developing institutional arrangements and draft 
legislation to regulate these sub-sectors.  The government’s primary objectives are to: 
 
• Ensure efficient and equitable service delivery to consumers at prices that reflect 
the cost of delivery; 
• Protect low income consumers; 
• Increase investment in these sectors; and 
• Accelerate reforms for sector development while minimizing their environmental 
and social impacts. 
 
V-11. In order to achieve these objectives, the government plans to establish a Utility 
Regulatory Agency (URA) that will be responsible for technical and customer service 
regulation in the utility sector as well as for the regulation of prices and tariffs. The URA 
will be independent in its decision making, organizationally separate and directed by a 
Commission of full-time regulators.  Commission members will be appointed for a fixed 
term based on objective criteria and will not be removed without just cause.  The 
regulatory agency will be responsible for communicating with the public.  The Ministry 
of Economic Development (MED), supported by line ministries and sector entities, will 
be responsible for developing the regulatory framework and actions required to establish 
the URA.  Key targets dates include:  
 
• mid 2005 – passage of appropriate enabling legislation;  
• end 2005 – establishment of the Utility Regulatory Agency;  
• mid 2006 – provision of social protection for vulnerable households; and 
• mid 2006 - full implementation of the new regulatory regime.   
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V-12. In developing the structure and governance provisions for the regulatory agency, 
the government should remain cognizant of good international practice.  In this regard, 
there are four well-documented and accepted fundamental requirements for effective 
regulation.  These are summarized in Box V-4 
 
Box V-4 
Fundamental Requirements for Effective Regulation 
1. The regulator must be assigned the requisite authority in its enabling legislation for 
conducting basic regulatory functions.  The regulator should be unambiguously assigned 
its responsibilities by statute and the statute should include clear, substantive and 
procedural guidelines for conducting the tasks. 
 
2. The regulator must be afforded the requisite capacity for performing its assigned 
functions.  This means that the regulatory body should be adequately staffed with 
personnel that have sufficient knowledge of utility sector operations, as well as highly 
developed skills along both functional (e.g. rate design, safety and reliability assessment 
etc.) and disciplinary (e.g. economics, finance, engineering, etc.) lines.  This also requires 
that regulatory staff be organized in a manner that allows their knowledge and skills to be 
effectively employed. 
 
3. The regulator must maintain sufficient independence from political interference in its 
day-to-day affairs.  This sort of autonomy from the political process is necessary to 
facilitate difficult and politically unpopular decisions.  Investors have consistently 
displayed a strong preference for an agency that is sufficiently shielded from the 
inevitable shifting tides of political concerns and calculations.  They will demand that the 
regulator operate under a statutory mandate that protects its autonomy and provides for 
appeal of regulatory decisions to a court system that is also independent of political 
influence.  In practice, the notion of independence can be effectively accomplished by the 
establishment of several structural and procedural safeguards. 
 
4. The regulator should establish and consistently apply a set of procedures for conducting 
its responsibilities.  There are a few basic principles that should guide the development of 
these procedures.  Interference with management of regulated companies, and the 
procedural requirements placed on the companies, should be minimized to the greatest 
extent possible.  Standards for decision making should be clearly stated and publicly 
disclosed; and the process of applying standards should be transparent.  In particular, 
specific mechanisms are needed to give consumers a voice in major decisions.  Public 
participation is important because it is a key component in any regulatory agency’s 
mandate to protect and respond to consumers’ interests. 
 Source: Nexant 
 
Addressing the Key Challenges 
 
V-13. In order to establish an effective regulatory function, the government will need to 
address a number of key challenges: 
 
i. To separate clearly policy making and regulatory functions 
ii. To ensure regulatory independence 
iii. To improve transparency and accountability 
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iv. To ensure service quality  
v. To promote competition  
 
 
To Separate Clearly Policy Making and Regulatory Functions 
 
V-14. Policy making and regulatory functions should be clearly separated.  Insofar as 
the government is concerned, policy making responsibility should be vested in the 
appropriate ministries while regulatory functions should be assigned to an independent 
agency.  The utilities themselves should not play a direct role in either policy making or 
regulatory oversight; their responsibilities should be focused on the technical and 
financial management of their operations. 
 
V-15. Most policy making functions for the energy sector are presently embodied in 
MED and the MoIE, with many functions overlapping.  The President’s Office and the 
state owned utility enterprises have also played a role in policy development.  However, 
there needs to be greater clarity with regard to the responsibility for policy making with 
regard to the energy sector.     
 
V-16. In order to provide greater clarity with regard to the responsibility for policy 
making in the energy sector, the government could redefine the relative roles and 
responsibilities of the two ministries in the area of energy policy making and incorporate 
the revised definition in a new decree.  Alternatively, the government could consolidate 
the entire responsibility within a single ministry (for example, MED).     
 
V-17. In the oil sector, SOCAR’s role as “competent authority” should be transferred to 
an independent agency with financing and reporting structures that are separate from 
SOCAR64.  Given the importance of the role, and the high economic profile of oil and gas 
development in Azerbaijan, the agency should report directly to top levels of 
Government.  
 
To Ensure Regulatory Independence 
 
V-18. Independent regulation ensures that key regulatory decisions are not distorted by 
political drivers, and provides third parties with confidence that they will be treated 
without political bias.  In the utility sectors, the Government’s commitment to establish 
an independent, non political, specialized regulatory agency is of crucial importance for 
conveying a sense of stability and continuity and encouraging foreign and domestic 
investment in the sectors.   
 
V-19. The issues of financial and organizational independence of the proposed URA are 
crucial.  On the financial side, the URA should develop a budget on an annual basis for 
approval by the government and/or Parliament.  This will help to ensure that the URA 
                                                 
64 SOCAR’s roles currently include: Government representative for oil and gas, investor in a number of 
joint ventures and PSAs, operator and manager of peripheral activities. 
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does not spend more than is strictly necessary to manage its affairs in an efficient manner.  
The URA should, however, have discretion to manage its budget and resources.   
 
V-20. There are several mechanisms that could be applied to finance the URA’s budget.  
These include: (i) State budget funding; (ii) earmarking taxes; (iii) the introduction of 
license fees for utilities; (iv) the introduction of a tariff surcharge on units of energy (each 
kWh of electricity and/or MCM of gas) purchased by consumers; or (v) making 
legislative provisions to exempt the URA from generally applicable constraints.  In 
general it is preferable to fund regulatory agencies from fees rather than from budget 
sources since this promotes a greater degree of independence.  As is indicated in Box V-5 
such a practice is consistent with the actions of European countries that have recently 
decided to establish regulatory agencies. 
 
Box V-5 
Resources of Electricity Regulators in Southeastern Europe 
 Budget Amount Budget Source Budget Approval Budget Schedule 
Albania 0.2 mil EURO License fees, services and 
penalties  
Under existing Law, the 
Government approves the 
annual budget; under the 
draft Law, Parliament 
approves the budget 
Annual; under draft Law, 
ERE submits budget for 
approval to Council of 
Ministers no later than 
three months prior to the 
beginning of the next 
fiscal year. 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
For SERC, the budget is 
estimated to be from 
approximately 613,000 to 
701,000 Euro, depending on 
whether government 
facilities are provided or not.  
No amounts for the Entity 
regulators have been 
disclosed. 
Fees; also, in the case of 
Entity regulators, grants. 
Parliament In the case of SERC, 
must be submitted by 
Dec. 1.  In the case of the 
Entities, start of the 
budget year. 
Bulgaria 1 mil Euro EEEA: Council of 
Ministers approves SERC 
budget and receives 
budgetary reports by 
SERC (Art. 5 and 20). 
 
 
Draft law: SERC has: self-
administered budget (Art. 
10(1)); financed by fees 
and by the state budget 
(Art. 26(1)); and Council 
of Ministers approves 
level of fees (Art. 27(1)).  
Under EEEA version. 
EEEA: National Assembly 
 
Draft law: Parliament, 
based upon proposal from 
the Council of Ministers. 
 
Annual 
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 Budget Amount Budget Source Budget Approval Budget Schedule 
Croatia For 2002: 2 million Euro 
allocated; 1.2 received for 
April-December term (term 
of CERC in office); the 
budget for 2003 has not yet 
been approved. The 
proposed  figure is 
comparable, but may be 
significantly reduced. 
.07% of the annual income 
of energy undertakings, 
fees imposed by CERC. 
Government; CERC 
prepares its budget and 
plan of activities, then 
submits to Government. 
Submit request to 
Government in 
November for following 
calendar year. 
FYROM65 0.3 mil Euro For 2003, from the 
government; thereafter 
from income fees and 
license fees of energy 
undertakings. 
Parliament Draft budget shall be 
proposed by ERC to 
Parliament no later than 
October 1st of each year. 
Budget must contain all 
expenditures of ERC, 
including salaries of the 
commissioners and staff. 
Greece 4.4 mil Euro RAE’s budget is annexed 
to the budget of the 
Ministry of Development. 
The budget of RAE is 
collected through levies 
on electricity, gas and oil 
undertakings.  The levies 
are determined by a 
common decision of the 
Minister of Development 
and the Minister of 
Economics. 
 RAE’s budget is annexed 
to the budget of the 
Ministry of Development. 
Annual 
Romania 1.6 mil Euro Tariffs and contributions 
from sector undertakings; 
in addition, ANRE may 
collect money for its 
budget from donors, legal 
and natural persons.  
ANRE is funded entirely 
from outside the state 
budget. 
Ministry of Industry and 
Resources 
“During the year” 
provide more 
information 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Serbia: For 2003 and 2004, 1 
mil. Euro; for 2005, 1.2 mil. 
Euro. 
 
Montenegro: Not yet 
determined. 
Serbia: For 2003 and 
2004, from the European 
Agency for 
Reconstruction; for 2005, 
fees. 
 
Montenegro: Initially, 
from Government; 
thereafter from fees. 
Serbia: National Assembly 
 
Montenegro: Regulator 
approves its own budget, 
but subject to annual 
reports to the Government, 
which must also be made 
available to the public. 
Serbia: Not yet defined 
 
Montenegro: Regulator 
shall create a detailed 
budget by September 30th 
for the subsequent year 
and must submit the 
budget to the 
Government and make it 
available to the public in 
accordance to rules 
established by the 
regulator. 
                                                 
65 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
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 Budget Amount Budget Source Budget Approval Budget Schedule 
Turkey 4.3 mil Euro Budget from license fees; 
publications and other 
revenues; grants from 
international 
organizations; 25% of 
administrative fines 
imposed; and transmission 
surcharges equal to 1% of 
the transmission tariff at 
most.  Art. 10 
The Energy Market 
Regulatory Board (EMRB) 
approves EMRA’s budget. 
EMRA sends its annual 
report to the Ministry of 
Energy and is audited by a 
group of three inspectors, 
one from the Prime 
Minister’s Inspection 
Board, one from the Prime 
Ministry’s Higher Board of 
Audit and one from the 
Finance Ministry. 
Regulator shall send by 
April 30, annual report 
for past financial year 
and shall be audited 
annually by Prime 
Minister’s Higher Audit 
Board.   
UNMIK66 Through the EU arm of 
UNMIK; not a separate 
budget.  Budget for future 
regulator, not yet defined. 
Not yet defined. Not yet defined Not yet defined 
 
 
 
Source:  “Regulatory Benchmarking Report” dated May 30, 2003, prepared for USAID by Pierce Atwood. 
 
V-21. From an organizational perspective, the URA should be provided, by law, with 
the authority to establish its own hiring and human resources policies and practices.  In 
addition, the URA should establish adequate compensation packages for its employees.  
Salaries should be comparable with the top salaries paid to staff of privately owned 
utilities that perform roughly equivalent work and/or have similar academic and 
experience requirements for their jobs.  This is necessary since the URA would be in 
direct competition with utilities for competent staff and needs to attract better than 
average professionals. 
 
V-22. URA decisions should be made in accordance with rules defined in the enabling 
legislation or in other normative acts and guidance set by official policy measures.  The 
URA should operate without direct orders, advice or interference from the government.  
However, to ensure an appropriate balance between political concerns and discipline in 
the sector, the government could play a role in setting criteria and guidance within which 
the URA could operate.  This could include: defining social objectives; participating in 
the formulation of technical and performance standards; permitting the use of technology 
and resources; recommending standards to the URA; and, laying down the principles and 
policy requirements for service production, transmission and distribution.  
 
V-23. Procedures need to be developed for URA operations and their interaction with 
utility operators.  Procedures should address enforcement mechanisms, dispute resolution 
and tariff review procedures, reporting requirements and the transparent application and 
public disclosure of decision making standards.   
 
V-24. To ensure the effective functioning of the URA, it should be empowered to:   
 
• Issue mandatory requirements for periodic reports to be submitted by the 
regulated companies on financial, statistical, accounting, technical and 
commercial information; 
                                                 
66 United Nations Administration in Kosovo 
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• Request and receive any information that it considers necessary for regulatory 
purposes in a reasonable timeframe;  
 
• Establish, for regulatory purposes, standard accounts to be used by regulated 
enterprises;  
 
• Investigate any complaints or abuse, and potential changes to the industry 
structure; 
 
• Impose penalties on utilities, up to a limit set by law, for non-compliance with 
applicable laws, decrees, resolutions or service standards; 
 
• Order interconnections and access to transmission and distribution systems;  
 
• Approve or disapprove mergers and acquisitions in the utility sector; and 
 
• Preserve confidentiality of individual customer’s financial data and of 
commercially sensitive information pertaining to the regulated entities. 
 
V-25. A clear description of the process for application and issue of licenses for each 
utility function should be outlined.  Typically, the URA would be responsible for the 
issue, modification, suspension, revocation and termination of licenses for utility 
services. In some cases these responsibilities are shared with a government agency that 
would be responsible for issuing licenses while the URA would be responsible for 
monitoring and enforcing their implementation. 
 
To Improve Transparency and Accountability 
 
V-26. To promote public acceptance of the URA, a transparent approach should be 
taken towards decision making and information disclosure which includes:  
 
• The use of public hearings to elicit opinions from stakeholders on key issues such 
as proposed changes to rules and standards;  
 
• Publication of records of decisions including supporting documentation, analysis 
and explanation;  
 
• Public access to communications on pending matters; 
 
• Public meetings where decisions are taken by a vote of the Commission members, 
with each Commission member having the opportunity to express their opinion.  
Commission members should also have the right to submit a written opinion, 
either concurring with the majority or dissenting from it; 
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• Public disclosure of information received or developed by the regulatory body at 
the request of any member of the public.   
 
V-27. To ensure accountability, annual or biannual public reviews should be conducted 
of the URA’s activities by legislative and executive authorities designated by law.  The 
reviews should cover both external actions, such as tariff setting or establishing service 
standards, and internal actions such as staffing policies and the audit of the use of funds. 
 
To Ensure Service Quality  
 
V-28. Service quality is as important for consumers as prices.  If standards of service 
fall but prices remain the same, customers are effectively suffering an increase in prices.  
In competitive industries, dissatisfied customers will then either demand lower prices or 
change suppliers.  Customers of regulated monopolies, however, do not have the choice 
of seeking other suppliers.  Regulators must, therefore, act to protect customers and set 
quality standards, monitor them and provide incentives for the regulated enterprises to 
comply with these standards through fines, discounts or rebates in billings to their 
customers in cases of non-compliance with the minimum quality standards.  This is 
particularly important as the sector moves towards more market oriented practices and 
tariffs are set on the basis of efficiency incentives.  Under these conditions, utilities could 
attempt to increase their profits by reducing operation and maintenance costs without due 
consideration of the possible effects on service quality.   
 
V-29. At present, in Azerbaijan, documented performance standards for utility technical 
quality and customer service are not linked to a penalty regime67.  While consumers may 
elect any supplier and force a supplier to assist with transmission costs68 there is little 
consumer protection if services are poor; the only alternative, in theory, is to select a new 
supplier69 although this is not, at present, a practical option. 
 
Box V-6 
Defining Service Quality in the Power sector 
Service quality is grouped under three major categories: technical quality, commercial quality 
and reliability: 
 
• Technical quality includes, but is not limited to, voltage and frequency levels. 
• Commercial quality refers to transactions between the distribution company and its 
customers, for example, time to connect new customers, adequacy of billings and meter 
readings, and time to answer and provide solutions to complaints. 
• Reliability is a measure of the ability of the distribution company to meet customer 
requirements for continuous electricity service, both in the short and long term, and is 
characterized by the number and duration of interruptions experienced by consumers.  
The most common measures are SAIFI, SAIDI, CAIDI and ASAI – see Box V-7. 
 
                                                 
67 Currently Azerenergy and Azerigaz apply and monitor their own standards.  In the power sector some 
concession agreements contain some service quality provisions.  
68 The Law on Electrical Energy (Article 15) 
69 The Law on Electrical Energy (Article 8) and the Law on Energy (Article 17(3)) 
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Box V-7 
Reliability Indicators 
SAIFI stands for System Average Interruption Frequency Index and measures the number of 
outages experienced by users.  It is calculated by dividing the number of interrupted 
customers by the total number of customers served. 
 
SAIDI stands for System Average Interruption Duration Index and provides a measure for 
the average time that customers are interrupted.  It is calculated by dividing aggregated time 
that all customers were interrupted by the total number of customers. 
 
CAIDI stands for Customer Average Interruption Duration Index and is a measure for the 
average time required to restore service to the average customer per interruption.  It is 
calculated by dividing the total interruption duration by the total number of interruptions. 
 
ASAI stands for Average System Availability Index.  It is derived from the SAIDI according 
to the formula: 
1-SAIDI 
8760 
 
V-30. Target service quality indicators should be established both for the system as a 
whole and for individual customers.  The program should distinguish between rural areas, 
small towns and large cities and should provide a reasonable timeframe for compliance.   
Compliance would be the responsibility of the distributors.  However, to protect the 
distributors, the URA should also establish standards of service quality for transmission 
operators, with rebates or fines being provided to their customers (generators and 
distributors).  Bi-lateral contracts between distributors and generators could be employed 
to compensate distributors for rebates or fines for which they may be liable due to the 
failure of generators to perform in line with contractual agreements. 
 
V-31. The URA should also develop targets to regulate losses and to allocate the 
benefits of loss reductions amongst the distributors and their consumers.  This could be 
done through benchmarking or other means.  Distribution companies should be allowed 
to meet or exceed those targets through optimizing operational, maintenance and 
investment expenditures.  Utilities should be able to capture efficiency gains derived 
from exceeding the targets.  If the targets are not met, consumers should not bear the cost 
of inadequate management. 
 
To promote competition  
 
V-32. The URA should have powers to encourage competition and prevent anti-
competitive behavior.  To achieve this, a number of basic principles apply: 
 
• Full legal separation of monopoly activities - With full legal separation, competitors 
know that monopolies do not gain from treating any one company differently from 
any other company. Full legal separation could be achieved in two stages, starting 
with separation within the company and extensive powers for the URA, followed by 
the full de-merger of shareholder interests.  Many of the provisions to protect third 
parties could be dismantled once full separation is achieved – and this is one of the 
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reasons companies may decide to de-merge of their own accord (e.g. British Gas in 
the UK). 
 
• Separate monopoly activities from all other activities - If full legal separation does 
not exist there would need to be strong institutional separation including a compliance 
team with full powers to investigate complaints that is appointed by the URA and 
reports to the URA and to third parties.  There would also need to be full and accurate 
published accounts on all the activities of the monopoly services allocated in fine 
detail to cover all the activities of the company.  Third parties would need protection, 
backed up by regulatory powers, to police and punish any discrimination exhibited by 
the monopolist. 
 
• Pricing - The URA is required to provide the same kind of impetus that in other 
industries is provided by competition.  The URA would need to set overall price 
controls to ensure that too much money is not raised from customers and to provide 
incentives for productivity improvements and appropriate investment.  Having set the 
overall level of prices/revenues, the URA would need to have a clear strategy for 
ensuring prices are fair between consumers.  This can be done in a number of ways, 
and would normally be a result of extensive consultation with the industry, consumers 
and other interested organizations.  Access to good quality information would be 
essential. 
 
• Investment - Third parties should be able to request access to any service they need to 
supply their customers.  The URA should be able to ensure that access would be 
provided within a reasonable time frame and at a reasonable cost.  Only when there is 
competition in potential provision of a service can the requirement for reasonable 
access be dropped.  
 
Conclusion 
 
V-33. Establishment of a solid legislative framework and an effective regulatory 
function is essential to the long term viability of the utility service sectors in Azerbaijan.  
The government’s decision to establish a regulatory agency is very positive, but it is 
important that the structure of the agency and its assigned roles and responsibilities 
conform to good international practice and that its function is rooted in solid legislation. 
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VI - Energy and the Environment in Azerbaijan 
 
Summary 
 
VI-i. While Azerbaijan is endowed with a significant hydrocarbon resource base that 
offers substantial wealth generation potential, it also inherited a legacy of extensive 
environmental problems related to more than 100 years of oil production.  In addition to 
the problems associated with oil contamination, increasing concerns are emerging related 
to emissions and to air quality that relate to the consumption of polluting fuels and to 
flaring and venting of natural gas. 
 
VI-ii. At the time the proposals for IFC and EBRD financing of the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline and the Azeri Chirag Guneshli (ACG) Phase 1 field development were 
being taken to the two institutions’ respective Boards, a number of questions were raised 
by shareholders of these institutions concerning the need for a program to address the 
legacy environmental problems.  This underscores the perception outside Azerbaijan that 
the country should give considerable priority to dealing with energy related 
environmental issues.  A proactive and aggressive stance on the part of the government to 
deal with these issues will enhance perceptions internationally that Azerbaijan is a 
responsible global citizen and will likely translate into an improvement in the overall 
climate for foreign investment. 
 
VI-iii. The immediate challenges facing Azerbaijan are (i) to ensure that environmental 
standards that conform to best international practice are implemented and monitored 
throughout the energy sector; (ii) to develop and implement a mitigation plan to address 
the legacy of oil related contamination; (iii) to reduce the incidence of indoor air 
pollution related to consumption of polluting fuels; and (iv) to reduce and ultimately 
eliminate flaring and venting of natural gas. 
 
VI-iv. The conclusions and recommendations of this section may briefly be summarized 
as follows: 
 
• Azerbaijan has demonstrated a commitment, in principle, to environmental protection 
by ratifying a wide range of international environmental conventions.  However, the 
country has yet to implement the programs required to conform to these conventions.  
A comprehensive environmental strategy that prioritizes environmental mitigation 
and investment needs for the energy sector should be developed as a matter of 
urgency and should be accompanied by the provision of budget funds to support 
implementation. 
 
• The framework of environmental legislation is a mixture of new and old approaches 
and important components are missing.  A gap analysis of Azerbaijan’s 
environmental legislation and standards is underway.  Once complete, a time bound 
action plan should be prepared to develop and implement measures to deal with the 
identified gaps. 
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• Onshore oil contamination affects a region of about 100 square kilometers and is one 
of the most serious examples of environmental degradation in the country.  There is 
an urgent need to address these legacy environmental problems.  Development and 
implementation of a program to address these problems should, therefore, be 
accorded high priority.  Land prices have been rapidly increasing, particularly around 
Baku where almost 7,000 hectares of land are contaminated.  As a result, there is 
potential to generate significant funds from the clean up and redeployment of this 
land and the funds generated could well be more than sufficient to finance the entire 
clean up program.  The proceeds from land sales and redeployment could be 
supplemented by the reclamation of oil and steel as part of the clean up process.  In 
this regard, the government should be cognizant of the fact that the current high oil 
price environment, together with the appreciation in land values, has created a 
window of opportunity to attract private sector participants to assist with remediation 
measures, thereby reducing the net cost of the clean up.  Such a program, which could 
extend over a ten year timeframe, also has the potential to create new job 
opportunities, some of which could be used to mitigate the impact of rationalizing 
SOCAR’s heavily over-staffed workforce. 
 
• Deterioration of the gas sector infrastructure over the last 12 years has led to a 
significant reduction in the availability of gas to households, particularly in rural 
areas.  As a result many households have switched to more polluting fuels.  In 
mountainous areas households near forests have typically switched to fuel wood 
creating a problem of de-forestation as well as significantly increasing indoor 
pollution with its consequent health risks.  In order to address this problem, a review 
is required of potential energy options for areas at high risk of de-forestation or loss 
of vegetation as a result of their use as fuel.  This should be accompanied by the 
establishment and implementation of sustainable wood cultivation and forest 
management practices and consideration should be given to the introduction of 
participatory forest management programs. 
 
• Approximately 1 billion cubic meters (BCM) of natural gas is being flared and an 
unknown quantity of gas is being vented as a result of leaks in the gas transmission 
and distribution systems.  Flaring and venting of natural gas not only constitutes a 
waste of a valuable resource, it also has negative environmental connotations in terms 
of air quality and emissions.  A portion of the existing gas flaring (about 0.3 BCM) 
will be eliminated once the Phase 1 development of ACG comes on stream.  A further 
0.3 BCM could be eliminated through an investment of about US$ 60 million to 
gather associated gas in shallow water Guneshli.  Given the current price level 
associated with gas imports such an investment could pay out in less than four years 
and could also be eligible for concessional financing.  In order to address the venting 
problem, investment for the rehabilitation of the transmission and distribution 
pipeline systems will be required. 
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Energy and the Environment in Azerbaijan 
 
VI-1. While Azerbaijan inherited a significant hydrocarbon resource base and an 
extensive energy infrastructure, it also inherited a legacy of environmental problems 
related to more than 100 years of oil production.  This environmental degradation affects 
more than one percent of the total land area.   
 
VI-2. The contamination associated with oil operations is the most visible evidence of 
Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon related environmental problems.  There are, however, 
increasing concerns related to emissions and to air quality that are related to gas 
operations both directly and indirectly and to the growing inefficiencies in the energy 
sector overall. 
 
VI-3. Azerbaijan, therefore, faces several immediate challenges in addressing energy 
related environmental issues: 
 
i. To ensure that environmental standards that conform to best international practice 
are implemented and monitored throughout the energy sector; 
ii. To develop and implement a mitigation plan to address the legacy of oil related 
contamination; 
iii. To reduce the incidence of indoor air pollution related to consumption of 
polluting fuels; and 
iv. To reduce and ultimately eliminate flaring and venting of natural gas. 
 
Ensuring the Implementation and Monitoring of Appropriate Environmental 
Standards  
 
VI-4. The overarching law providing the basis for environmental legislation in 
Azerbaijan is the Law on the Protection of the Environment (adopted August 1999).  
Under this law responsibility rests with the State to set, monitor and control 
environmental standards. Consistent with other economies in transition, the legal 
framework is presently a mixture of new and old approaches and many regulations and 
by-laws that are important for implementation of environmental legislation are lacking.  
A gap analysis of Azerbaijan’s environmental legislation and standards has therefore 
been initiated through the World Bank’s Urgent Environmental Investment Project (with 
support from a PHRD grant) to support the Government’s efforts to align national laws 
and standards with international best practice and to identify gaps in the implementation 
of existing legislation.  Once completed, a time bound action plan will need to be 
developed to prioritize actions identified through the gap analysis and to identify and 
allocate resources and responsibilities for their implementation.   
 
VI-5. Environmental protection is recognized as being important and actions to improve 
Azerbaijan’s environmental performance have been identified through: (i) the National 
Environmental Action Plan developed in 1998; and (ii) the  National Program on 
Environmentally Sustainable Socio-economic Development developed in 2003.   
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Amongst other items these plans include actions to mitigate the impact of the energy 
sector on the environment.   
 
Box VI-1 
Actions Required to Mitigate the Impact of the Energy Sector on the Environment 
National Program on Environmentally Sustainable Socio-Economic Development 
 
This program covers the period 2003 to 2010 and includes actions to mitigate the impact of the 
energy sector on the environment, including: 
 
i. The introduction of highly efficient technologies at thermal power plants; 
ii. The promotion of modern energy saving technologies in both the production and non-
production sectors; 
iii. The development and implementation of national and regional programs aimed at 
demand management; and 
iv. The better use of renewable energy sources (hydro, wind and solar energy, biogas) in 
rural areas. 
 
VI-6. In parallel, Azerbaijan has ratified a number of international conventions (see 
Attachment VI-1) and has been harmonizing environmental legislation with international 
laws and conventions, an example being the new Law on Air Protection under which 
ambient standards will be aligned with WHO Guidelines.   
 
VI-7. That being said, funding for implementation of these programs remains an issue.  
For example, the 1998 NEAP listed 46 items that required action, 33 of which were 
classified as top priority, requiring attention within a 1 to 2 year timeframe.  Direct 
implementation costs for the NEAP were estimated as US$ 42.5 million over the planned 
timeframe of 1998 to 2003, or approximately 1% of State budget expenditure.  However, 
by the end of 2003 only about 20% of activities had been completed due to a lack of 
financing and prioritization of actions70.  A similar issue has the potential to arise for the 
National Program on Environmentally Sustainable Socio-economic Development.  While 
this Program outlines a strategy covering 2003 to 2010 for the initial resolution of 
environmental concerns it lacks cost estimates or details of financing measures.  Its 
implementation is therefore dependent on the ability to obtain financing from external 
sources.    
 
VI-8. To minimize the risks and impacts of energy sector activities on the environment, 
a comprehensive environmental management strategy is needed for the sector that 
prioritizes environmental mitigation and investment needs.  The strategy should take into 
account issues identified in the NEAP and the National Program on Environmentally 
Sustainable Socio-economic Development, as well as pollution (and liabilities) related to 
past practices and current sector operations.  In the latter case, a program of 
environmental audit and monitoring would enable a better understanding to be gained of 
                                                 
70 Completed items included the implementation of new legislation and most significantly the establishment 
of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources (2001).  At this point there has been insufficient progress 
on the clean up and prevention of pollution and the introduction of lower level normative acts for 
implementation of the general provisions of laws. 
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how well sector operations comply with  existing legislation and apply environmental 
practices that are consistent with good international practice.  Regular reporting and 
disclosure of environmental data and information related to the strategy and audit 
program would be essential to ensure transparency and to improve the investment 
climate. 
 
VI-9. Funding has been, and is, an important issue and budget provisions would need to 
be made in relation to this strategy, as well as the allocation of accountability for its 
timely implementation.  Consideration should be given as to how best to leverage 
external funds including those of the private sector to support investment needs.  This 
could include the promotion of environmental investments in concession contracts, or the 
identification of projects for co-financing. 
 
Establishing and Implementing a Program to Address Legacy Environmental 
Problems 
 
VI-10. Azerbaijan’s history as an oil producer stretches back into the late 19th century.  
Unfortunately, much of the development and production activity over this extended 
period paid little regard to consequential environmental damage.  As a result, Azerbaijan 
has a legacy of oil related environmental problems characterized by extensive onshore oil 
contamination and the visual pollution associated with abandoned rigs.   
 
VI-11. Onshore oil contamination affects a region of about 100 square kilometers (more 
than one percent of the land area) and is one of the most serious examples, and certainly 
the most visible, of environmental degradation in the country.  Many oil field sites have 
also been used as unofficial waste disposal sites creating a secondary problem.  The 
situation is most acute on the Apsheron Peninsula and in areas around Baku where almost 
7,000 hectares of land are contaminated. 
 
VI-12. Onshore oil contamination has been occurring since oil was first extracted on a 
commercial basis.  Early oil field practices, such as the use of unlined storage ponds or 
occasionally free flowing wells, had high contamination potential.  As has been noted, 
lack of investment for maintenance and technology upgrades have resulted in the level of 
contamination continuing to grow. 
 
VI-13. Clearly an immediate priority is to bring all current operating practices in line 
with good international practice.  However, there is an increasingly urgent need to 
develop and implement a program to address the legacy of environmental problems. 
 
VI-14. At the time the proposals for IFC and EBRD financing of the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline and the Azeri Chirag Guneshli (ACG) Phase 1 field development were 
being taken to the two institutions’ respective Boards, a number of questions were raised 
by shareholders of these institutions concerning the need for a program to address the 
legacy environmental problems.  The level of interest in this issue underscores the 
increasing concern about this legacy on the part of both donors and potential investors.  
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Consequently, it will be very much in Azerbaijan’s interest to develop and implement a 
program to address these problems.   
 
VI-15. Three other factors are also of immediate relevance.  First, land values in 
Azerbaijan and, in particular on the Apsheron Peninsula have been rapidly increasing 
creating the potential to generate significant funds as a result of clean up and 
redeployment of contaminated land71.  Second, funds can also be generated from the 
reclamation of oil and steel as part of the clean up process.  The current high oil price 
environment makes the prospect of oil reclamation particularly attractive and this, 
coupled with the appreciation in land values, provides a possible window of opportunity 
to attract private sector participants to assist with remediation measures and there is the 
associated potential to reduce and potentially eliminate the net cost of clean up.  Third, 
Azerbaijan is faced with a need both to rationalize the work force in its heavily over-
staffed state oil and gas company SOCAR and to create new job opportunities.  Elements 
of the environmental clean up will be relatively labor intensive and will, therefore, 
provide an opportunity both to re-deploy some of SOCAR’s existing workforce as well as 
provide some new job opportunities. 
 
VI-16. Some work has been undertaken to address the issue of onshore oil 
contamination.  In 1999-2000, an EU TACIS funded project tested local clean up 
technologies.  The project included the establishment of a small laboratory to test 
contaminated soil samples.  Also, an ongoing World Bank funded project is designed to 
demonstrate the clean up of lands contaminated by mercury and oil. 
 
VI-17. In 1988-1989, a detailed study was conducted of the nature and extent of oil 
contamination.  A map of oil contamination was developed and an inventory of 
contaminated lakes was completed.  While this provides an analytical base, further work 
will be required to update the study and to classify the nature of contamination.  This, in 
turn, will allow the government to assess the extent of the clean up requirements and 
prioritize areas for clean up.  This additional work, therefore, represents a priority action 
item. 
 
VI-18. Another issue that requires early resolution is the assignment of both liability for 
past contamination and responsibilities for effecting the cleanup.  Although SOCAR has 
legal responsibility for the land, the land pollution in many of these sites was generated as 
a result of practices that occurred prior to SOCAR assuming this legal responsibility.  
Land for oil production is currently assigned to SOCAR and is handed back to local 
authorities when operations cease and clean up is complete.  In the interim, SOCAR pays 
compensation for land which is not used for oil production but is unavailable for other 
uses such as agriculture or construction as a result of its condition. 
 
VI-19. SOCAR is the logical choice to oversee the clean up since it has knowledge and 
understanding of the sites, technologies and oil field chemistry.  Consistent with normal 
                                                 
71 The clean up program should, of course, not be limited to areas where significant additional value can be 
attained (such as on the Apsheron Peninsula) but should be designed to address the legacy of environmental 
problems throughout the country. 
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industry practice when assets are transferred, however, SOCAR should not be required to 
assume the full financial responsibility for cleaning up land that was polluted when 
assigned to SOCAR.  (Conversely, of course, SOCAR should assume the financial 
responsibility to clean up any pollution it caused).  Budget provisions will, therefore, 
likely be required to cover the costs associated with this exercise 
 
VI-20. Cost assessments for the clean up of polluted land are still very preliminary, 
although some estimates suggest a cost level on the order of $100 million, assuming a 
clean up program that extends over ten years.  It should be cautioned, however, that these 
estimates are very rough, reflecting experience elsewhere.  A more refined estimate will 
require verification on the basis of site specific information.  As has been noted, it should 
be possible to mitigate a portion, and perhaps all of these costs through the sale of 
cleaned up land and through reclamation programs involving the sale of scrap steel from 
abandoned rigs and the sale of oil recovered from polluted soils and ponds.  If the budget 
takes on the responsibility to cover the cost of the cleanup, the budget should also be the 
beneficiary of any reclamation proceeds. 
 
VI-21. A number of private firms in the US and elsewhere have made a successful 
business of managing the environmental clean up of polluted oil facilities, covering the 
costs and securing a profit through reclamation programs.  In the current high oil price 
environment, it is possible that private sector interests may be prepared to manage the 
clean up of certain sites with no cost to the budget.  Contaminated land is conservatively 
estimated to include 2 million tons of crude oil components.  Even though a large 
proportion of this oil could be unrecoverable or unusable, at today’s oil prices this 
represents a significant financial resource.  The government, either directly or through 
SOCAR, would benefit from soliciting expressions of interest to manage environmental 
clean up activities.  This would serve as input into development of a program, but final 
decisions on the inclusion of any such enterprises would have to await an overall 
assessment of the best way to implement the entire program. 
 
VI-22. Clean up activities can be broadly grouped into those that will require significant 
technology but are not particularly labor intensive (e.g. some forms of land reclamation) 
and those that are relatively labor intensive (e.g. dismantling abandoned rigs).  The more 
labor intensive activities represent an opportunity for SOCAR to re-deploy a portion of 
its workforce and reduce the overall workforce rationalization requirement. 
 
VI-23. Development and implementation of a program to mitigate the legacy of 
environmental problems will have to move forward in phases.  The key actions are 
briefly outlined in Table VI-1 below. 
 
VI-24. The first two phases of the program are likely to take up to two years.  It would, 
therefore, be desirable to initiate work as soon as possible. 
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Table VI-1 
The Phased Development of an Environmental Mitigation Program 
Phase Analysis Implementation Financing 
Current 
Status 
A 1988/89 map of oil 
contamination was 
developed and an 
inventory of contaminated 
lakes was completed. 
Pilot projects funded by 
EU TACIS (1999/2000) 
and the World Bank 
(ongoing) have been 
implemented. 
No serious discussion has 
taken place regarding 
financing for an 
environmental mitigation 
program. 
Phase Analysis Implementation Financing 
Phase 1 Update the 1988/89 study. 
 
Establish clean up 
priorities and refine clean 
up cost estimates. 
Solicit expressions of 
interest from private 
contractors in participating 
in the clean up 
Clarify relative liabilities 
and responsibilities for the 
clean up and identify 
potential sources of 
funding. 
Phase 2  Establish and make public 
a specific time bound 
program for the clean up. 
 
Initiate contractor hiring. 
Make specific financing 
provisions including 
provisions in the budget. 
 
Initiate a program to 
recover clean up costs 
through land sales and 
reclamation of oil and 
steel. 
Phase 3  Implement the clean up 
program. 
 
Monitor performance 
against the established 
program and make the 
results public. 
 
 
Reducing Indoor Air Pollution 
 
VI-25. Since independence, Azerbaijan’s extensive gas transmission and distribution 
network has suffered significant deterioration and this, in turn, has led to a significant 
decrease in gas supplies to rural areas.  Prior to 1991, approximately 80% of rural 
households were connected to the gas grid.  It is currently estimated that less than 50% of 
rural households still have access to gas through the grid and availability of gas to these 
households is not consistently reliable.  Faced with a reduced access or no access to gas, 
many households have switched to more polluting fuels.   
 
VI-26. In mountainous areas, households near forests have typically switched to fuel 
wood and this is often associated with illegal wood cutting.  These households generally 
burn the wood in low efficiency stoves.  This, in turn, has resulted in a significant 
increase in indoor pollution.  Indoor pollution associated with wood burning is linked to a 
number of health concerns, particularly of a respiratory nature. 
 
VI-27. The current demand for fuel wood is also estimated to exceed sustainable annual 
yields for Azerbaijan’s forests.  As a result, mountain valleys are suffering the effects of 
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deforestation and erosion, a drastic reduction in forest areas and fauna and the eradication 
of some plant species72. 
 
VI-28. Tariffs for power and gas need to be increased if they are to cover the economic 
cost of these energy supplies.  However, such increases also raise the prospect of a 
further increase in the use of wood for heating with a consequent adverse impact on both 
health and the environment.  Areas most at risk from increased wood usage related to 
increases in power and gas tariffs have been assessed in the recent Poverty and Social 
Impact Analysis (PSIA) undertaken by the Bank and include Gusar and Khachmaz in the 
north and Yardymly and Jalilabad in the south (see Attachment VI-2). 
 
VI-29. In order to address these concerns, a series of parallel measures are required: 
 
i. A review should be conducted of potential energy options for areas at high risk of 
deforestation or loss of vegetation as a result of utility price increases.  Energy 
solutions could vary from place to place and could include improvements in 
existing energy services or the promotion of other alternate energy resources.  In 
all cases they would need to be cost effective and sustainable and take into 
account the level of poverty, climatic conditions and the availability of resources 
and facilities to deliver energy supplies.  Solutions could deal with both the issue 
of supply (considering both existing and potential supply options) and demand 
(for example, the provision of high efficiency stoves and other energy efficiency 
measures). 
 
ii. Sustainable wood cultivation and forest management practices should be 
established and implemented, with priority of implementation given to those areas 
at highest risk of increased deforestation due to proposed utility tariff reforms (see 
Attachment 1). 
 
iii. The introduction of participatory forest management programs should be 
considered.  With the development of local level forest management plans, the 
transparency of transactions related to resource use and pricing could be improved 
and measures could be introduced to manage cutting and reforestation, as well as 
supervision, monitoring and enforcement of good forest management practices. 
 
Reducing and Ultimately Eliminating Venting and Flaring of Natural Gas 
 
VI-30. Flaring and venting of natural gas not only constitutes a waste of a valuable 
resource, it also has negative environmental connotations in terms of air quality and 
emissions.  Approximately 1 billion cubic meters (BCM) of gas is currently being flared 
annually in Azerbaijan.  SOCAR contributes about 0.7 BCM of this amount with about 
half being associated with operations in shallow water Guneshli and the remainder 
associated with operations in several smaller onshore locations.  The balance of the 
flaring, approximately 0.3 BCM, is attributable to the Early Oil phase of the AIOC 
Consortium’s development of Azeri, Chirag, Guneshli (ACG).  In addition, an 
                                                 
72 The Ministry of Ecology has estimated that 41,110 cubic meters of forest was damaged in 2003. 
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indeterminate amount of gas is vented as a result of problems with the integrity of the gas 
transmission and distribution systems. 
 
VI-31. The ACG Consortium anticipates eliminating flaring from its existing facilities in 
the 2005/2006 timeframe concurrent with the implementation of Phase 1 development of 
ACG.  However, full field development will ultimately produce about 6.2 BCM per year 
(at the peak) of additional associated gas.  The ACG Consortium plans to install 
compression facilities so that this gas can be piped onshore where, under the terms of the 
PSA, it accrues to the benefit of the State.  However, investments will also be required 
for the pipeline to transport the gas onshore, to expand the gas processing facilities and to 
upgrade and rehabilitate the gas storage facilities in order to handle these increments of 
associated gas.  Preliminary estimates suggest a capital investment requirement on the 
order of $200 million.  Given the cost of alternative gas supplies which are currently 
priced at the border at $60 per thousand cubic meters, the required investments can 
clearly be justified. 
 
V-32. SOCAR has also developed a preliminary plan to eliminate the gas flaring 
associated with operations in shallow water Guneshli.  This would result in a reduction of 
about 0.3 BCM per year of flared gas at an investment cost estimated at $60 million.  
Again, given the substitution of this gathered gas for imported gas, the project would 
offer a reasonably quick payout.  A project designed to reduce gas flaring such as this 
could also be eligible for some grant and/or concessionary funding from such sources as 
the Prototype Carbon Fund administered by the World Bank. 
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Attachment VI-2 
Areas at Risk of Deforestation as a Result of Utility Tariff Increases 
 
The risk of deforestation as a result of tariff increases in the power sector has been assessed in the recent 
PSIA for Azerbaijan.  The analysis has been based on: (i) residential wood consumption; (ii) poverty; (iii) 
access to gas; (iv) access to forests; (v) proximity of population to forests.  The study concludes that Gusar 
in the Northeast and Zardab in the center of Azerbaijan are at greatest risk of increased residential wood 
use when tariff levels rise (Map 1).  They are also potentially at greatest risk from indoor air pollution 
associated with wood burning.  Where there is no forest cover, such as Zardab, Map 1 demonstrates where 
total vegetation cover (including peri-urban trees, tree lined alleys, tree-lined rivers and hedgerows) is 
threatened by increased wood use.  When Map 1 is overlaid with the country’s forest resources this shows 
the forest areas at greatest risk (Map 2), i.e. Gusar and Khachmaz in the North and Yardymly and Jalilabad 
in the South.    
 
Map 1: Risk of Increased Residential Wood Use is Likely to be Highest in Gusar and Zardab (dark red 
zones) 
 
 Map 2: Deforestation is Most Likely to Occur in the North and South (dark red zones) 
 
Source: Poverty and Social Impact Analysis, Ex-Ante Evaluation of Residential Electricity Tariff Reform, Decision Draft, June 22, 
2004, Europe and Central Asia Region.  
Ref: Ex-Ante Evaluation of Residential Electricity Tariff Reform, June 22, 2004, The World Bank 
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VII - Social Issues in the Energy Sector in Azerbaijan 
 
Summary 
 
VII-i. The long term financial viability of the domestic power and gas sectors is 
predicated on improvements in collections levels and on an increase in tariffs to levels 
that are sufficient to recover costs in the sector.  At present, residential customers, who 
are the most costly to supply, benefit from the lowest tariff levels.  Consequently, they 
will ultimately have to be subject to a greater level of tariff increases than other customer 
categories. 
 
VII-ii. Under ideal circumstances, a targeted, fully functioning social safety net should 
be in place before utility tariffs to residential customers should be increased.  However, in 
the absence of such a safety net, tariffs can still be increased with only limited adverse 
social consequences if the population is able to afford the increases. 
 
VII-iii. This section discusses the issue of the affordability of energy utility services.  It 
also discusses the need to establish an effective social safety net along with some of the 
options that need to be addressed.  The conclusions and recommendations of this section 
may briefly be summarized as follows: 
 
•  There has been a significant growth in economic activity and in incomes of the 
population over the last few years.  Old age pensions were raised by 41,000 
AZM/month (approximately $8) in 2003; public sector employees received an 
average 30% wage increase in 2003 and an additional 30% increase in January, 2004; 
and the minimum wage was increased by 40,000 AZM/month (approximately $8) in 
July, 2004.  Estimates of the potential impact of electricity tariff increases suggest 
that the average income loss from a 50% tariff increase in Baku is just under AZM 
10,000/month (approximately $2).  Since the increase in the minimum wage that took 
place in July, 2004 and the increase in old age pensions that took place in 2003 were 
both about four times the size of the likely impact of a 50% increase in electricity 
tariffs, such an increase should be affordable. 
 
• Within the context of the discussion on the affordability of utility services, it is worth 
noting that, based on data from the 2002 household survey it appears that, on average, 
households spent only 5.8% of their consumption expenditures on housing and 
utilities.  This ranks among the lowest percentage rates in the region.  
 
• Electricity supply to residents in Baku is metered.  In much of the country, however, 
there is no metering and norms are used to calculate billings for electricity use.  A 
comparison, however, of these norms with consumption levels in areas which are 
metered (Baku and Sumgayit) suggests that these norms may be disproportionately 
high.  Consequently, in conjunction with tariff increases to households it would be 
appropriate to revise some (and possibly all) of the norms downwards to provide a 
more accurate reflection of what is actually being consumed.  Such revisions should 
be preceded by some pilot programs using meters to obtain validating data on 
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consumption levels in each region.  A downward revision in the norms would help 
mitigate the impact of higher unit tariffs. 
 
• In the case of gas, norms are more widely used and an analysis of their accuracy 
should also be undertaken. 
 
• While it appears the population should be able to afford some increases in utility tariff 
levels, it is important that work continue on refining and improving the social 
protection system.  The first priority should be to strengthen the current social safety 
system.  The draft Law on Targeted Social Assistance anticipates the introduction of a 
means tested family poverty benefit which could be supported in the short term by 
selective adjustments to the existing network of social assistance payments (or 
categorical benefits) to support some of the more vulnerable groups. 
 
• In the longer term, the upgraded social safety system should be reviewed for 
adequacy and an assessment made of the benefit or need for a parallel scheme to 
focus specifically on addressing the impact of utility tariffs.  An integrated approach 
should be taken to ensure that tariff adjustments do not collectively overburden 
vulnerable households. 
 
• Regardless of the chosen tariff scheme, non payments represent a significant hurdle to 
sustainable cost recovery.  A mechanism should, therefore, be established to track and 
evaluate non payments as an integral component of the regulation of the sector. 
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VII - Social Issues in the Energy Sector in Azerbaijan 
 
VII-1. At present, both the domestic power sector and the domestic gas sector fall well 
short of covering their financial needs.  As is indicated in Table VII-1, in 2002 the 
combination of non payments, tariffs below full cost recovery levels and excess losses 
resulted in the power sector recovering only 17% of its costs and the gas sector 
recovering only 30%. 
 
Table VII-1 
Financial Performance of the Power and Gas Sectors – 2002 
Commodity Excess 
Losses 
% 
Collections 
% 
Weighted 
Average 
Tariff 
Average 
Receipt 
Average Cost 
Recovery Price 
% of Cost 
Recovery 
Electricity (Usc/kWh) 2.03 34.0    1.90 0.65   3.80 17.1 
Gas (US$/MCM) 2.00 47.0 19.00 8.93 30.00 29.8 
 Source: World Bank analysis 
 
VII-2. The government is cognizant of these problems and has, appropriately, placed 
priority emphasis on addressing the non payments problem.  However, the longer term 
financial viability of the domestic power and gas sectors will be dependent on both an 
improvement in collections performance and an increase in tariffs to full cost recovery 
levels.  In considering tariff increases, the issue of an appropriate balance of tariff levels 
will have to be addressed.  At present, residential customers, who are the most costly to 
supply, benefit from the lowest tariff levels (see Table VII-2 below).  This means that 
residential customers will ultimately be subject to a greater level of tariff increases than 
other customer categories.  This, in turn, raises the issues of the affordability of these 
services and the need for a social safety net. 
 
Table VII-2 
Electricity and Gas Tariffs – 200473  
Electricity 
AZM/kWh 
Gas 
AZM/MCM 
Customer Category 
w/o VAT with VAT w/o VAT with VAT 
Residential   96   96   68,644   81,000 
Budget/Utilities/SOEs 130 153   200,000 236,000 
Commercial 250 295 200,000 236,000 
Weighted Average  110     
Memo: Wholesale Price   71   84   73,000 
  82,000 
  82,000 
  96,760 
Average Cost Recovery Price 186 219   198,83274 234,622 
                                                 
73 Gas tariffs were increased on November 2nd 2004.  The prices shown are the post November 2nd prices.  
The wholesale gas prices apply  to treated (73,000) and untreated (82,000) gas. 
74 This price covers operating costs only (SOCAR’s costs for supplying gas are assumed to average 
156,832 AZM/MCM ($32/MCM)), it does not provide funds to cover investment requirements (estimated 
as a 46,000 AZM/MCM increment).  It should also be noted that the import price for gas, at the border is 
$52/MCM or 254,852 AZM.  The tariff should ultimately be brought up to a level that covers import costs 
and domestic transmission and distribution costs. 
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The Affordability of Higher Priced Electricity and Gas 
 
VII-3. Under ideal circumstances, a targeted fully functioning social safety net should be 
in place before tariffs to residential customers are increased.  However, in the absence of 
such a safety net tariffs can still be increased with only limited adverse social 
consequences if the population is able to afford the increases.  The high rates of economic 
growth in Azerbaijan coupled with the increases in the incomes of the population suggest 
that some fairly substantial tariff increases would be affordable. 
 
VII-4. By all macroeconomic indicators, the country enjoys one of the highest rates of 
economic growth in the region and perhaps even the world. Economic recovery started in 
1996 and, in the past six years, GDP growth rates have been close to, or in excess of, 
double-digit figures.  However, growth is concentrated in only a few sectors of the 
economy, particularly the oil and gas sector, and, in recent years, also in agriculture75.  
The mono-structural nature of the economy is readily evident when considering the GDP.  
For example, in 2002, the oil sector accounted for about 30 percent of GDP, but only one 
percent of employment. 
 
Table VII-3 
Azerbaijan: Real GDP and Consumer Prices (Annual percentage change) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 
Real GDP 10.0 7.4 11.1 9.0 10.6 11.2 9.1 
CPI -1 -9 1.8 1.5 2.8 2.7 2.5 
* - estimate 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, relevant years; National Bank of Azerbaijan (www.nba.az). 
 
Table VII-4 
Azerbaijan: Macroeconomic Indicators 
 2001 2002 2003 
GDP, % of increase     9.9   10.2   11.2 
Volume of industry production, % of increase     5.1     3.6     6.1 
Volume of agriculture production, % of increase   11.1     6.4     5.6 
Population money income, % of increase   10.4   11.4   11.4 
Nominal average monthly wage (1000’ manat) 260.0 312.9 383.1 
Wage increase, compared with the same period of previous year   26.7   21.2   21.4 
CPI, %, December to December 101.3 103.3 103.6 
Source: National Bank of Azerbaijan (www.nba.az). 
 
VII-5. Average monthly wage increases have outpaced GDP and labor productivity 
growth.  In each of 2001, 2002 and 2003 reported average nominal wages increased more 
than 20% annually.  Over the past three years the monetary income of the population has 
increased by between 10% and 11% per annum.   
 
VII-6. In 2003 and 2004, the Government took measures to increase significantly the 
incomes of members of the population financed through the State budget.  In particular, 
old age pensions were raised on average from AZM 92,200 in 2002 to AZM 133,000 in 
                                                 
75 This is directly related to land reform which resulted in the allocation of small land plots to most of the 
rural population who are considered, under the Law on Employment, to be employed. 
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2003.  The long-awaited reform of the public pay system resulted in a 30% average wage 
increase for public sector employees in autumn 2003 and an additional 30% rise in 
January, 2004.  The minimum wage also increased from AZM 60,000 to AZM 100,000 in 
July, 2004.  Following the recommendations of the European Social Charter, the 
Government aims to bring the minimum salary in line with the minimum per capita 
poverty level (AZM 125,100 per capita per month).  
 
VII-7. Between 1998 and 2002, the number of employed people of working age 
increased by 0.7%76.  This was predominantly in the agricultural sector where 
employment increased by 35%.  In contrast, employment in the industrial sector declined 
20%.   The informal economy is widespread77 and about 34% of the employed 
workforce78 is self employed.  Earnings from employment represent about 40% of total 
household income, with the share being higher in urban areas (55%).  The unemployment 
rate was estimated at 10.7% in 2003 (Labor Force Survey) which is considered to be 
around average for an economy in transition.  
 
VII-8. Taking into account measures undertaken by the Government, as well as the rapid 
increase in real wages and other incomes, the number of people living in poverty has 
reduced. The number of Azeris below the poverty threshold of AZM 175,00079 per capita 
per month was estimated at 46.7% in 200280.   During the same period approximately 
10% of these were in extreme poverty, i.e. below the threshold of AZM 125,100 per 
capita per month81.  Those below the poverty line are predominantly urban dwellers, with 
the largest concentration found in Baku.  However, those in the extreme poverty category 
are almost exclusively urban dwellers in centers other than Baku. 
 
Table VII-5 
Azerbaijan: Consumer Price Index 
(Compared with December of previous year, %) 
Year CPI, 
total 
Food, 
beverages 
and tobacco 
Non-food 
products, 
services 
Non-food 
products 
Food and 
non-food 
products 
Services 
1998 -7.6 -9.0 -2.1 -3.0 -8.2 -0.6 
1999 -0.5 -2.0 2.5 0.0 -1.6 6.1 
2000 2.2 4.0 -0.9 1.7 3.4 -4.4 
2001 1.3 1.8 0.5 1.3 1.7 -0.6 
2002 3.3 4.8 1.0 1.7 4.0 -0.1 
2003 3.6 5.4 0.5 1.0 4.1 -0.3 
Source: National Bank of Azerbaijan (www.nba.az). 
 
VII-9. The CPI has remained relatively stable in recent years (see Table VII-5 above), 
increasing by two to three percentage points annually mostly due to rising food prices.  
                                                 
76 From 3.701 million to 3.727 million people 
77 Statistics register more than 3.7 million employed persons in the country but the State Social Protection 
Fund receives pension contributions from less than 1 million people in 2002.  
78 Based on the last census in 1999. 
79 Consumption expenditures per capita 
80 Based on the revised 2002 Household Budget Survey 
81 70% of median per capita consumption expenditure 
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However prices and tariffs for services82 have declined slightly.  The latest information 
from the 2002 household survey shows that, on average, households spent 5.8% of their 
consumption expenditures on housing and utilities.  This ranks among the lowest in the 
region83. 
 
VII-10. Estimates of the potential impact of electricity tariff increases suggest that the 
average income loss resulting from a 50% tariff increase in Baku is close to two dollars 
per household per month.  Assuming a pre-tariff consumption level of 200 kWh, a price 
elasticity of demand of – 0.20, and 100 percent collection, then the upper bound on the 
income loss from a 50 percent tariff rise is US$ 1.95 (AZM 9,600) per month and the 
lower bound is US$ 1.76 (AZM 8,640)84.  This is the amount of money that would have 
to be given to a household to make it no worse off than it was before the tariff increase.  
To reach cost recovery levels (for the residential customer) of 5 US cents per kWh or 
AZM 240, the income loss would be between US$ 4.1 and US$ 5.9 per month.  Table 
VII-6 below summarizes the projected household income losses under alternative 
electricity tariff scenarios. 
 
Table VII-6 
Household Income Losses Under Alternative Electricity Tariff Scenarios 
Elasticity 0.2       
Increase in 
Tariffs 
Tariff 
 
Consumption 
 
Income Loss  
(per month) 
(%) (Manat) (US$) (kWh) Max  
(US$) 
Min  
(US$) 
% of Min. 
Wage 
% of Avg. 
Wage 
0%   96 0.02 200 0 0 0 0 
50% 144 0.03 180 2.0 1.8 15 - 16 2 - 3 
100% 192 0.04 160 3.9 3.1 25 - 32 4 - 5 
150% 240 0.05 140 5.9 4.1 34 - 48 5 - 8 
200% 288 0.06 120 7.8 4.7 39 - 64 6 - 10 
Source: World Bank (2004). Ex-Ante Evaluation of Residential Electricity Tariff Reform. Mimeo. 
Note: Min. wage of 60,000 AZM per capita per month (January 2004); Average wage 383,100 AZM per 
capita per month (2003). 
 
VII-11. This analysis suggests that an immediate increase in tariff levels of 50% would be 
affordable.  However, as is discussed below, some other adjustments would also be 
appropriate in the case of households whose tariffs are calculated on the basis of norms 
which would mitigate the impact of higher unit tariff levels. 
 
Quality of Service 
 
VII-12. In an environment where infrastructure is deteriorating and quality of service is 
becoming increasingly problematic, non payment problems tend to increase and there is 
                                                 
82 This includes housing and utility costs. 
83 This analysis was undertaken by the PRSP Strategy Working Group under the Ministry of Economic 
Development. 
84 Lower bound = manat 8,640 = (manat 144 - manat 96) x 180 kWh per month 
Upper bound = manat 9,600= (manat 144 – manat 96) x 200 kWh per month  
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resistance to tariff increases.  In effect, if standards of service fall but prices remain the 
same, customers are suffering an increase in prices.  Such a deemed increase is 
compounded if tariffs rise while service declines. 
 
VII-13. In Azerbaijan, while a large percentage of households are connected to the power 
and gas networks, the availability of services has not been continuous or consistent across 
regions and consumer satisfaction is low (see Table VII-7 below). 
 
Table VII-7 
Satisfaction with Municipal Energy Services 
Type of service 
%  
Households 
connected or 
using 
% of using 
households 
who report 
permanent or 
near permanent 
supply 
% of using households 
who believe strongly or 
very strongly that 
maintenance of the 
service is needed 
% of using households 
who are dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied with 
the service 
Network electricity 100.0 48.6 39.6 48.61 / 53.22 
Network gas 87.9 81.5 10.6 42.0 
1 % of connected households who are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the duration of power supply; 
2 % of connected households who are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the power intensity; 
Source:  Azerbaijan Municipal Services Survey (AMSS) 
 
VII-14. There are also distinct disparities in the quality of service depending on the 
location.  Table VII-8 summarizes these disparities. 
 
Table VII-8 
Electricity Consumption and Service Quality Varies Widely by Location 
 Location Billing 
method 
Mean Household 
consumption 
(kWh per month) 
Winter Supply 
(hours per day)
Summer Supply  
(hours per day) 
Collection Rate 
(Payments/ Billing)
Ali-Bairamly Norms 628 17 22 25% 
Baku Meters 265 24 24 63% 
Ganja Norms n/a 10 22 n/a 
Gosar Norms 503 15 18 42% 
Guba Norms n/a   9 15 n/a 
Imishly Norms 960   8 20 7% 
Ismailly Norms n/a 18 21 n/a 
Mingechevir Norms 260   9 21 28% 
Sabirabad Norms 447   8 20 35% 
Sumgayit Meters 374 24 24 24% 
Source: 2003 Household Energy Survey, (non-random), 2003 Barmek Records, 2003 Bayva records. In: 
World Bank (2004). Ex-Ante Evaluation of Residential Electricity Tariff Reform. Mimeo. 
 
VII-15. One other feature in Table VII-8 that is interesting is the discrepancy between 
consumption levels where power is metered (in Baku and Sumgayit) and the deemed 
consumption associated with the use of norms which is considerably higher.  While the 
use of meters creates incentives to conserve energy and thereby reduce consumption 
levels, certain of the norms appear disproportionately high.  Consequently, in conjunction 
with tariff increases to households it would be appropriate to revise some (and possibly 
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all) of the norms downwards to provide a more accurate reflection of what is actually 
being consumed.  Such revisions should be preceded by some pilot programs using 
meters to obtain validating data on consumption levels in each region.  A downward 
revision of norms would ensure that households are not charged for amounts of electricity 
significantly in excess of their consumption levels and would help mitigate the impact of 
higher unit tariffs. 
 
VII-16. In the case of gas, norms are more widely used and an analysis of their accuracy 
should also be undertaken. 
 
The Social Protection System 
 
VII-17. While it would appear that the population should be able to afford some increases 
in utility tariff levels, it is important that work continue on refining and improving the 
social protection system so that the impact of tariff increases on the most vulnerable 
groups85 can be fully mitigated in the future. 
  
Table VII-9 
The Efficiency of Selected Social Assistance Programs 
 Coverage 
of the 
Poor86 
Leakage Towards the  
Non-poor 
  
(%) 
Individuals 
(%) 
Benefits 
(%) 
Social assistance, 44 47 39 
Of which:    
Child allowances 39 47 44 
Scholarships   6 31 31 
Social Pension   4 44 43 
                         Source:  World Bank estimations based on the HBS 2002. 
 
VII-18. The current social protection system is built on two components: (i) a mandatory 
social insurance system for old age, illness, disability and unemployment; and, (ii) non-
contributory social assistance for categories of persons considered at risk or poor.  A 
substantial amount - (between 5% and 6% of GDP) - has been redistributed through these 
programs every year from 1995 to 2002. According to SPPRED87 documents, it is 
expected that over the coming three years, social protection expenditures will increase as 
a proportion of budgetary expenditures from 16% in 2002 to 18.6% in 2005; in other 
words, more resources will be spent on social protection.  The 2002 Household Budget 
Survey shows that social benefits88 are distributed almost equally across the expenditure 
                                                 
85 Such as households with many children, single parent households, old people who live alone and have no 
support from relatives, and  households with disabled and unemployed members. 
86 Coverage of the poor is the percentage of poor individuals that receive benefits from the 
program.  Leakage toward the non-poor represents the share of funds that are captured by the non-
poor. 
87 State Program on Poverty Reduction and Economic Development 
88 Excluding pensions 
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deciles.  However, there is wide recognition that these programs are not adequately 
focused on those most in need (see Table VII-9).  Most programs are based on flat rate 
allowances that are unrelated to the economic status of the recipient and, therefore, do not 
make a major contribution to poverty reduction.  As such, the Government is pursuing an 
overall reform of its social assistance program. 
 
VII-19. The fragmentation of assistance funds into multiple programs greatly reduces the 
efficacy of the overall safety net.  Out of 35 benefits89, only nine are higher than one 
tenth of the average monthly wage (more than AZM 35,000, or US$ 7 per month). For 
the vast majority of recipients, benefits are between 2% and 10% of the monthly average 
wage.  Thus, in terms of adequacy (ratio of benefits to average household consumption, 
or to the monthly wage), most benefits fail to provide the needed assistance. In fact, 
administrative costs may hardly be justified for some of these benefits; such costs may 
outweigh the value of the benefit, reducing considerably the efficiency of the transfer.  
On the demand side, the take-up rate may possibly be low due to the private costs90 
associated with cashing in the benefits acting as a barrier for many households.    
 
VII-20. To address these issues the government has outlined its social reform strategy in 
the State Program on Poverty Reduction and Economic Development (SPPRED).  The 
SPPRED defines the Government’s main task as “to define an effective safety net strategy 
that will enhance the targeting efficiency, support the poorest and most vulnerable 
groups and will mitigate the impact of new public utility policies in the short-run.” The 
Government, with the help of the World Bank and other international donors (EU 
TACIS), is currently involved in the design of a new means tested and targeted family 
poverty benefit.   
 
VII-21. To this end, in January 2004, a new draft Law on Targeted Social Assistance was 
submitted by the Inter-ministerial Working Group under the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Protection to the Cabinet of Ministers. Under this new law, social assistance would be 
rendered in the following ways: (i) cash payments (social benefits, compensations for 
utility services and other payments); and (ii) in kind assistance (food, fuel, clothes, 
medicine and other types of assistance). The draft law anticipates the introduction of an 
employment test91 and an asset test92.  
 
VII-22. Other measures taken to reform the social assistance program include: 
 
                                                 
89 Nine can be classified as family and child benefits; eight benefits are pension and disability supplements, 
and sick leave payments; fourteen benefits are merit based; and four benefits support households in other 
occasions ( funeral allowance; food allowance for IDPs, etc.). 
90 Such as the time spent queuing to get the benefit 
91 e.g., Able-bodied but unemployed citizens who are not registered with relevant executive authorities and 
who refuse suitable vacancies offered more than twice by these agency two times will not be entitled to 
targeted social assistance. 
92 e.g., an assessment of family property, however, the rules need to be developed. 
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• In 2002, the abolition of social privileges (discounts in prices and tariffs, mostly 
on housing and utilities) provided to 25 categories of citizens and their 
replacement with cash compensation to nine groups. 93 
 
• A commitment to raise utility tariffs to cover marginal costs by 2005 and to 
strengthen financial discipline in the energy sector, including the unconditional 
disconnection of households that fail to pay for services.  
 
• The proposal to develop an employment program, supported by budgetary 
resources and institutional reforms, to create 600,000 new jobs between 2004 and 
2008 (November 2003 Presidential Decree).  
 
VII-23. The government’s priority now should be to strengthen the current social safety 
system, particularly given the existing and significant institutional constraints.  This 
would allow benefit targeting and coverage to be improved and expenditures to be 
rationalized while raising institutional capacity.   
 
VII-24. The basic safety net is currently a fragmentation of programs offering low benefit 
levels spread among a large number of recipients.  There is general consensus that most 
of these benefits need to be streamlined and consolidated, with benefits based on 
targeting and means testing principles.  The draft Law on Targeted Social Assistance 
anticipates the introduction of a means tested family poverty benefit that would improve 
the efficiency of use of public funds and provide more equitable compensation for 
economic hardships that would accompany energy sector reforms.  The government, with 
the help of the World Bank, is working on the improvement of current social assistance 
schemes to incorporate also the mitigation of the potential impact of utility tariff 
increases on living standards of the population. The government also proposes to adjust 
further its pension, wage and minimum wage policies in relation to necessary future price 
increases on utility services.  
 
VII-25. The rapid growth in population incomes, together with the expected reduction in 
explicit and implicit subsidies to the energy and housing sectors, will enable selectivity to 
be increased in the application of social benefits financed by the State Social Protection 
Fund (SSPF) and the budget94.  As an additional supporting short term and relatively easy 
intervention, the Government could use the existing network of social assistance 
payments (or categorical benefits) and selectively adjust them to support some of the 
more vulnerable groups from tariff increases.  A review would need to be conducted to 
identify those groups most at risk. 
 
VII-26. In the longer term, the upgraded social safety system should be reviewed for 
adequacy and an assessment should be made of the benefit or need for a parallel scheme 
                                                 
93 A few remaining social privileges cover public transport and pharmaceuticals for a very few categories of  
the population. 
94 Of 35 benefits (except pensions), 29 benefit payments are financed from the state budget. The State 
Social Protection Fund is heavily dependent on budgetary transfers. In 2003, 42.5 percent of the SSPF’s 
budget came from the state budget. 
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to focus specifically on addressing the impact of utility tariffs.  The design of a parallel 
scheme would be based, in part, upon the characteristics of the upgraded social safety 
system.  It would also need to take into consideration the use of other specially designed 
policies and measures to mitigate the impact of tariff increases, such as life-line tariffs, 
subsidies to limit the burden placed by utility expenditures on household budgets (so-
called notional burden approach), or earmarked cash transfers.   
 
Table VII-10 
Benefits and Shortcomings of Various Housing Subsidy Mechanisms 
Mechanism Benefits Shortcomings 
Notional burden 
approach 
Benefits can be predicted with 
reasonable certainty; relatively low 
administration costs 
Coverage and targeting of the poor is 
usually relatively low; there are heavy 
administrative burdens on the poor 
associated with its application; it is one of 
the most distortionary mechanisms of all 
utility subsidy mechanisms on the demand 
side; costly for the budget; a network of 
offices needed to administer the scheme. 
Life-line tariffs High coverage of the poor; 
targeting ratio improves as the size 
of the initial block decreases; the 
benefits received are highly 
predictable, especially through a 
two-block life-line tariff; the 
scheme is simple to administer. 
Since the poor tend to be under-represented 
among those with utility connections, 
many would not benefit; it requires reliable 
(tamper-proof) metering or a reasonable 
proxy (such as apartment size for heating) 
to estimate consumption; disciplined meter 
readers/controllers are needed; there is a 
significant burden on the budget, on the 
finances of the utility, or on other 
(industrial) consumers (if the cost is 
recovered through a higher industrial 
tariff). 
Other earmarked cash 
transfer 
The targeting ratio is relatively 
high; the net financial burden on 
utilities is low. 
Coverage of the poor as achieved by 
earmarked cash transfer schemes is highly 
uncertain, and in most surveyed countries 
was low; it is administratively demanding. 
Non-earmarked cash 
transfers (Current 
Scheme in Azerbaijan) 
Coverage depends on the ability 
and willingness of the poor to meet 
the eligibility criteria; it is the least 
distortionary of the utility subsidy 
mechanisms; there are no 
additional administrative 
requirements if a social assistance 
system is already in place; there is 
no financial burden for utilities or 
other (non-household) consumers. 
The targeting ratio of the poor is usually at 
a medium or low level; there is a 
significant fiscal cost. 
 
 
VII-27. There is significant debate on the validity of these individual assistance measures 
(see Table VII-10 above).  Instruments that perform well against some criteria frequently 
perform poorly according to others.  Further, not all mechanisms are expected to perform 
equally across countries or over all utility services.  While each approach has its own pros 
and cons, selected measures should recognize the low institutional capacity of the 
existing social protection system and the already extremely high work load of social 
assistance officers.  The selection of one of these options would be driven to some extent 
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by the availability and reliability of metering, Baku being one example where there is a 
higher level of household metering.  For example, if electricity tariff increases were 
considered in isolation, life-line tariffs could be appropriate due to the relative ease of 
metering.  Disciplined meter readers/controllers would be needed to underpin this 
approach to ensure its effectiveness.  If, however, a more comprehensive package of 
utility tariff increases is considered, ear-marked cash transfers or the application of the 
notional burden approach may be more promising.  
 
VII-28. In all scenarios, an integrated approach needs to be taken towards social 
assistance to ensure that energy sector tariff adjustments do not collectively overburden 
vulnerable households.  This is particularly important given the likelihood that 
privatization or letting of concession contracts for power and gas distribution would be 
spread across multiple entities.   
 
VII-29. Incentives could be provided to promote the use of more efficient energy sources 
to mitigate the effect of tariff increases on the poor.  A variety of instruments could be 
effectively used but explicit compensation should be considered by the Government for 
the “losing” utility provider.  Examples could include the award of subsidies to encourage 
the extension of natural gas into rural areas or purchase assistance programs for high cost 
items such as gas furnaces for poorer households.   
 
VII-30. Utility tariff increases could also raise the prospect of further increases in the use 
of wood for heating particularly for households in forested mountainous areas.  This is 
often associated with illegal wood cutting and the demand for fuel wood is estimated to 
exceed sustainable annual yields.  A review should therefore be conducted of potential 
alternative energy options for areas at high risk of deforestation or loss of vegetation as a 
result of utility price increases.  
 
VII-31. It should also be emphasized that, while social assistance can ameliorate poverty, 
the escape from poverty has to come from economic growth and better employment 
opportunities for the poor.   
 
Restructuring of Energy Sector State Operated Enterprises 
 
VII-32. Restructuring the utilities sector, and SOCAR, to eliminate operational and 
financial inefficiencies could lead to an increase in unemployment, and hence to poverty.  
The Government wishes to develop a Social Support Program (SSP) to cushion the 
impact of restructuring.  The SSP would address the social protection and employment of 
persons displaced as a result of the privatization of state owned enterprises.  The recently 
completed IBTA-I labor redeployment program focused on the design of the labor 
redeployment program itself.  The Bank is supporting a Poverty and Social Impact 
Analysis (PSIA)95 that will address other aspects of labor retrenchment including an 
analysis of employment opportunities and social mitigation measures.  The PSIA will be 
linked to the PRSP and the upcoming CAS that anticipate the development of a strategy 
                                                 
95 PSIA, Azerbaijan: a Framework for Labor Redeployment Program, Concept Note.  Draft outputs are 
expected at the end of 2004. 
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to cushion the effects of mass redundancies, together with analysis of labor markets and 
the institutional capacity of relevant agencies.  
 
VII-33. In the specific case of SOCAR, where studies are ongoing regarding the 
restructuring of the organization, a transition strategy should be developed for workers at 
risk.  Potential job opportunities linked to the clean up and decommissioning of past 
extraction activities could be linked to the transition strategy to help relieve pressures 
from staff reductions associated with restructuring. 
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Appendix 1 
The Outlook for Crude Oil Prices96 
 
1. For much of the past year, crude oil prices have been above OPEC’s target range 
of $22 to $28 per barrel and, in recent months, have climbed well above the top of the 
range and have reached a series of all time highs (in current dollar terms).  This has 
generated expectations that prices may remain well above their historic norms (in 
constant dollar terms) for the indefinite future.  However, an analysis of price trends 
going back to the inception of the industry in the middle of the 19th century would not 
support that assessment. 
 
2. Oil prices have always been managed97 to some degree, although the entities 
effectively doing the “managing” have changed over time.  Price levels are driven by 
perceptions and these, in turn, are colored by assumptions about the effectiveness of the 
management process.  The current high price environment has been created by a number 
of factors, including the following: 
 
i. The initial upturn in prices following the very low levels prevalent in 1998, as 
well as the more sustained upturn that began early in 2002, were both driven by 
perceptions that OPEC was reasserting a level of control over the market. 
 
ii. The global economic recovery has created a surge in demand for oil, led by 
surging demand in China and significant demand increases in the United States.  
The IEA estimates that current demand growth levels are higher than any year 
since 1988, when demand grew 2.8%98, and this, coupled with low stock levels 
and assessments that spare capacity is limited, have created the perception that oil 
is and will be in short supply.   
 
iii. The U.S. refining sector is currently operating at about 96% of capacity in 
contrast with historic norms of just under 90% utilization.  This has supported the 
perception of a tight supply situation. 
 
iv. There is a widespread view that only limited spare capacity currently exists – 
mainly in Saudi Arabia - and that even if all this capacity is made available, it 
may not be sufficient to meet potential demand. 
 
v. Uncertainties in the Middle East have created a premium component in the 
market. 
 
                                                 
96 This Appendix was prepared in October 2004, but the analysis and conclusions remain relevant in March 
2005. 
97 In other words, market efficiency alone has not been allowed to dictate the price of oil. 
98 To put this in perspective a 2.8% increase in demand translates into an additional requirement of about 
2.1 million barrels per day or 105 million tons per year.  Between 1998 and 1999 global demand grew 
2.3%.  In the three year period from the end of 1999 through 2002, however, demand growth averaged less 
than 0.6% per year. 
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vi. The Yukos situation in Russia has raised questions about future levels of Russian 
production. 
 
vii. Speculative activity involving hedge funds and other derivatives traders have also 
pushed prices up.  Some industry estimates suggest that the speculative activity 
associated with oil trading has added as much as $10/barrel to the price. 
 
3. While prices may not stay at levels above $40/barrel for an extended period, there 
is widespread expectation that prices will remain well above their historic norms for 
some time.  Historic patterns, however, suggest that perceptions could well be reversed 
completely within the next two to thee years and there are some underlying fundamentals 
that also support this. 
 
The “Management” of Oil Markets 
 
4. The process of “managing” the oil markets is effected through manipulation of oil 
supplies.  Effective management, therefore, is predicated on (i) the ability to manipulate 
supplies which means having both adequate spare producing capacity and the capability 
to adjust production volumes and (ii) willingness to exploit this ability fully.  The 
perception of the “market manager’s” ability and willingness to manage the market 
determines the effectiveness of the management process.  The effectiveness of the 
process, in turn, affects the degree of pricing volatility in the market place. 
 
The Evolution of “Market Management” 
 
5. The industry began in the United States in 1859 in a laissez-faire economic 
environment.  The business climate was characterized by a short-term perspective in 
which oil fields were found, produced at “flush” production and rapidly depleted.  The 
result was a total mismatch of supply and demand, chaotic markets and volatile prices.  
Out of this chaos Standard Oil emerged as a dominant force, reaching the peak of its 
power at the turn of the century (1885-1910).  Standard’s tremendous purchasing power 
and its transportation and storage facilities resulted in the achievement of relative market 
stability in areas in which it operated.  However the “boom and bust” oil field practices of 
the time prevented market stabilization in absolute terms.  After the break-up of Standard 
Oil in 1911 markets remained turbulent until 1935 when the Texas Railroad Commission 
took steps to control production. 
 
6. The long period of market stability that extended from 1935 to 1973 was 
essentially the result of a series of actions and sanctions by the U.S. and British 
governments to establish a system that would regulate supply and demand and stabilize 
markets and prices.  The most important of these was to give individual states in the U.S. 
the power to regulate the production of oil.  Two states, Texas and Oklahoma, thus 
assumed the role of swing producers.  Internationally, the victorious powers of the First 
World War allocated the then known oil resources of the Middle East to consortia 
consisting of a few international oil companies.  The “Red Line Agreement” of 1928 had 
the effect of limiting competition for Middle East oil which, in turn, put the international 
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oil companies in the position of individually matching their oil production with system 
demands. 
 
7. This system was remarkably successful in maintaining market stability for 38 
years, including the years of the Second World War.  However, in the early 1970s, OPEC 
took control of a significant portion of the world’s hydrocarbon resources and production 
and, in doing so, effectively took over the role of managing the market.  The role has 
remained with OPEC since then.  (Or, to be more specific, with those OPEC members 
with the capacity and willingness to manipulate supply).   This transition, however, was 
accompanied by an abiding perception that OPEC cannot consistently manage the market 
effectively.  The result has been a marked upsurge in pricing volatility since 1973. 
 
8. The first evidence of this loss of market stability came in the form of the two 
major price shocks of the 1970s (1973/74 and 1979/80).  These were the result of strong 
perceptions of supply shortages and geopolitical uncertainty together with concerns that 
OPEC would be unable or unwilling to make adequate volumes of crude oil available to 
stabilize the market.  In the subsequent period, OPEC’s attempts to maintain price levels 
through the imposition of production quotas were adversely impacted by a perception of 
supply surpluses resulting from (i) the sharp decline in demand brought about by the two 
price shocks, (ii) increased competition from non-OPEC oil and (iii) quota cheating on 
the part of member states.   
 
9. This period of perceived supply surplus continued through 1998, albeit in an 
environment of considerable price volatility.  Perceptions again began to change in 1999 
as key countries within OPEC (Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Kuwait) took more effective 
action to control supply availability.  The price rise that began in 1999 has been fueled by 
the various events cited on the first page of this appendix, underscored by OPEC’s 
apparent commitment to control access to oil at the margin.  However, with the recent 
surge in prices, the perception has now emerged that, while OPEC has the ability to keep 
oil off the market, it does not have the capacity to provide the additional supplies that 
would be required to dampen availability concerns.  While OPEC’s announcements that 
it would increase quotas created initial drops in spot market prices these were short-lived 
and prices moved on to achieve all time high levels (in current dollar terms).    
 
Historic Market Cycles 
 
10. The attached chart details oil prices in 2003 dollar terms from 1861 through 
200299.  This chart demonstrates the relative levels of volatility associated with the way 
management of the market has evolved.   
 
11. It is interesting to note that in 2003 dollar terms the median price for the entire 
period has been about $17.51/barrel and the average price about $23.15/barrel and that 
prices have shown a tendency to revert to this historic band.  Since OPEC took over de 
facto management of the market, prices have been higher.  For the 1974 – 2003 period, 
the median price (in 2003 dollars) was $29.33/barrel and the average price was 
                                                 
99 Source:  BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2004 
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$36.15/barrel.  However, these price levels were inordinately influenced by the high 
prices that prevailed from 1974 through 1985 that were associated with the two oil price 
shocks.  For the period 1986 through 2002, both the average and the median prices have 
been just under $25/barrel, only slightly above the top end of the historic band. 
 
12. An analysis of the chart points to a series of cycles comprising periods of 
perceived tight supply (when the tendency was for prices to rise) and periods of perceived 
surplus (when the tendency was for prices to fall).  The length of these cycles has been 
remarkably consistent over the last 100 plus years with a period of perceived tight supply 
in the range of 7 to 10 years being followed by a period of perceived glut lasting almost 
twice as long.  The chart highlights the turning points in the cycles.   
 
13. These cycles were identified in the mid 1980s in the midst of a perceived supply 
glut.  At the time it was predicted that the glut would continue until about the 1997/1998 
timeframe at which point, it was projected, a period of perceived tight supply would 
ensue.  The turn, in fact, took place at the beginning of 1999 having been presaged by an 
extended period of relative price softness.  It is perhaps worth noting that in periods of 
perceived glut, prices tend to soften but are not necessarily consistently low.  When Iraq 
invaded Kuwait, followed by Desert Storm, prices spiked upwards but the higher levels 
were not sustained100.  Similarly, in periods of perceived tight supply, prices will not 
remain consistently high.  Rather, the tendency will be for volatility to spike upwards 
rather than downwards. 
 
14. The timing of the cycles suggest that, while we are now in a “tight” cycle, the 
situation will likely turn in the 2006 – 2008 timeframe and be followed by a 15 to 20 year 
period of perceived “glut” with associated price softness. 
 
The Underlying Fundamentals 
 
15. There are a number of underlying fundamentals that would tend to support this 
assessment: 
 
i. The upstream oil industry requires significant capital and fairly long lead times in 
order to bring on new capacity.  Lead times for the development of major new 
increments of capacity can be in the 7 to 10 year range101 which may well explain 
the timing of the historic cycles.  When oil prices are high, capital budgets tend to 
be increased.  In general, therefore, producers commit more capital than average 
in periods of tight supply creating the potential for future supply surpluses.  
Producers also, however, discount sunk costs (consistent with a zero base 
budgeting approach).  Consequently, when perceptions change and a perceived 
tight market becomes a perceived glut, capital spending does not drop off right 
                                                 
100 Prices initially surged in mid August 1990, peaked in mid October 1990 but then dropped back to pre-
August 1990 levels by mid January 1991, notwithstanding the fact that Kuwait production was not resumed 
until several months later. 
101 Projects onshore can typically be brought on stream in a four to five year time frame.  However, the time 
required for offshore projects can extend to ten years or more. 
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away.  Rather, commitments are fulfilled, sustaining the potential supply surplus.  
However, when these capital commitments have been met, new commitments 
tend to be much lower, presaging a reduction in future increments of supply 
which, coupled with a boost in demand growth fueled by lower prices, ultimately 
translates into a perception of supply shortages and a new cycle of perceived 
“tight” supply. 
 
ii. One of the clearest examples of the impact that higher prices can have on 
production is provided by Russia.  Table 1 below details crude oil production, 
consumption and available export levels for Russia for the period 1998 (when 
prices bottomed out) through 2003, and reflects the major upswing in investment 
in the Russian oil sector that began in 2000. 
 
Table 1 
 Russian Crude Oil (Million Tons) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Production 304.3 304.8 323.3 348.1 379.6 421.4 
Consumption 123.7 126.2 123.5 122.3 122.9 123.0 
Available for Export 180.6 178.6 199.8 226.3 256.7 298.4 
 Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy and Interfax 
 
There is every indication that Russian production levels will continue to increase.  
The main near term constraint is export capacity.  Over the last few years Russia 
has been effective in increasing the availability of crude oil export capacity 
(something the World Bank had strongly encouraged the government to do).  
Statements from the President of Transneft early in 2004, however, suggest that a 
near term ceiling has been reached (a further factor in fueling the current 
perception of supply shortages).  There is, however, extensive discussion of new 
export projects including a pipeline to the East and it is very likely that 
implementation of these projects will get underway within the next one to two 
years creating the perception that substantial additional supplies will become 
available from Russia within a few years. 
 
There is some question about how much Russia’s production can increase without 
initiating major new plays.  This constraint, however, may not come into play 
until sometime after 2010 and a number of analysts believe that by 2010 Russia’s 
production capacity could exceed 600 million tons per year which could translate 
into an additional 180 million tons per year of exports. 
 
iii. Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have major investment programs underway that 
will result in significantly higher export levels in the 2008 – 2010 timeframe.  
Table 2 summarizes the production projections through 2010 for these two 
countries. 
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Table 2 
Crude Oil Production Outlook – Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (Million Tons) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Azerbaijan 15.2 15.1 19.6 29.8 47.3 62.3 69.5 71.2 
Kazakhstan 51.4 56.4 61.6 74.6 82.8 83.4 91.9 97.5 
        Source: World Bank estimates 
 
In 2008 exports from these two countries could increase by as much million tons 
versus 2004 and could increase by over 90 million tons by 2010.  These increases 
will serve to ease supply concern perceptions. 
 
iv. While the OPEC countries have very little spare production capacity at present, 
the underlying reserve base is sufficient to support capacity increases and there is 
a distinct possibility that investments will be directed towards increasing capacity.  
Significant additions may not materialize for several years but the expectation that 
such capacity will come on stream could help fuel a perception of supply 
surpluses102.  Iraq, of course, is one producing country that offers significant 
upside potential as and when the political situation stabilizes.  It is also worth 
noting that Libya has sizable reserves with a current reserves–to-production ratio 
of 59 years.  Libya’s willingness to invite in weapons inspectors and other 
measures to develop more positive relations with the West may well result in 
additional investment in the development of its oil resources. 
 
v. Several non OPEC countries in Africa – Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Chad - 
are also expected to increase production capacity over the next few years. 
 
vi. Current high price levels will have an effect on demand.  The first oil price shock 
in 1973 led to a 2.75% reduction in global demand by 1975, at which point 
demand again began to grow.  However, the second price shock had a more 
dramatic impact reducing demand by 11% between 1979 and 1983.  While 
demand began to grow again in 1984 it did not reach the 1979 level until 1990.  
The relative impact of the current price levels is not as dramatic as the impact that 
was felt by the two oil price shocks.  The current price levels will, however, 
dampen economic growth and with it the growth in demand for oil.  At some 
point a slowing in demand growth will play into perceptions concerning oil 
supply availability and help trigger the perception that the next “glut” has arrived. 
 
Product Pricing Considerations 
 
16. A few comments on the issue of product pricing may be appropriate.  Unlike the 
crude oil market, the refined product market is not “managed” although it is significantly 
impacted by crude oil prices.  There are three factors that impact product prices; (i) 
refinery economics, (ii) the price of alternative fuels such as gas and coal that compete 
with residual fuel oil, and (iii) the price of crude oil. 
                                                 
102 Some industry analysts have estimated that OPEC capacity could be increased by 1.0 to 1.5 million 
barrels per day within a year. 
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17. Refinery economics are influenced by three principal closely inter-related factors: 
the mode of incremental operation in a particular refining enclave; the cost and types of 
feedstock available; and which product is the swing component of the refined product 
barrel. 
 
18. Incremental refining economics play a significant role in defining spot product 
prices.  In Europe, for example, incremental topping/reforming economics based on spot 
product prices and spot crude in major refining enclaves, such as Rotterdam, have 
consistently been close to break-even.  This is true despite the fluctuations in the price 
spread between residual fuel and gasoline and distillates.  This black/white product 
spread defines the additional economic contribution, or upgrading margin, made by 
conversion capacity.   
 
19. The price of crude oil dictates the overall price level of the mix of product prices.  
Higher crude prices tend to increase the black/white product spread since, in general, 
residual fuel is the swing product.  Residual fuel competes with coal and natural gas in 
the industrial boiler market, which effectively defines the residual fuel price.  However, 
this is not always the case.  In 1984 and 1985, in part because of the UK coal miners 
strike, crude was run specifically to meet residual fuel demand.  The result was a surplus 
in white products that had no ready alternative outlet.  The market narrowed the 
black/white product price spread, residual fuel prices increased and white product prices 
declined.  This sharply reduced and, in some cases eliminated, the economic contribution 
made by conversion hardware. 
 
20. The two factors therefore that most influence upgrading margins are the price of 
crude oil and the demand for residual fuel.  In the current environment, availability of 
coal and gas supplies acts as a damper on demand for residual fuel and hence the price 
(although a tightening gas supply outlook and increasing demand for coal could push up 
both residual fuel demand and prices).  The current high crude oil prices, therefore, 
provide extremely attractive upgrading margins and the refining sector, as a whole, is 
generating significant profits.  It should be kept in mind, however, that refineries that 
operate in essentially the same mode as an enclave’s incremental refining mode (e.g. 
simple topping reforming refineries in both the Europe North Africa and the Asia Pacific 
enclaves) will not benefit from a high oil price environment.  It is also worth noting that, 
while the US refining sector is operating at close to full capacity, there is still quite a bit 
of spare capacity in both the Europe North Africa and Asia Pacific refining enclaves. 
 
The Impact of High Oil Prices 
 
21. While it is not clear exactly what effect the current level of oil prices will have on 
the global economy higher prices do tend to impact the poorer countries 
disproportionately.  The impact of a $10/barrel price increase on the US results in a 
higher cost for consumption of about $72 billion on an annualized basis.  This is a little 
less than 0.7% of GDP.  In the five poorest countries in the former Soviet Union (the CIS 
7 excluding Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan) the impact of a $10/barrel price increase is 
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equivalent to about 2.8% of GDP – or about four times the impact on the US in relative 
terms.  Resource rich countries, of course, benefit in absolute terms but there is strong 
evidence that the “resource curse” (the inability of these economies to deploy these 
revenues effectively) minimizes the value of these benefits such that, in global welfare 
terms, high oil prices have a negative impact. 
 
22. High volatility for a commodity as critical as oil (and, more broadly, energy) also 
tends to constrain economic development.  Again the impact falls disproportionately on 
the poorer countries since they have less capacity within their economies to manage 
commodity price volatility. 
 
23. The history of the industry demonstrates that periods of greatest price stability 
also offer lower prices on average – in effect prices remain at levels sufficient to 
encourage the exploration and development activity necessary to maintain a stable market 
without providing windfall profits. 
 
Conclusions 
 
24. In brief, the following are key conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of 
historic pricing: 
 
i. Unmanaged markets are liable to be highly volatile (as was evidenced in the 
earliest years of the industry).  However, OPEC (or more specifically the few 
countries within OPEC with the capacity to manage supply levels), has been 
relatively ineffective in the role of “managing” the market.  It has demonstrated 
that it can, from time to time, apply upward pressure to the market, but that it does 
not have the capacity to establish and maintain a high degree of market stability. 
 
ii. The period of extended market stability that ran from 1935 to 1973 owed a great 
deal to the direct support of the US and British governments – both countries were 
major oil consumers.  This was also a period of significant economic growth 
driven, in part, by stability in the oil market and moderate pricing levels. 
 
iii. A more stable oil market with a moderate level of oil pricing will deliver optimum 
benefits to the global economy.  There will always be debate about what level of 
pricing is appropriately “moderate”, but there seems to be some consensus to the 
view that a stable price in the low to mid $20s/barrel in real terms (i.e. increasing 
with inflation) could meet this definition. 
 
iv. Given the uncertainty about the crude oil price outlook and the questions about 
OPEC’s ability to manage the market effectively, it would be prudent for the 
government of Azerbaijan to take a fairly conservative view in making pricing 
projections for budget purposes.   
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Appendix 2 
The Gas Sector Regulator103 
1. This appendix lists the key functions needed by the regulator to further the 
development of competition in the market.  It examines the liberalization process and the 
regulatory models that have been adopted in the UK, USA, California, Romania and 
Germany.  It explains how these models have promoted or hindered competition and the 
functioning of the market.  
 
Key Features of Regulatory Function to Promote Competition 
 
2. The regulator has to have powers to encourage competition and prevent anti-
monopoly behavior.  If these powers are backed up by a strong national law on 
competition and the prevention of monopoly abuse of power, the regulator does not need 
additional strong legal powers.  However if this law is weak, strong laws and powers 
need to be provided expressly for the gas industry (and the remainder of the energy 
industries).  Specifically, the regulator needs to able to police and punish anti-competitive 
behavior.  The first step is to provide some basic principles: 
 
• Separate Natural Monopoly Activities from all other activities 
o This does not necessitate full legal separation, but if full legal separation does 
not exist, there needs to be strong institutional separation including a 
compliance team appointed by the regulator and reporting to the regulator and 
third parties to whistle blow abuses, and with full powers to investigate 
complaints. 
o There also needs to be full and accurate published accounts on all the 
activities of the monopoly services allocated in fine detail to cover all the 
activities of the company. 
o Non-Discrimination provision.  Third parties need protection, backed up by 
regulatory powers, to police and punish any discrimination exhibited by the 
monopolist. 
• Separate monopoly activities from all other activities 
o The same issues apply as for a natural monopoly, but these activities should 
be presumed to be open to competition over time, preferably to a defined 
timetable. 
o The power of separation is difficult to exaggerate – effectively done it 
provides confidence to the industry that it will be treated fairly. 
• Full legal separation is the best option 
o With full legal separation competitors know that the monopoly does not gain 
from treating any one company differently from any other company. 
o As long as the company is one legal entity there is advantage for it to 
discriminate in favor of its other parts.  The only way to provide confidence is 
to ensure the regulator has enough powers to investigate, police, and enforce 
with punitive damages. 
                                                 
103 This appendix was prepared for the World Bank by Gas Strategies Consulting Ltd. 
  
130
 
o The first choice is therefore full separation.  This can be done in two stages, 
starting with separation within the company and extensive powers for the 
regulator, followed by full demerger of shareholder interests.  Many of the 
provisions to protect third parties can be dismantled once full separation is 
achieved – and this is one of the reasons companies may decide to demerge of 
their own accord (e.g. British Gas in the UK) 
 
• Monopolies act as Monopolists 
o Uncontrolled monopoly behavior results in too high prices, too little 
investment, and moribund managerial and worker behavior.  A regulator is 
required to provide the same kind of impetus that in other industries is 
provided by competition. 
o The regulator needs to set overall price controls to ensure that too much 
money is not raised from customers and to provide incentives for productivity 
improvements and appropriate investment 
o Having set the overall level of prices / revenues, the regulator needs to have a 
clear strategy for ensuring prices are fair between consumers.  This can be 
done in a number of ways, and would normally be a result of extensive 
consultation with the industry, consumers and other interested organizations.  
Access to good quality information is essential. 
 
• Investment 
o Third parties need to be able to request access to any service they need to 
provide gas to their customers.  The regulator has to have powers to ensure 
that this access will be provided within a reasonable time frame and at a 
reasonable cost.  Only when there is competition in potential provision of a 
service can this requirement for reasonable access be dropped. 
 
• Information 
o The regulator needs access to any information requested in a reasonable time 
frame.  Ideally the regulator should have full access to all the internal accounts 
systems, staff, IT systems, etc to ensure that information is provided and is 
accurate.  Where there is no information internally the regulator needs to be 
able to insist it is provided. 
 
• Political Independence 
o The best systems work by government providing the policy framework, and 
taking the tax and spend decisions, while the regulator implements the policy 
and works out how most effectively to deliver that policy, and works closely 
with government to provide the analytical framework and data to help the 
government make better decisions. 
o Independent regulation ensures that key regulatory decisions are not distorted 
by political drivers, and provides third parties with confidence that they will 
be treated without political bias. 
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• Powers to investigate and remedy transgressions 
o The regulator needs full powers to investigate any complaints, abuse, and to 
investigate potential changes to the industry structure.  It needs enough 
powers to dissuade the company from misbehaving in the first place, and a 
system of penalties if misbehavior is identified. 
 
Regulatory Models in Developed and Transition Economies 
 
UK 
 
3. The UK was the first country to introduce gas market liberalization all the way to 
the retail customer.  Gas market liberalization was promoted as part of a political and 
economic agenda intended to introduce competition into the downstream gas business.  
Competition would promote choice for customers, increased efficiency of operations, and 
price reductions for consumers.  The process has largely been successful, and there are 
now 93 licensed gas-marketing companies, and prices paid by end users are among the 
lowest in Europe, all customers can choice their supplier, and barriers to switching are 
small. 
 
4. The process of liberalization took 16 years to complete, beginning in 1982 and 
finishing in 1998.  The process can be defined in four phases, as shown in Table 1. 
 
5. In the initial phase of liberalization between 1982 and 1988 there was very little 
material progress made toward the introduction of competition despite the legislative and 
regulatory changes introduced.  Although the Oil and Gas Enterprise Act 1982 granted 
firms other than British Gas Corporation the right to use the existing pipeline network 
and to supply customers whose annual consumption exceeded 25,000 therms 
(732.7 MWh), by 1985, three years after the act, no alternate supplier had entered the 
market.  There were a number of reasons that explain the failure of competition in the 
early days of liberalization.  Chief among which were first, the difficulty any potential 
new suppliers had accessing the transmission and distribution grid which was through 
negotiation with British Gas and secondly, the difficulty of actually obtaining gas 
supplies.   
 
6. However, with the introduction of measures to create a more competitive 
environment in the early 1990s, large numbers of marketers began to enter the market.  
The release gas programs introduced in 1992, the relatively undemanding financial 
credentials required for new marketers and the fact that British Gas was forced to stick to 
its published price schedules meant that it was relatively easy for companies to enter the 
market and sell gas at a profit.  Furthermore, in 1992 Ofgas lowered the eligibility 
threshold for consumers from 25,000 therms per annum (732.7 MWh) to 2,500 therms 
per annum (73.3 MWh) which effectively made all but commercial and residential 
customers eligible to buy from suppliers other than British Gas.  At the same time Ofgas 
put an upper limit of British Gas’s allowed share of the eligible market of 55% 
effectively forcing them to release market share to new entrants. 
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Phases of UK Gas Market Deregulation 
 Measures Effects 
1982-
1988 
From 1982, companies other than 
British Gas Corporation has the 
right to use the existing pipeline 
network and supply customers with 
an annual consumption over 25,000 
therms (732.7 MWh) 
By 1985, no new suppliers had 
entered the market, mainly for two 
reasons: difficulty in accessing the 
transmission and distribution grid 
which was through negotiation with 
British Gas and difficulty in 
obtaining supplies 
1988-
1994 
In 1988 British Gas was made to 
publish a price schedule and stick to 
it, giving new suppliers a target 
price to beat. 
British Gas was allowed to buy only 
90% of new gas production 
In 1992 British Gas was forced to 
release some gas purchased under 
long term contracts 
Eligibility threshold to choose 
supplier 2.500 therms (73.3 MWh) – 
effectively all industrial customers 
First third party transportation deal 
signed in 1990.   
By the end of 1990, British Gas had 
lost 10% of its market share.  By 
1995, British Gas’ share of the 
eligible market had fallen to 50% 
and over 65% of industrial 
customers had switched suppliers 
1994-
1996 
Prices fell due to new entrants 
securing supplies.  British Gas starts 
renegotiating long term contracts 
which are at higher prices 
British Gas share of eligible market 
limited to 55% 
The Network Code introduced 
setting out rules for regulated third 
party access to the transmission 
network 
British Gas to de-merge into 
Centrica (trading) and BG 
(transportation, exploration and 
international) 
 
1996-
1998 
Opening of residential market 
started in 1996 and was complete by 
June 1998 
 
Source: Gas Strategies 
   
7. In 1996 the network code setting out the rules and allowing for regulated third 
party access to the UK transmission network was established and then in 1997 British 
Gas de-merged into two companies, one a trading business to be named Centrica and the 
second a transportation, exploration and international business to be named BG plc.  Both 
these moves were regarded as essential by the regulator to ensure the continued 
development of competition.  It was believed that without formal separation of the 
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transmission and supply business and a clear transparent third party access regime 
competition would certainly be hindered. 
 
8. The final phase of the process was the gradual opening of the residential market to 
competition.  This market was opened in stages from 1996 with competition gradually 
introduced over a period of two years in a series of trial areas; by June 1998 this process 
was completed. 
 
USA 
 
9. The US gas industry started to be transformed to its current shape with FERC 
Order 436 in 1985 which encourage pipeline companies to separate their sales and 
transportation functions.  Prior to FERC order 436, pipeline companies bought gas from 
producers, transported it through their pipelines, and sold it to distribution companies 
which then sold it to end users.  A series of FERC orders, starting with 436 and 
culminating in FERC order 636 in 1992, unbundled these services, so pipeline companies 
provided services for third parties and did not own the gas they transported.  Purchasers 
of natural gas are now able to negotiate with many different suppliers and contract 
separately with pipeline companies for transportation and storage.  This has led to the 
emergence of independent gas marketers, which arrange transportation and market gas 
for producers.  The availability of information about commodity and transportation prices 
via commodity markets and electronic bulletin boards mean that price signals are quickly 
transmitted between consumers and producers. 
 
10. Between 1988 and 1994, the market changed considerably. 
 
• Gas production increased by 10%, wellhead prices declined by 11% and reserves 
declined by 2%. 
• Gas delivered to consumers increased by 16%. 
• Prices to consumers dropped significantly as consumers benefited from lower 
wellhead prices and transportation costs. 
US Gas Market Development 
1938 The National Gas Act created the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to regulate 
natural gas pipelines but not wellhead prices.  Demand growth in the 1940s and 
1950s outpaced pipeline expansion, leading to price volatility and supply 
shortages.  Producers wanted price caps, but the FPC said it did not have the 
authority to introduce them. 
1954 The Supreme Court decides that the National Gas Act should provide for the 
regulation of both pipelines and wellhead prices.  This led to an industry 
structure where regulated gas producers sold to regulated pipeline companies, 
who sold gas to local distribution companies, who then sold the gas to end users.  
Local distribution companies were regulated by state or local agencies. 
This reduced price volatility but caused supply shortages, as it did not provide 
any incentive for producers to replace reserves. 
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1978 The Natural Gas Policy acted created the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) to replace the FPC. 
Wellhead prices were deregulated and production increased rapidly.  This led to 
a gas surplus.  However, as pipeline companies charged enough to cover the cost 
they paid to purchase gas, there was no incentive for them to select the most 
competitively priced gas. 
1985 FERC Order 436 required pipelines to provide open access, allowing consumers 
to negotiate prices directly with producers and contract separately with pipelines 
for transportation. 
1987 FERC order 500 clarified some open access issues remaining after Order 436 and 
created a mechanism for pipeline companies to recover from their customers the 
costs of modifying or terminating their long term take or pay contracts with 
producers.   
1992 FERC Order 636 required pipeline companies to provide open access 
transportation and storage and to separate sales completely from transportation. 
1994 FERC retained the right to disregard the separate corporate structures of a 
pipeline company and its affiliates in the event that they abuse their 
interrelationship. 
Source: Gas Strategies 
 
Californian Energy Crisis 
 
Introduction 
 
11. The California Energy Crisis hit California in summer 2000 and ran on for the 
first quarter of 2001.  The whole state was affected with rotating black outs and frequent 
brown outs hitting homes and businesses across the state.  The crisis has cost the state 
billions both directly as a result of electricity purchases that it has had to make and 
indirectly in terms of damage to businesses.  The crisis has led to a worldwide reappraisal 
of the way in which energy markets are liberalized and has caused many to call into 
question the wisdom of breaking up the old monopoly systems.  Much of the response 
and lasting impression both locally and internationally is based on myth and emotion but 
it is a very forceful impression.  Thus, whilst it is important to try to understand the real 
facts, it is equally important to note that most people identify the cause as “deregulation” 
and the liberalization agenda worldwide has been impacted by the various perceptions of 
California.  The causes that lay behind the crisis can be summarized as: 
 
• Fundamental electricity supply demand imbalance (supply shortage) 
• Flawed electricity market structure 
• Regulatory uncertainty, political interference 
• Unexpectedly hot weather in summer of 2000 
• Coincidence of high gas prices which further pushed up electricity prices 
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Legislation and Regulation 
 
12. Although it was the fundamental supply situation which lay at the heart of the 
crisis the problem was exacerbated by the legislative and regulatory framework that was 
in place.  An ever increasing spread of responsibility amongst too many regulatory and 
supervisory bodies, the inadequate structure of those bodies and a degree of political 
interference (primarily from the legislature) caused regulatory uncertainty at best, chaos 
at worst.   
 
13. The supervisory bodies that were set up to oversee the CalPX (California Power 
Exchange) and the Independent System Operator (ISO) were too unwieldy and poorly 
structured to make decisions.  For example, the ISO board had 28 members representing 
different interest groups who made decision-making practically impossible and it was one 
of many bodies involved.  These inadequacies became particularly apparent as the crisis 
unfolded and quick decisions were needed.  Political interference in the design of the 
market structure and failure to implement timely remedies made things worse not better.  
The frequent insistence of politicians on setting consumer prices to meet political rather 
than economic ends seems to have fuelled the crisis. 
 
Pricing Systems and Market Structures 
 
14. In 1996, the state law AB 1890 changed the structure of California’s electricity 
industry which was intended to create a market based system from a tightly regulated 
monopoly system.  It relied exclusively on spot, day ahead price and supply. For the first 
two years of the transition, market prices tracked expectations with wholesale electricity 
prices averaging $33 per MWh which was very close to the marginal cost of power 
production.  However, from the summer of 2000 and through early 2001 market trends 
were extremely volatile with the market producing a series of problems; including very 
high electricity prices, decreased system reliability, very high profits for generators and 
wholesale power sellers and large debts for utility distributors who were forced to buy 
their power at inflated prices but unable to pass any of this price increase on to their retail 
consumers.  
 
15. There were a number of reasons that explain the problems outlined above.  Firstly 
the politicians were initially unwilling to allow consumers to face any price increases 
regardless of the cost of power, which in turn, undermined a proper demand response to 
higher prices, eroded supplier confidence and thus fuelled the crisis.  This was manifest 
in the fact that retail prices were capped while the wholesale price was governed entirely 
by the daily spot market.  In order for liberalization to work successfully, wholesale 
markets need realistic contracted revenue from the retail market or a free retail market.  
However, politicians are often very unwilling to leave control of retail energy prices to 
the market.  As the problems unfolded in California and the crisis deepened the 
governor’s office categorically refused to put up retail electricity prices when only minor 
action was required.  It was argued that a simple 2% rise in retail prices early on in the 
crisis could have significantly reduced its impact.   
 
  
136
 
16. In addition, the decision to force all electricity sales through the CalPX 
(California Power Exchange) and the refusal to allow long term bilateral contracts 
between power producers and consumers meant that the system was structurally unstable 
and extremely vulnerable to massive short term price hikes.  This problem was 
exacerbated by the fact that no realistic hedging in the forward markets was allowed (the 
rules were set so tight as to make permissible hedging useless).  Furthermore, California 
did not develop a capacity market or other mechanism, which would trigger the building 
of generating capacity and transmission, an extremely dangerous omission, given the 
supply shortage that has already been described.  Indeed this weakness in the market 
structure was noticed as early as 1997 in a CERA report on Californian electricity market 
deregulation in which it was pointed out that: 
 
“There is no reliable mechanism [in California] to pay for the fixed and 
operating costs of new generating facilities, … That is likely to lead to 
extended periods of low prices followed by periods of very high prices, as 
supply shortages and surpluses develop.  Price volatility will not be 
conducive to a smooth transition to competition.” 
17. The structure of the market combined with the system supply shortages allowed 
generators to “play” the system and take advantage of, and artificially inflate, prices on 
the CalPX.  By carrying out “maintenance” or choosing to export power out of California 
at times of peak demand generators were able to push prices on the CalPX even higher.  
A further flaw in the market relates to the relatively low numbers of players involved in 
both supplying and generating power.  Insufficient incentives were provided to IPP’s to 
build capacity and, as explained above, tight siting and environmental regulations also 
made it difficult to get capacity built in California.  Equally, on the supply side, the state 
legislature in dismantling the monopoly system was very keen to protect consumers, 
particularly retail consumers, under the new market structure.  As such extremely tight 
regulations were imposed on potential new Energy Service Providers (ESPs) which 
negated all the incentives designed to encourage new entrants into the market.   
 
Supply – Demand 
 
18. The fundamental problem that lay behind the energy crisis in California was the 
existence of an imbalance between supply and demand, an imbalance that was 
improperly handled and made worse by the actions and reactions of the authorities.  Over 
the preceding decade the state failed to approve (and developers to build) adequate 
capacity to meet rising demand; between 1990 and 1999 electricity demand rose by 
11.3% but supply capacity actually fell by 1.7% as some older power plants were retired.  
After 1990 no new major power plants were constructed, relatively few were planned and 
a significant number were shut down. 
 
19. Incumbents and new entrants alike were unwilling to invest in capacity and 
transmission due to the uncertainty and difficulty of the regulatory situation.  
Furthermore, strict planning laws supported by a strong environmental lobby meant that 
it was extremely difficult to gain permission to build new capacity.  On average, it took 
seven years to get a project from application to completion.  This was in sharp contrast to 
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other states where power projects could be fast-tracked if deemed necessary by the 
regulator and local authorities.   
 
20. California also faced the problem that it relied heavily on hydro generation for its 
electricity (much of it from outside the state).  In an average year hydro accounts for 
more than 30% of supply.  This was reduced to only 20% in 2000 as a result of poor 
rainfall.  It must be noted that similar low rainfall in the summer of 2001 did not spark 
another crisis that year.  
 
21. The supply side problem was exacerbated by California’s reliance on imports of 
electricity from neighboring states particularly in the peak summer period.  This was 
sustainable for many years because the region was generally oversupplied with 
generating capacity.  Power surpluses in the southwest were caused by overbuilding of 
generation capacity in 1970s and 1980s which had been driven by demand forecasts 
which turned out to overoptimistic.  Similarly, the Pacific Northwest (PNW), a major 
source of imports to California, had substantial supply available to export.  Its supply is 
also ideal for California in that seasonal demand within the region is complementary with 
that of California; that is to say, peak demand in PNW is in winter whereas peak demand 
in California is in summer.  However, surplus capacity built in both PNW and the 
southwest has been steadily absorbed by growing local demand thereby reducing that 
available for export to California.  Clearly, California came to take out of state electricity 
for granted. 
 
22. By the time of the crisis, the robustness of California’s electricity supply system 
was compromised, peak reserve margins (i.e. the capacity available in reserve at peak 
periods) had fallen from a high of 18% in 1993 to around 5% in 1999 making the system 
dangerously vulnerable.  It is clear, therefore, that the supply shortfall in California was 
fundamental to the energy crisis of 2000 and 2001 and was not a one off brought on by 
exceptional conditions but a result of a long running failure to invest or to encourage 
investment in sufficient new generating capacity both within and outside California.  In 
addition there was a failure to build capacity close to the major centers of demand which 
in part was a result of the difficulty of gaining planning consent for power projects close 
to centers of population. 
 
Gas Prices 
 
23. The price of gas also played its part in exacerbating the effect of the California 
energy crisis.  Close to 50% of California’s instate generation capacity is driven by gas, 
such that the extremely high gas prices at the California border which were seen in 
November 2000 and February and March 2001 had a serious effect on electricity prices.  
At the same time the whole US was seeing a rise in gas prices with Henry Hub104 floating 
around $10/MMBtu throughout late November, December and early January.  These 
prices were small in comparison with the $50/MMBtu on the Californian border in 
November 2000 and the $30+ price seen in February and March 2001. 
                                                 
104 Henry Hub is the physical delivery location for gas traded under regulated futures contracts in the 
United States. 
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24. These high prices can be explained by a number of factors; the long running low 
gas prices in the US prior to the rises at the end of 2000 had meant a reduction in drilling 
activity over the preceding years which in turn led to the supply surplus being eroded.  A 
further reason was the lack of an economic alternative fuel supply with the prices of 
competing fuels rising in parallel with gas.  For power generators fuel switching was also 
not really an option with heavy environmental restrictions on burning fuel oil.  In 
addition an explosion in August 2000 on one of the pipelines delivering southwestern gas 
to California meant reduced capacity at a time when supplies were already tight.  The 
pipelines feeding into California have also been running at close to capacity, as have 
pipelines within the state.  As such, stiff competition to gain access to capacity had an 
inflationary effect on prices.  Furthermore, price spikes at the Californian border have 
also been blamed on suppliers withholding gas in order to take advantage of high prices 
and on “round-trip” trades conducted by Enron and others that intensified price spikes. 
 
Developments Since the Crisis 
 
25. After the first quarter of 2001 the situation in California stabilized, the last brown 
or black outs being in March 2001.  Similarly electricity spot prices fell back into line 
with long-term expectations.  The explanation for this is manifold but there were several 
key reasons 
i. FERC imposed temporary price caps to spot market price spikes 
ii. Department of Water Resources signed long term power purchase contracts with 
generators (for above current electricity prices) 
iii. Electricity consumption fell due to both more moderate temperatures in summer 
2001 and major consumer conservation initiatives 
iv. Fast tracking of new build generating capacity 
 
26. By June 2001, natural gas prices in California fell back into line with Henry Hub 
and as drilling increased across the US and Canada it brought new supplies to market 
alleviating the supply shortages.  Equally the constraints on infrastructure have been 
addressed, with the expansion of delivery capacity to California from 6630 MMcf/d in 
2001 to 8310 MMcf/d in 2003, and additional expansion being considered.  The CalPX 
has been disbanded and the state legislature has, through the Department of Water 
Resources, entered into a number of long term power purchase contracts with generators 
to ensure security of electricity supply to consumers within the state.  The price cap 
imposed on spot electricity had the effect of curbing excessive prices for electricity 
within the state and helped to bring the situation under control.  The weather intervened 
with temperatures that summer being moderate compared with 2000.  In addition the state 
legislature also launched a major energy conservation program which included an energy 
efficiency rebate system which has had a significant effect on suppressing demand.  
Finally the state has radically overhauled the planning process for getting new generation 
capacity built, three major and six minor (under 150 MW) power plants , with a 
combined capacity of 1864.5 MW came on line in 2001.  In 2002, a total on 2502.5 MW 
came on line, and in 2003, 3944 MW.  In 2003, there was 4051 MW of generating 
capacity under construction, and 6007 MW under review. 
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Implications of the Crisis 
 
27. The measures taken since the crisis brought the situation under control and many 
of the measures that have been taken will help prevent a recurrence of the crisis.  New 
generating and gas pipeline infrastructure will address the long running supply shortfalls 
which were fundamentally behind the crisis.  Equally the conservation program has also 
had a very positive effect.  The cause of market liberalization has been damaged by the 
crisis but it is unlikely that there will be a return to the old monopoly based structures of 
the past; the uncertainty over the future will inevitably cause potential generators, 
suppliers and infrastructure developers to think twice before embarking on expensive 
projects.  Similarly, one of the most important questions that has to be addressed is the 
way in which generating capacity and infrastructure are built in time to avoid the kind of 
supply shortfalls that lay at the heart of this crisis.  Would a capacity market be able to 
read price signals in time to develop capacity as it is needed or do the lead times involved 
in building generation make this impractical?   
 
28. It is essential to make the point that the Californian energy crisis does not 
represent a failure of market liberalization, but rather a failure to liberalize correctly.  The 
market structure was fundamentally flawed and no one agency with enough authority had 
regulatory oversight for the development of the market as a whole.  Since the crisis, 
measures have been taken to allow the Californian market to function effectively.  CalPX 
stopped operating in January 2001.  In February 2001 California's Department of Water 
Resources was permitted to purchase power under long-term contracts for sale to PG&E 
and SCE.  In April 2001, FERC introduced a price mitigation plan for the spot market, 
and in May 2001, it was announced that prices would be raised by 19% for all except the 
most vulnerable customers.  Also in May 2001, Senate Bill 28X was signed to shorten the 
time needed to review plans for building new capacity.  It may well be that to produce an 
effective market more not less regulation is required and this is one of the key lessons 
that can be drawn from the crisis, liberalization does not mean deregulation, indeed the 
transition from a monopoly market to a free market requires heavy handed regulation to 
force the market open but that regulation needs to be focused and free from day-to-day 
interference from political bodies. 
 
29. California’s electricity crisis remains an example of how not to organize energy 
markets.  Ironically, it is not and was not a flawed gas market.  The message to be learnt 
from it is not to avoid liberalization, but to ensure that new market reforms are structured 
on a practical basis, taking care to avoid the obvious mistakes of curtailed supply, total 
exposure to price risk and a multiplicity of regulatory bodies. 
 
Romania 
 
30. Romania is a country with a highly developed gas industry with a long tradition of 
upstream industry and the liberalization of the gas industry is also highly politicized. 
Romania is one of the highest consumers and producers of energy in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  By the early 1980s natural gas accounted for 55% of Romania’s total energy 
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supply - the highest penetration any Central and Eastern European country has achieved.  
This unusually large market share was due to former President Ceaucescu’s policy of 
self-sufficiency at all costs, which led to short-term maximization of domestic gas 
production without heed to optimizing recoverability of reserves.  The high inefficiency 
of the industry and falling gas production prompted the Romanian authorities to reform 
and liberalize the industry in order to reverse the negative development.  Romania is in 
the process of reforming its energy industries but the reluctance of the government to 
introduce politically controversial and economically challenging reforms means Romania 
is moving slower than originally planned and progress in implementing key structural 
reforms and improving administrative capacity has been limited.  Nevertheless, a number 
of changes have been implemented and liberalization is an objective. 
  
31. The Romanian government has committed itself to increasing domestic 
production of oil and gas in order to reduce the country's reliance on imports.  
Restructuring of the gas industry has commenced with the “unbundling” of Romgaz into 
divisions for storage, production and transmission.  A regulatory authority, the National 
Agency for Natural Gas Reserves, (ANRGN) has been created and continues to oversee 
the industry and introduce legislation, often with one eye on EU requirements with the 
intention of aiding Romania’s accession process to the EU.  Liberalization of the gas 
market has commenced with the creation of a free market to Eligible Customers, typically 
the largest gas consumers.  However, Romania has been inconsistent in how it has 
applied the energy reform. A timeline of the main events in the Romanian legislation is 
shown below:  
Main Events in Romanian Legislation 
1990 Passed first energy reform 
1996 Introduction of the Petroleum Law 
2000 ANRGN was established  
2001 Romanian Energy Legislative was updated  
2001 ANRGN re-opened the gas market 
2002 New list of Eligible Customers 
                 Source: Gas Strategies 
 
32. As part of the Romanian energy reform passed in 1990, the sector was 
reorganized by separating policy and regulation from operation and function.  On the 
production side, regional divisions were created to better manage output and supply, 
aided by commercial companies providing more centralized support.  The intention was 
to break up the large, cumbersome companies inherited from the centrally planned 
economy of the Soviet era.  In fact, little alteration was seen in practice as the inertia and, 
in some cases, hostility of existing bureaucracies proved resistant to change.  As regards 
liberalization of the gas industry hardly any progress was made and the industry remained 
in the hands of the gas monopoly, Romgaz. 
 
33. A second major change was introduced in the Petroleum Law passed in February 
1996, which provided the legal framework for the operation of both Romanian and 
foreign companies.  The law introduced third party access (TPA) to gas pipelines. The 
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TPA was granted to other parties and the market was opened to a limited number of 
largest industrial gas consumers. In 2000, Romania established a National Agency for 
Natural Gas Reserves (ANRGN).  The Agency is responsible for issuing licenses, 
drafting operational legislation, establishing gas tariffs, and monitoring the observance of 
competition rules.  All cross-subsidies have been reportedly removed in these sectors 
though in practice this is not easy to verify. The establishment of ANRGN as the national 
gas regulator is intended to be the main step towards creating a tool that, in the context of 
a free market, will: increase the security of supplying natural gas; facilitate free market 
transactions between licensed suppliers and eligible consumers; improve the dispatching 
and distribution system; optimize the delivery parameters for natural gas by specifying 
the precise quantities and pressures to be delivered by a direct contractual relationship 
between client and supplier. The Prime Minister appoints the president of ANRGN. The 
energy sector is under the supervision of the Ministry of Industries and Resources, which 
formulates policy and strategy.  
  
34. However, the gas sector has been subject to considerable shifts in policy over the 
last three years.  Whereas 15% of the market used to be open through licensed suppliers 
and eligible customers, the government suspended all bilateral contracts in October 2000 
as winter supply shortages threatened domestic supplies.  In July 2001 it re-opened 10% 
of the market to competition and the regulatory authority selected 18 new eligible 
customers, who were free to switch suppliers and operate in a “liberalized” market.  In 
2002 the regulator ANRGN selected 45 eligible customers with a minimum consumption 
of 5 MMcm in the previous year, with the intention of opening more than 25% of the 
national gas market to competitive pressure. As more eligible customers qualify for this 
status it is planned to have 33% of the market for gas in competition by 2006.  Eligible 
customers are natural gas consumers that have the right to select their own supplier and to 
contract directly, having access to the transport/distribution network.  They have the right 
to connect to and use the transport/distribution network.  To qualify as an eligible 
customer the entity has to meet fairly strict criteria in different areas of activity.  New 
eligible consumers have to re-apply for accreditation on an annual basis.  Re-qualification 
as eligible is not automatic. Eligibility commences on 31st January.  The consumer loses 
the status of eligible customer if it does not fulfill its obligations under the contract 
concluded with the chosen supplier.  In the event of contract breach the supplier can ask 
ANRGN for the suspension or cancellation of accreditation for the eligible customer.  An 
independent producer can sell gas directly to an eligible customer if it is a licensed 
supplier. 
  
35. Captive Customers are all customers that are not defined and qualified as eligible.  
One exception is Termoelectrica, the national electricity producer, (a de facto captive 
customer), a company that is not qualified as eligible but may be allowed to directly 
negotiate imported gas supply under contracts.  As it is also the largest gas consumer in 
Romania, the reform of the electricity sector will undoubtedly affect the gas demand of 
Termoelectrica.  As Termoelectrica restructures it may privatize a number of power 
plants, which may become Eligible Customers in their own right.  The captive customers 
may only buy from the distribution companies at the ANRGN regulated price.  Gas prices 
have been adjusted to reflect production costs and they are now indexed with the US 
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dollar.  The eligible customers may choose to buy either from distribution companies or 
from licensed traders/suppliers.  They can also buy from importers but only if the selling 
party holds a license to sell/distribute gas. There are a number of independent suppliers 
and importers who successfully supply gas directly to industrial customers.  Romania has 
thus managed to open its gas market to large industrial consumers since it introduced 
non-discriminatory TPA.  Apart from the Baltic republics, Romania is the only country in 
Central and Eastern Europe where liberalization has been successfully introduced. 
Although legislation was already introduced in 1990 the process only started once the 
transparent TPA was introduced in 1996. Nevertheless, there are some problems with the 
gas liberalization, because the complexity of the legislation and strict criteria mean that 
many industrial consumers are unaware that they could qualify, and thereby acquire 
access to the gas transit system and contract for new supplies. However, these are 
bureaucratic difficulties rather than real obstructions to the liberalization.  
 
Germany 
 
36. The liberalization process in Germany is largely driven by EU directives. 
Germany has been one of the slowest to adopt the EU directive, and it only became law 
in 11 April 2003, when the federal government passed the amendment to the 1998 
German Energy Law. Germany is virtually alone in attempting to implement the EU third 
party access agreement by means of a negotiated rather than a regulated mechanism. The 
system of negotiated TPA to pipelines as it has developed in Germany since 1998 is 
based on private, voluntary industry agreements, the so-called Verbandevereinbarungen. 
These agreements set common pricing guidelines for industry participants, but are 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis by the parties involved.  
 
37. The chronology of liberalization process in Germany is outlined below: 
Chronology of the German Gas Market Liberalization Process 
1998 April - German Energy Law passed, June - EU Directive passed 
2000 July - German VVI for gas agreed 
2001 March – First amendment to VVI for gas agreed 
2002 March – at Barcelona summit Germany succeeds opt out from EU 
requirement to set up regulator, May – German VVII for gas signed  
2003 February – EU amendments to original energy directive passed, April – 
industry talks on German VVIII for gas break down, German government 
passes amendment to Energy Law, September – German gas code VVII 
expires 
2004 Q1 – German government to finalize regulatory framework, July – German 
regulatory framework comes into force 
Source: Gas Strategies 
 
38. At present Germany still has no independent regulator. Instead it has a system of 
self-regulation based on voluntary agreements between industry participants.  Germany’s 
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Federal Cartel Office (FCO) carries out the supervision on an ex-post basis, which is a 
government-funded but independent entity responsible for ensuring that German business 
adheres to national and EU competition law.  FCO has the power to investigate network 
access charges when it has grounds for suspecting that prices are excessive, both in 
response to customers’ complaints and on its own initiative. It has the power to reduce 
the price.  However, German transmission and storage charges are well above the 
relevant EU average.  Although the EU’s legal requirement that all member states 
establish an energy regulator by July 1, 2004 is that it still leaves a lot of discretion to the 
governments of each member state in deciding on the nature and scope of the regulatory 
framework.  
 
39. The German gas industry is concentrated at the transmission level but extremely 
fragmented at the distribution level.  The distribution level is very politicized because it is 
dominated by municipal-utility companies that generate much needed finances to the 
municipal authorities, which are currently experiencing severe budgetary difficulties.  
The financing of municipalities is a major concern to the federal government and thus 
government decision on the regulator will be influenced by this factor.  
 
40. German gas market is currently theoretically free and 100% open to competition 
but this is only theory. In practice change has been limited and very slow.  However, 
court cases under domestic and European competition law have opened up volumes under 
old long-term contracts to competition.  But little has changed at the customer end 
because Germany has opted for negotiated third-party access, which has not so far 
brought down network charges sufficiently for competitors to make real inroads into the 
market.  Storage is still a particularly difficult area.  The vagueness of the EU Gas 
Directive originally gave incumbents hope that, although they had been obliged to 
concede the principal of third party access to pipes, they might be able to eviscerate the 
overall impact of that measure by denying access to storage.  In Germany access to 
storage is particularly important for new suppliers looking to use Interconnector gas 
because the Interconnector is a sub-sea pipeline, which closes for maintenance for about 
two weeks per year (and has recently suffered unplanned downtime as a result of liquid 
incursion).  Therefore without storage somewhere it cannot be a source of firm gas.  
Without storage facilities in Germany, close to customers, a supplier has no hope of 
offering seasonally structured gas on competitive terms. 
 
41. In July 2003 the German gas industry group, the BGW, published a survey of 700 
grid operators, as well as TPA contracts which had been agreed since July 2000 when the 
Verbändevereinbarung Gas agreement became effective.  Around 469 TPA contracts had 
been made since July 2000, with approximately 180 of these agreements being signed 
between the beginning of the current gas year and April 2003.  The survey indicated that, 
since July 2000, there had been a tripling of the cumulated gas volumes, reaching a total 
of around 77.5 billion kWh in April, which had been transported via TPA contracts.  
However, the consumer lobby group, VIK, was critical of the methodology used by the 
BGW. The group suggested that the number of TPA contracts was small in relation to the 
700 active grid operators, but more significantly, the number of contracts was 
unimpressive when compared to the number of transportation cases underlying the TPA 
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contracts, which had not been included in the BGW statistics.  The VIK explained that if 
a gas supplier transports gas across Germany, the supplier may require several TPA 
contracts in order to ship the gas through various grid systems.  The BGW had, for the 
purposes of the survey, simply added up all contracts which represented a distortion of 
actual competition.  On the grid operator’s side, a large number of contracts have 
involved major gas distributors. 
 
42. The EU Directives impose obligations on Germany in two specific areas: one is 
legal unbundling which is to be introduced to prevent cross-subsidization among 
company divisions; and the other is stricter ex-ante regulation in relation to conditions for 
network access and fees for network use.  The structure of the German gas market, with 
several providers across the municipalities, may yet prove to be a favorable landscape for 
the emergence of competition.  The lack of transparency of TPA and regulatory 
framework resulted in the slow process of gas liberalization in Germany.  As regards gas 
liberalization within the EU Germany has become the laggard among the member’s 
countries.  As a result no customer group in Germany has enjoyed falling end-user prices 
since the process of liberalization started.  Other EU members on the other hand have 
achieved falling end-user prices over the same period despite the rise in gas border price 
since 2000. Moreover, not only are German prices high compared to the EU average; 
they have actually risen for small commercial customers and for households. 
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Appendix 3 
The State Program for the Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector 
of the Azerbaijan Republic (2005 – 2015) 
 
Summary Description 
 
The State Program for the Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector of the Azerbaijan 
Republic (2005 – 2015) was approved by Presidential Decree on February 14, 2005.  The 
Ministry of Industry and Energy has been designated as the coordinating agency for this 
program. 
 
The overall goal of this program is to fully meet demand for power, gas and other energy 
resources through the continued development of the fuel and energy sector.  The program 
also focuses on sector restructuring, the installation of modern equipment and the 
introduction of management systems suitable for operating in a market economy.  
Specific aims of the program include: 
 
• the identification of priority areas for development;  
• improvements in the production, processing, transport, storage, accounting and 
consumption of energy resources;  
• the enhancement of operational effectiveness and compliance with best practice; 
• an improvement in utility collection rates;  
• an increase in sector investment;  
• the provision of an enabling environment for competition; and 
• ensuring environmental safety. 
 
Between 2005 and 2015, the State’s upstream oil and gas program will focus on 
development of the oil and gas industry and modernization of the processing and refining 
sector.  Specific activities will focus on new field exploration; full scale development of 
discovered fields; drilling programs and the modernization of facilities in operated fields; 
and the construction, rehabilitation and modernization of production, transport, refining 
and processing facilities.  
 
In the upstream oil and gas sector, Azerbaijan has been successful in attracting foreign 
investment (to the tune of US$13 billion) and 23 exploration and development contracts 
have been entered into with foreign investors105.  Over the period 2006 to 2008 further 
foreign investments totaling US$ 10 – 12 billion are expected for the Phase 2 
development of the ACG (Western and Southern Azeri) field.  Other activities associated 
with the development of the Azeri, Chirag and Gunashli fields, the BTC and South 
Caucasus pipelines and the Sangachal facilities are also expected to continue. 
 
                                                 
105 This includes 4 significant and ongoing projects: full field development of the ACG field; the first stage 
development of the Shah Deniz gas condensate field; construction of the BTC main export pipeline; and 
construction of the BTE South Caucasus pipeline. 
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The gas sector serves all large cities and 32 regional centers in Azerbaijan.  
Approximately 8 bcm of natural gas are transported (50% from imports) and 67,000 
meters have been installed for residential consumers to date.  The State’s development 
program will continue with and accelerate the metering program and expand coverage to 
other consumer groups.  Emphasis will be placed on improving financial discipline in the 
gas sector including the resolution of collection, payment and mutual debt issues; excess 
loss reduction; and an improvement in gas quality and sales. Technical capacity will be 
developed in Azerigaz JSC.   
 
Domestic demand for natural gas is expected to increase to a level of about 5.4 – 5.9 bcm 
per year with natural gas being the primary fuel source for the power sector106.  Domestic 
supplies will only be able to meet this need from 2009 due to other competing demands 
within the economy.  Gas imports will fill the gap in the interim.   
 
There has been a sharp decline in power generation capacity (4289 MW available 
compared to 5735 MW installed capacity) due to aging and under-maintained equipment. 
At the same time demand has increased.  Residential consumers account for 70 – 75% of 
power demand107 using power largely for heating purposes.  Around 50% of consumption 
takes place in the Absheron Peninsula while the main generation facilities are located to 
the west of Azerbaijan increasing technical losses and fuel transportation costs and 
affecting system stability.  There are sharp disparities in power supply between regions, 
with Lenkaran, Shaki-Zagatala and Guba-Khachmaz being most affected due to technical 
constraints in the system. 
 
To meet the expected growth in demand (4.7% per annum to 2015)108, the State’s 
program will develop generation capacity up to 6500 – 7000 MW by 2015, with new 
capacity being located closer to consumers.  This will be achieved through the 
modernization of existing generation facilities109, the construction of new thermal power 
facilities and the use of renewable energy resources.   These measures will also serve to 
improve fuel efficiency110. Generation capacity is expected to be increased through a 
combination of State owned (88.3%) and private facilities (11.7%).   
 
To ensure reliable and continuous power supply, system forming transmission lines will 
be reconstructed together with relevant sub-stations.  Similar works will be conducted in 
the distribution sector.  System losses and theft will be reduced; and energy efficiency 
and accounting will also be focal points for the development program.  
 
                                                 
106 Mazut (fuel oil) will cover 15- 20% of fuel supply and consumption needs 
107 In contrast with developed countries were residential demand is typically in the range 25 – 30% 
108 Based on the projected GDP trend in the non oil sector from 2004 – 2015. 
109 Mostly at Azerbaijan DRES and Mingchevir SES 
110 Conventional fuel use at thermal power facilities is predicted to decline from 407 gr/kWh in 2002 to 250 
gr/ kWh in 2015  
